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“SENTENCING”: A FOREWORD
The Hon. Mr. Justice M. D. Kirby
Chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission
The Dilemma of Sentencing
A proverb is ascribed to theChinese which captures something of the
dilemma of sentencing which emerges from these pages:
“Beat your child once a day. Ifyou don‘t know why, he does”.
It is because we cannot secure entire agreement about the rationale for
sentencing that disparities appear to arise in the maximum (and sometimes
minimum) sentences allowed by Parliament and the individual sentences
imposed by judicial officers for apparently like offences. Theories, of course,
abound. They range from the Removal from Society, Denunciation, Retribution
and Deterrence theories, at the one end of the spectrum to the Restoration,
Compensation, Behaviour Modiﬁcation and Rehabilitation theories at the
other. Unfortunately, the theorists’ language is sometimes used loosely by
practitioners. Judge Roden points out that all too frequently “deterrent”
sentences are synonymous with “heavy” sentences; “rehabilitation” becomes
synonymous with “light”. The aim of deterrence is to modify conduct, for fear
of the consequences. Yet if the consequences are perceived to be remote, or
are not known or appear to be applied unequally and irrationally by the courts,
a “deterrent” sentence is not likely to have the desired result. Judge Roden
illustrates this point by reference to the comparative severity typically visited
upon those convicted of culpable driving causing death by the same judges
who deal lightly with appeals against sentence on conviction of driving under the
influence. The conduct may be precisely the same in each case. Only the
consequences may distinguish the two crimes. '
Beside disagreement on the fundamental aim of sentencing, many other
factors are identified in this seminar as the cause of apparent disparity in
sentences. They include the incomplete perceptions often conveyed by
inadequate reporting of the full facts ofa case, the inconsistent legislative policy
which arises from the piecemeal amendment of the Statute Book and the erosion
of fine values by the passage of time, the separate trial of co-criminals and the
individuality ofjudges and magistrates, who have the function of imposing the
sentence. The speed with which many sentences have to be passed, particularly
in the Magistrates’ Courts and uneven fact presentation, inherent in the
adversary trial, all contribute to some degree of inequality in the sentences
imposed for like offences in Australian courts. Should we be concerned about
this? Is it anything more than a feature of human justice? Are the inequalities
at an acceptable level? What should we do about them?
F—7
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Equality is Justice
There is no doubt that perceptions of unequal sentences or apparently
excessive or (more usually) inadequate sentences agitate our community from
time to time. Examples are mentioned in the seminar and many will spring to
the mind of the average reader. It seems to be assumed that equal “guilt” will
be equally punished. Dr. Francis and Dr. Coyle have set about testing
scientifically the degree of variance in penalties imposed by different magistrates
for like offences. In order to reduce the experiment. to the greatest degree of
objectivity possible, a videotape procedure has been adopted, by which
component parts can be varied, in order to test the relative importance of
multiple factors including age, appearance, sex, racial origin, the offence and
so on. The results so far emerging from their work are recounted in this report.
They suggest that the more extravagant claims of variance in sentencing are
simply not borne out, if the videotape experiment is reliable.
Judge Roden, in his paper and oral comments, questions the fundamental
assumption that sentences should be equal in every case. So long as individuals
impose a sentence with discretionary powers conferred, within limits, by
Parliament, it is inevitable that disparities will arise. This is a feature of human
justice. What some condemn as disparity and inequality, others applaud as
ﬂexibility and individualised decision-making.
One reﬂection of the concern in some quarters about inequality in
sentencing and the alleged inadequacy of some sentences is the current moves,
especially in the United States, towards mandatory minimum sentences which
reduce the judicial officer’s options, once a defendant has been convicted of‘a
particular offence. A like reform reﬂected in the Criminal Code Reform Act
of I977 (S.l437) now before the United States Congress seeks to define crimes
with precision and to assign specified sentences to particular offences, listing
aggravating and mitigating circumstances that can modify the penalty. Various
suggestions are contained in these papers, designed to reduce inequalities in
sentencing, short of passing the problem from thejudicial arm ofgovernment to
the legislature, by the adoption of fixed penalties. The suggestions include the
special training of judges and magistrates (including by the use of videotape
techniques), regular meetings amongst them to discuss sentencing practices,
the provision of greater legislative guidance concerning the hierarchy of crimes
and the introduction of improved reporting of appeals against magistrates’
sentences, for the guidance of the lower courts where the great bulk of
sentencing is done.
Alternatives to Imprisonment
A major theme to emerge is the need to consider alternatives to
imprisonment. The range of alternatives available will inevitably raise the
objections of those who seek complete equality in penalties imposed for
apparently like conduct. if there is but one penalty, for example, death or a
fixed term of imprisonment, equality may, superﬁcially, be achieved. However,
in any system of individualised justice, this approach is bound to leave many
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dissatisﬁed. For example, a money fine falls unequally upon the middle class
and afﬂuent, on the one hand, and the unemployed on the other. Imprisonment
has well identified social inefficiences as a correctional measure. Furthermore,
it is extremely labour-intensive and costly and achieves little discernable positive
good either for society as a whole or for the victims of crime. A recent
announcement by the Minister for Welfare in Queensland, Mr. Herbert,
estimated that the average cost of keeping a prisoner in a Queensland gaol was
$33,000 per year. allowing for $9,000 loss of wages by the prisoner and
payments of social security to the prisoner’s dependants. By comparison, the
cost of supervising a person on probation or parole was about $300 per year.
Considerations of this kind have taken criminologists and lawyers to the
scrutiny of alternatives to imprisonment. The recommendations of the
Australian Delegation to the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and Treatment of Offenders in Geneva in September 1975 included a
recommendation that consideration should be given by the Commonwealth and
State Governments to:
“the revision of the laws with respect to sentencing to promote the greater
use of alternatives to imprisonment, having regard to the costs and other
unsatisfactory features of the punishment of imprisonment. Such a
revision should take into account the need to rationalise existing
provisions, fill in gaps that exist in their operation, develop new
alternatives, introduce sentencing principles and criteria, and establish a
legislative intent that imprisonment is to be used only as a last resort”.
The Parliaments of the United Kingdom and New Zealand have already enacted
restrictions on imprisonment. Section 20 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act
1973 (UK) provides that a court shall not pass sentence ofimprisonment on a
person who has attained the age of 21 and has not previously been sentenced to
imprisonment unless the court is of the opinion that no other method of
dealing with him is appropriate. Section 43A of the Criminal Justice Act 1954
(N.Z.) likewise provides that no court shall sentence any person to imprisonment
for a term of less than six months unless “having regard to all the circumstances
of the case, including the nature of the person’s offence and his character and
personal history, the court has formed the opinion that no way of dealing with
him other than imprisonment is appropriate”.
These statements of legislative recognition of the potentially harmful
effects of incarceration, so that it is relegated to the position of a measure of
last resort, obviously require the closest possible attention to the provision of
sentences, alternative to imprisonment. Attention was given to this subject in the
seminar.
Among the alternatives, some of which were indentified and discussed are
the following:
Recognizance
Fines, including “day fines” i.e. a fine expressed in terms of average
earnings not money
Compensation and restitution orders
Probation
Periodic detention
Suspended sentences
Attendance centre orders
Community work orders
Work release orders.
*
*
The alternative of community service orders attracted the keenest attention
of the seminar, the experiments in Tasmania and Western Australia being
described. The most hopeful statistic of all was provided by Mr. J. P. McAvoy
of the Probation and Parole Service who suggested that experience in England
has shown in one scheme that 40% of offenders, after finishing their compulsory
community service order, actually continued to work with the community
group in a voluntary capacity. Amidst all the pessimistic statistics on the effect
of institutional rehabilitation, this figure may bear a message ofhope.
Sixth United Nations Congress
The Sixth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
Treatment of Offenders will take place in Sydney in August 1980. The assembly
of this major Congress in Australia will bring to this country nearly 2,000
Ministers, Judges, Academics and other leaders in the fields oflaw, criminology, ,.,_
police corrections, social welfare and allied disciplines. The spotlight of attention
will be placed upon Australia’s criminal justice system generally and the
treatment of offenders, in particular. The agenda for the Congress will most
likely include the self-same subjects as are debated in these pages. Australia,
which began its colonial history as a penal colony, has special reasons to give
urgent attention to the punishment and treatment of offenders and the
principles and policies which should guide those who sentence them. The debate
recorded here has value in identifying some of the major themes that will have
to be addressed. Identifying the problems may be the beginning of wisdom.
i
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THE SENTENCING PROCESS: A NEW EMPIRICAL APPROACH
Ronald D. Francis, MA., Ph.D., Dip. Crim., F.A.P.S.
Senior Lecturer, Department of Applied Psychology,
Caulfreld Institute of Technology;
Honorary Senior Research Fellow, Department
of Psychology, La Trobe University
and
[an R. Coyle, B.A., Ph.D.,
Consultant, Hays Associates (Australasia) Ltd.,
Honorary Research Fellow, Department of
Psychology, La Trobe University.
Writing in 1971 Hogarth opens his book with the quotation:
“There is no decision in the criminal process that is so complicated and so
difficult to make as that of the sentencingjudge.”
It is to this brief that the article is addressed; the court processes have for
centuries been concerned with the adjudicatory and dispositional aspects. The
adjudicatory process is circumscribed and guided by rules and precepts that
exercise strict control to ensure that the finding part of the proceedings retain
the rights of the accused. The dispositional part of the process, the application
of the penalty, is not circumscribed by strict safeguards and is very much a
fallible human process.
It is difficult to see exactly what safeguards one should introduce into ‘ -
dispositional stage but some suggestions will be presented at the end of in.
paper
Among the reasons for selecting the lower courts sentencing for study is
the fact that over 95% of all cases heard by courts are heard in the lower court
system and the sentences in the overwhelming majority of cases are given
without extended consideration. This should not be construed as a criticism for
if the system is to function at all it must do so with reasonable dispatch.
This paper deals with decision making in the court process. As indicated in
Figure 1, the emphasis is with criminal rather than civil jurisdiction in the
lower courts. Further, the focus is on dispositional factors (both legal and
g non-legal) rather than adjudicatory factors.
Interest in the application of penalties is not of recent origin. However,
research and public debate in this area has been mediated by a number of
factors. These include such factors as the apparent denial of natural justice in
the dispositional aspect of criminal proceedings and the possibility of empirical
l4- _ ,5:
‘-"-‘-" .. Figurel
‘ , . .u.
DECISION MAKiNG‘AND THE SENTENCING PROCESS
‘ ' urn; , .‘.' .
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‘ £7
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Q l
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investigations Of decision making and how they may be modiﬁed. Fox and
O’Brien2 refer to‘Sir James Stephens, writing in 1863 on the capriciousness of
sentencing in the criminal law:
“ ......without consultation, advice or guidance of any description whatever
yet the sentence is the gist of the proceeding, it is to the trial what the
bullet is to the powder.” .
¥
The extent of the jurisdiction of the courts is, of course, extensive but there
are particular problems with this wide ranging authority. For instance, how does
one deal with aliens and on what occasions are deportations appropriately
,ordered? Devlin3 also points out the distinction between recommendations for
deportation of aliens and of Commonwealth citizens and thus illustrates how
complicated the issue may become. How should one deal with the offences
committed outside the jurisdiction and what should one reasonably do with
the mentally disordered offender?
*
‘1. Hogarth, J ., Sentencing as a Human Process. University of Toronto Press: Toronto,
1971 '
2. Fox,.R. G. and O’Brien, B. M., Fact-ﬁnding for Sentencers. Melbourne University
Law Review, 1975 10 pp 163-206.
3. Dgevlin, 11%, Sentencing Offenders in Magistrates Courts. Sweet and Maxwell: London,
1 70. p 7.
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The application of sentences in terms of their appropriateness and also the
issue of disparity have been the concern of the majority of empirical studies.
There is, however, a case to be made for disparity in sentencing. Bartholomew
has pointed out that certain pathological conditions may be regarded as cases
deserving of special and/or different treatment. Further, he goes on to discuss
whether the object of punishment is to inﬂict hurt without consideration of
iother matters.5 It will be appreciated that the distinction, in the aims of
' sentencing, between punishment and reform may be yet further complicated
by a third category that we might call “treatment”. A hard and fast distinction
is, of course, a difﬁcult one to draw. Stealing may be seen as a straightforward
criminal matter but if it becomes known that the objects stolen were always
frilly underwear, this may be construed to mean that there is some kind of fetish
or perhaps a mental disorder and that may shade into yet more serious types of
pathology. In these cases involving psychiatry and the law there is the added
difﬁculty of conﬁdentiality. In ordering a psychiatric report the court obliges
the accused to be examined by a psychiatrist, thereby placing the forensic
psychiatrist in a position of appearing to be a quasi-judicial person for it will be
clear to the accused that what he tells the psychiatrist will have a powerful
bearing upon the sentence handed down. Thus, instead of the conventional
conﬁdential relationship that normally obtains between a medical practitioner
and patient, in the legal context the object of the consultation can be to make
the information public rather than keep it private. Further, the aim of the
conventional medical consultation is the primary interest of the patient. In this
forensic context its aim may be quite the contrary. '
The conventionally stated aims of punishment are deterrence, both speciﬁc
and general. There may be other aims such as rehabilitation. The conflict
between the deterrence and reform is-frequently not made clear and, even if it
were, would still present difficult problems in sentencing. For this
Bartholomew6 coins the neologism “punitherapy”. Walker7 in discussing the
aims of a penal system, outlines what he believes to be a mistaken assumption,
that penal philosophy is just a sector of moral philosophy under a more
fashionable name. The points Walker raises in that chapter again show that there
are a variety of issues which are interlocked and about which many sentencing
magistrates must be unaware.
 
Among the many issues in sentencing is the one concerned with personal
responsibility. On the one hand Wootton8 has argued that the problem of
responsibility need not be an issue in the courts. She holds that the courts
should be concerned only with the question of “did this person commit this
offence?” and, secondly, “what should the court do about it?” The contrary
view is discussed by Johnston9 where he presents the notion that offenders
 
——
Bartholomew, A. A., Psychiatry and Sentencing. In Section 5 of Cha
ppell
and Wilson. The Australian Criminal Justice System,Butterwor
ths: Sydney (1977) p317.
ibid. p321.
ibid. p333.
Walker, N., Sentencing in a Rational Society. Pelican: Harmondworth, 1969, p1
5.
Wootton, B., Social Science and Social Pathology. George Allen and Unwin: London, 1959.
Johnston, S. W., The Utilitarian Does Something Useful. In section 5 of
Chappell and Wilson, op.cit. p274.
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should still keep their rights as human beings and be treated as morally
responsible. In this context Johnston discusses the indeterminant sentence
and goes on to conclude that the test of logic is not the primary but the test of
community mores is.
In sentencing, the presiding judge or magistrate hands down a penalty that
in some way reﬂects the commission of an offence and, also, the prevalence of
that offence in recent times. The penalty may be a sort of social advertisement
of society‘s standards and the imposition of penalties, such as extended prison
terms, may take cognizance of the probable future behaviour of the offender.
Walkerloin speaking of the assumptions of the sentencing system, states that
the most venerable and fundamental of them all is that the sentencer should
deal ’only with the offender. It is clear to the present writers that that
assumption is a questionable one. Devlinlldiscusses the available dispensations
that the court may use and he uses the alliterative terms Reformation,
Rehabilitation, Retribution, Reprobation, Reparation and Reductivism, pointing
out that with this vast array of available sentences, some are bound to be foolish. 
In recent times one of the sources of information available to the courts is
the pre-sentence report. This is an example of the principle that the bench
should have access to expert professional advice, but it is unrealistic to expect
a-judge to acquire proﬁciency in a wide range of social sciences. In this context
one of the most signiﬁcant precedents established in recent times is that of the
Portolesi case12 in which it was successfully argued by Counsel that the
formulation of sentencing policy can be properly informed by the presentation
to the court of criminological arguments and data. This principle is no longer
accepted having been upset by a decision of the High Court in the case of Lyon
and Ors.
Among the problems of the principle of pre-sentence reports is that of
disclosure. The anonymity of informants should afford a measure of protection
to them but when viewed from a civil liberties perspective it will be seen that if
the defendant does not have the right of access to the report he is not in a
position to rebut those allegations which may be prejudicial to him, and which
may also be false. Fox and O’Brienl3state:
“ ...... a case may be made for legal representation and disclosure only to
Counsel, but total non-disclosure is unacceptable.”
On the matter of natural justice, Fox and O’Brien14 also say:
u
...... failure to allow a defendant or his Counsel an opportunity to be heard
on sentence clearly constitutes a reviewable denial of natural justice and
failure by a court to obtain sufﬁcient facts upon which to found a sentence
may entirely vitiate the sentencing discretion.”
—
10. Walker, op. cit, p139.
. 11. Devlin, op. cit.
12. R vPortoIesi. 1973 1 NSWLR 105
13. Fox and O’Brien, op. cit, p200.
14. ibid p169
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There are two basic approaches to sentencing, one of them the legal and the
other human decision-making process, although of course this distinction is only
made for analytic purposes since in the courts themselves they, are factors that
operate jointly. Of the ﬁrst, legal issues, the authors cited in the preceding
sections are representative. (See also: Thomas15 for a deﬁnitive analysis.) Of the
second, perhaps the best known studies are those of Hood16 and Hogarth”.
In the latter studies, Hogarth, for instance, did an analysis of the decisions of 71
magistrates in over 2000 real cases and he examines a variety of issues in that
context, including the background characteristics of magistrates and the penal
philosophies that they hold.
From the decision-making point of view the present authors regard the
sentencing process as having a number of problems. Firstly, there are no
properly constituted guide lines for sentencing as there are for trials (while
recognising that it may not be possible to frame such guide lines). Secondly, the
sentencing decision is not as publicly seen as the ﬁnding decision (again
recognising that this, too, is a difﬁcult problem). Thirdly, the sentencing appears
to be done in less time and with smaller consideration than is accorded the
adjudicatory part of the process, although it may be argued that consideration is
being given to the sentence while the adjudication takes place.
Studies of sentencing such as those of Hood and Hogarth are concerned
with magistrates as agents of the law and it is very difﬁcult to ﬁnd studies which
evaluate the process rather than the agents. One example of a study which has
evaluated the sentencing process is Morris’18 article in which he points out that
in the United States the powers of the bench have been reduced in recent times
by three factors: plea-bargaining; legislatively ﬁxed terms; and parole. Perhaps
we should add another to these and that is development of the appellate system.
Some of the issues are that the appeals may pertain to the ﬁnding or to the
sentencing. If pertaining to the sentence, the appeal may be against leniency and
severity and on the type of penalty imposed. There has also been a great increase
in the range of options available to the bench in sentencing. In addition to the
conventional options such as prison and ﬁnes in the Australian context new
options have recently become available, such as work release programmes and
'community service orders. Brooke-Taylor and Booth” in a British context, list
21 options available to the bench. In this respect, then, the decision-making
process in sentencing is very much more difﬁcult than it is in determining
innocence or guilt, where there are only two alternatives.
Of the various ways of solving the problems in sentencing, empirical
research is but one. It is argued here that it is a very powerful method of
investigation but we would not wish to argue that it is the only form.
15. Thomas, D. A.,Principles of Sentencing. Heinemann: London, 1970.
16. Hood, R. G., Sentencing in Magistrates Courts. Stevens and Sons: London, 1962.
17. Hogarth, op. cit. _
18. Morris, N., Sentencing and Parole. A.L.J. 51 (1977) pp 523-531
19. Brooke-Taylor, J. C., and Booth, D. H., A Magistrate Court Handbook. Barry Rose:
London, 1974.
18
Cross 2° suggests that it is necessary to put a curb on undue optimism that
research will solve all the problems associated with sentencing. As he point out,
there are two major difficulties: the difficulty of performing the necessary
experiments without perpetrating an injustice; and the fact that some of the
most interesting questions are not capable of resolution by empirical research.
While recognising that empirical research will not solve all the problems
associated with sentencing, this paper presents an innovative approach to
impirical investigation of the sentencing process that is economical, realistic and
which does not perpetrate injustice.
In using an empirical approach to sentencing there are two basic
methodologies. One is to use a vast array of information, as was the case with
the Hogarth 21 study referred to earlier. In this approach minor variations
between cases is accommodated by the analysis of a great number of cases.
The alternative approach is to use a few cases and simulate realism while keeping
the points under investigation in strict and precise control. Sentencing exercises
commonly do this and in such cases either transcripts or enactment are used.
Some time ago the writers tried the technique of sending teams of senior
students out to observe in courts and to choose cases that were comparable.
This approach did not work as it was not possible to ﬁnd cases that were exactly
comparable. It was also very uneconomical of time.
The simulation approach was tried but it is unreasonable to expect
experienced magistrates to give their time to produce only one item of
information for each case.
Transcript reading was also tried and that lacked the necessary element of
realism. Sentences are decided after seeing and hearing a defendant as well as
gaining the facts of the case.
The procedure ultimately adopted was to videotape cases and present
those to magistrates for sentencing.
The first instance of making the videotapes had actors simulating the court
roles. These tapes (B/W) were made in the media centre at La Trobe University.
When shown to the magistrates they offered the advice that the addition of
colour would be a help, and that professionals should play their own roles.
A second series was made, in colour videotape, and with a professional
director. In this second instance the videotaping was done at the National Film
and TV. School in Sydney. Here the parts of S.M., police prosecutor, clerk,
policeman, detective, etc., were all played by the appropriate professionals in
their own roles. The only exception was that the parts of the defendants were
played by students from the N.S.W. College of Law. (For a fuller description of
the technique, see pages 30-31).
—_
‘20. Cross, R., The English Sentencing System. Butterworths: London (1975) p178.
21. Hogarth, op. cit.
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In this professionally produced series there are several important points
to note. Firstly, the production was professional. Secondly, the addition of
colour made the presentation more realistic. Thirdly, the courtroom roles were
played by people who did that as an occupation. (This, as it turned out, had the
dual merit of using people who needed no tutoring and, when shown to
magistrates, the cases were accepted as realistic since the magisterial viewers
knew that the enactment was by professionals who thoroughly understood
what they were doing.) Fourthly, the videotaped cases were available for re-use
and being a recorded medium were presented as invariable from one occasion to
the next.
To these substantial advantages the writers added one important
ingredient. When the cases were ﬁlmed each part of the judicial process was
videotaped separately. The identification (Are you Robin Wallace, born
Melbourne 27 April, 1950, technician of 18 Holmes Grove, Burwood) was
shot as a unit. Similarly, the charge (You are charged with offensive behaviour
on 14 May this year in that you did ...... ). Each section of the trial thus became a
module.
Some of the modules were reshot as, for example, the identification which
on one occasion would have the same facts except that one was changed. For
instance, the birth date was changed from, say, 1950 to 1940 or the birthplace
from Melbourne to Zagreb, Yugoslavia.
This is particularly advantageous in that the modules may be combined
in different ways. For example, a case could be produced that involved an older
or a younger defendant, a migrant or a native defendant, appearing on any one
of a series of charges. The editing simply consists of selecting the particular
modules of interest and recording from them in order to construct a case. Edited
factors of this kind have been referred to as “tape” factors.
Figure 2 .
THE VIDEOTAPE MODULAR TECHNIQUE FOR SENTENCING
Module 1 Module 2 Module 3 Module 4 Sentence
(Identification) (Charge) (Plea) (Evidence)
Male/female (2) Assault Guilty No record
Migrant/native (2) Stealing Not guilty No record
for these
Younger/older (2) Drugs offences
~ RecordM t
O oring for these
offences
Eight possible Four Three
combinations possibles possibles
8 X 4 X 3 = 96 cases
 
‘ 96 cases X 2 types of psychiatric report = 192 cases
192 cases X 2 types of character reference = 384 cases
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From Figure 2 it is apparent that in the construction presented ther are
eight possible combinations at the identiﬁcation level. With four different types
of charge, those four may be combined in various ways with any of the eight
possible identiﬁcations, thereby producing 32 possible cases. Each of these could
be combined in various ways with any of the three combinations of prior
convictions, thereby making 96 possible cases.‘
In addition to these “tape” factors of modular combination, “ex tape”
factors have been incorporated. An example of an “ex tape” factor is the
presentation of a pre-sentence report. At the sentencing exercise, in addition to
the case to be viewed, the magistrate would receive a copy of a pre-sentence
report. For the exercise the group could be divided into two. One group could
receive a favourable report and the other an unfavourable one. By this means
our 96 possible cases would become 192. If this were to be extended by the
addition of two types of written character references, that would extend the
possibilities to 384 cases. Of course, it would not be meaningful to show all of
these cases to the same group. However, the cases are available for comparative
purposes.
It will be appreciated that this technique of modular visual units and
“ex tape” modular changes is both economical and versatile.
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant feature of the method outlined here is its
dual function. The ﬁrst feature is its use as a training device whereby hundreds
of precisely and reliably presented cases are available. The second feature is its
research function. By the use of this tightly controlled and easy to manipulate
series of cases it is possible for a researcher to indicate fairly precisely what
changes in the case produce what kind of effects.
Among the studies that have so far been conducted using the videotape
modular technique is an evaluation of the effects of group discussion on the
sentence prescribed (see page31-37). In a document produced by the British
Magistrates Association22 the value of group discussion is outlined:
“Anyone, however qualiﬁed, who acts as a judge sitting on his own, will
carefully guard against his prejudices in so far as he recognises them. But
we all have other prejudices that we do not recognise. The best way of
guarding against them is for a small group of people to act jointly as
judges. If the group is drawn from different sections of society with
different backgrounds their unrecognised prejudices will tend to even
themselves out, so that the group judgement represents the greatest
common measure of agreement and avoids individual quirks. Magistrates’
courts rarely have difﬁculty in deciding between guilty and not quilty but
often have difﬁculty over sentence. This must be a question of opinion
where several heads (and usually both sexes) are better than one. A bench
of magistrates must contain 2 - 7 people, 3 being best. In domestic cases
they must sit 3 including magistrates of both sexes.”
—
22. The Magistrates Association, Speakers Notes 2. Fitzroy Square, London. Revised
October, 1975. Document 75/30A, Section 7.
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It. is interesting to note that the videotape modular technique may be used
not only to evaluate agents of the law but also to process. Its investigative use
thus may be both procedural and substantive.
The current concern with crime in general and sentencing in particular
stems, no doubt, from its importance in the social fabric but we should keep our
sense of perspective.
Johnston23 puts this most aptly when he says:
“The courts glorify crime as being somehow more grave than industrial or
other intergroup conﬂict. We have institutionalised reasonableness in
industrial conciliation; and since the threat to social order is less from a
criminal (indeed many serious crimes actually cement the sense of
community), we should be even more reasonable there. I suspect that one
reason that people indulge a retributive philosophy with the individual
criminal is that he can not hit back: with serious industrial, political or
other inter-group conﬂict, we may be offended no less by the enemy than
we are by a criminal, but we respect the strength of his political following
and therefore do not bully but put our passions in their place, under the
rule of conciliatory reason. So it should be with the individual criminal.”
The writers would like to conclude by saying that there is much that
needs to be done in modifying the sentencing process.
Numerous suggestions on sentencing have been proffered. They include
such ideas as: remove the sentencing process from the courts; rationalise and
formalise the sentencing process though leaving it within the court’s province;
let the sentence be the result of a group decision; do net sentence immediately.
but have time to reﬂect.
The authors believe that before any such modiﬁcations are affected, the
community should keep its sense of perspective and obtain a great deal of
empirical information on the consequences of substantive and procedural
modifications.
The videotape modular technique is one method by which that
understanding may be fostered.
——
23. Johnston, op. cit. p267
“I
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Dr. R. D. Francis
My colleague Dr. Coyle and I are gratiﬁed at the invitation to present
papers at this seminar. We have been working for two or three years on the
process of sentencing, particularly in the lower courts, and have reached a.
position where we have something to say from the standpoint of behavioural
science. 1 should make it plain that we are not here to tell the experts what to
do. Although I am qualiﬁed in Criminology I am in blissful ignorance of the law
and can speak with great conﬁdence because I am not hampered by information
of any kind.
I would like to emphasise the following points:
1. (a) We believe that sentencing studies are important because there are
fewer safeguards in the trial process.
(b) There are more alternatives available in the trial process, of course, but
there are only the two alternatives in ourjUrisdiction: guilty or not guilty.
Whereas in the sentencing process there are a number of alternatives
available and they are increasing.
(c) There is a confusion about the purposes of sentencing; whether we are
reformatory, reprobation or reparation, or as Dr. Bartholomew calls it
punitive or therapy - “punitherapy”. As he says the therapy part is so
small that “puny” is perhaps an apt way to put it.
(d) The sentencing process deals not only with the offender but also it can,
of course, deal. with the way that the crimes become prevalent in the
community, and we are therefore remarking on not only what the
offender did but what the community thinks of as a warning to others.
(e) There is less time devoted to sentencing but, of course, consideration
may be given while the trial proceeds so that it looks to an outsider as
though the sentencing process takes relevantly little time. Perhaps it
should take more, and at the end of my presentation I shall have some
suggestions to offer, and finally in
(f) that we have an ignorance of the outcomes of various programs: when
sentencing does take place we do not really, know quite enough about the
outcomes of different kinds of sentence on different kinds of people. We
know for instance that the recidivism rate is fairly high and does not
change much no matter what you do. But we really need to know a great
deal more. Perhaps knowing something about the personality of the
offenders would be important.
W
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2. Sentencing in lower courts we believe is important because it deals with
the majority of cases heard and the estimates range from somewhere between
80 and 98 per cent. Some of them, of course, are heard in both jurisdictions, in
the lower courts and higher. Nonetheless it is plain that the majority of cases do
go through the lower courts.
3. The means of investigation are legal and this is the kind of work that
David Thomas of Cambridge has been addressing for some time and that is
outside our area of competence. We tried the collection of statistics. In the
lower courts the statistics are not kept in such a manner as to answer the kinds
of questions that we wish to pose. The third technique of court observation: we
have sent teams of students out observing in courts but the cases were never
comparable, so we decided on simulation.
Perhaps I should say that this project arose originally out of an entirely
distinct project. For some years we have been interested in the problem of
migrant crime and what happens to the sentencing of migrants in courts. We
made a first series in which we made a case in which the defendant was an
Australian and we changed only the segment that identified him and made him a
migrant. With the co-operation of the magistrates in the State we showed it to
two distinct groups of magistrates to see if they would sentence the migrant
differently, and the answer was that they did not. There was no discernible
difference between the sentences. We were so taken with the idea, we thought
that we would generalise it as a technique and we have come to call it the
“video-modular technique”. Instead of changing only the birthplace you can
also change other variables as well. So, basically we are interested in the
simulation process.
4. The video-modular technique is used as a training device and as a research
tool. Originally it was a research tool for the above project in migrant crime. But
plainly it can be used as a training device and most recently it has some to be
used as that for Justices of the Peace in Victoria.
5. We had to make a number of decisions about the processes that were
taking place (see Figure 1 page 14). I have described on page 18 the details
of the various series we produced, and why the changes were introduced.
Perhapsjust to emphasize threelpoints:
(a) The merits of using professionals in their own roles - they needed no
tutoring. They know what to do, and they tell us what to do when we
are wrong.
(b) We discovered, quite by accident, that if you use professional actors
you have an Actors Equity problem, involving copyright and payment of
royalties for each showing.
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(c) Perhaps the most important of all is the acceptance of the product by
the professionals. When we showed the original amateur productions to
the magistrates, who are senior and experienced, they could detect
immediately that the amateurs did not know what they were doing. By
actually using senior, experienced magistrates it makes those things most
acceptable to the practitioners themselves. They know that they are
realistic because they are done by people with decades of experience
between them and we found that was a very important feature.
6. The merit of the video-module system is the way in which we can
construct cases. In Figure 2 page 19 we have divided the court process up into
several segments. Identiﬁcation: Are you John Smith? Were you born in ....?
and so forth. Then the reading of the charge, the taking of the plea and so on
down to prior record and we have made each of these as separate segments. We
have made three series altogether. The ﬁrst series were the amateur ones, the
second series were made in The National Film School in a court which was
constructed for the purpose within the studio and the third which we completed
about three weeks ago were done in the Central Court of Petty Sessions in
Sydney by The National Film School.
In the new series the defendants can be male or female, they can be older
or younger, they can be native or migrant, they can be well dressed or ill dressed.
So we have sixteen possible combinations of defendant. There are four different
charges, assault, theft, forgery and refusing a breath test. We can combine them
with the other identifications. We have three kinds of prior record: none, three
of a similar kind, or three of a dissimilar kind. We have so made these modulars
on the tape with spaces between that you can pick up an older or younger, male
or female, defendant, or migrant-native, ill dressed - well dressed. Combine with
any of the charges, with any of the prior records, and we can end up with a
192 possible cases which are simply done by editing in the studio. We call those
“on-tape factors”. i.e. they are on the tape by editing the modules to make them
ﬁt. If you want to extend the series you can have the addition of, say, two kinds
of pre-sentence report so that twice 192 will give 384 cases: or perhaps a legal
directive, two kinds of those combined with these will give us 768 and so on.
What we aim to do is have a set of cases so that you can “dial a case”, and you
can use them. for training (which we are now starting to do in Victoria for
Justices) or you can use them to investigate “Does'the informal matters in the
court, such as how they appear in their dress, does it make a difference to the
sentence?”
7. It has been apparent from the papers that one of the difﬁculties in
research in court processes is that sometimes it intrudes into ethical
considerations and civil liberties matters. One of the singular merits of our
video-module system is that it does not bring in those kinds of difﬁculties in
research. It is ethically neutral and that seems to us to be another merit of the
case.
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8. The empirical data to date is going to be presented by my colleague, Dr.
Coyle. Concerning the prospect of international comparisons, I spent several
months overseas during the long vacation and showed tapes in various countries.
At the moment we have a reasonable prospect of having a set of cases that have
been viewed by magistrates not only in this State and in Western Australia, but
have also been viewed by magistrates in Britain and in Canada and in New
Zealand. If this happens it is the nearest comparison we can get with four
jurisdictions, four different countries within the British Commonwealth, and it is
the only international one that we know of.
I referred earlier to its use in the training of Justices of the Peace in
Victoria. When we made the last set of modular cases three 'weeks ago we also
took the opportunity of making a documentary, the opening and closing address
which was given by Mr. Justice Kirby. We also made another case which we have
come to call the “right and wrong way” case, in which the magistrate permitted
three deliberate errors to take place in the trial. We hope to use it as a training
device to see if practitioners can pick up deliberate mistakes. They are matters
like leading witnesses, admitting to prior convictions before the ﬁnding, and
admission of hearsay evidence.
9 Conclusions.
(a) Sentencing is a difﬁcult area for the reasons that we mentioned at the
beginning, and is one in need of very close examination.
(b) That research will not solve all of the problems but it is a necessary
adjunct to other approaches. There is a need to know what is the actual
basis of magisterial decisions. That is until we actually know what really
takes place in court we are not in a position to make judgements in terms
of legal or moral issues.
(c) There is a case for guided discretion but that will encompass both
substantive and procedural issues and this technique will allow us at
least to approach thatproblem.
10. The options available. If we are concerned about sentencing, and plainly
we are, one option available is to reduce the discretion available by having some
kind of ﬁxed tariff. Another option is that of plea bargaining. This is done
rather more widely in the United States. Another method of amending it might
be by having group decisions with sentencing, perhaps with a form of lay
assessors. There is a difficulty with that, of course, because in summary
jurisdiction it is necessary to move at a fair speed. Another option that one
might consider is remand for sentencing so that the magistrate has time to stop
and consider instead of making the decision under some pressure.
I would like to conclude by stating that there is something amiss with
sentencing. It is not circumscribed by the same procedural safeguards as the trial
process and we ought to quite rightly be concerned about that. I am somewhat
heartened however by two things. One is that seminars of this kind can take
place and the kind of concern expressed here is obviously something that is
27'
-wholly commendable, and secondly, that when we entered this enterprise of
doing this “video-module technique” the amount of co-operation that we
received from the magistrates and justices absolutely astonished us.
The enterprise was funded originally by a grant from The Victorian Law
Foundation. We were helped by the N.S.W. Law Foundation, by the magistrates
of all States, by the justices of Victoria, by the N.S.W. College of Law, by the
Institute of Criminology in Sydney. It is difﬁcult to express how grateful we are
for the enthusiasm we have met. We have something that we think can be
developed into a very useful tool. It is not to supplant anything, it is an adjunct
to other approaches and ‘ the kind of reception that it has received, the
enthusiasm of the professionals, gives us heart to continue.
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SENTENCING IN MAGISTRATES COURTS:
‘ A VIEW FROM THE OUTSIDE
Ian R. Coyle, B.A., Ph.D.
and
Ronald D. Francis, MA, PhD.
Dip. Crim, F.A.Ps. S.
Sentencing and the Videotape Modular Technique
It is generally considered that the determination of guilt or innocence is
the most crucial aspect of Court proceedings. Yet, guilt as to the crime charged,
is one of the most predictable of issues in the entire legal process. Only in those
relatively few cases in'which the defendant pleads not guilty is the determination
of guilt or innocence of prime importance. In the Australian legal system, and
in similar jurisdictions, the overwhelming majority of defendants appear before
a magistrate and plead guilty.“ The real concern of the defendant then is usually
not “Will I be found guilty” but “How much will I get”.2
In contrast to the earlier stages in the legal process, the discretion which is
exercised by magistrates in sentencing offenders is much more visible and open
to public scrutiny. Indeed, public scrutiny has given rise to a considerable
folklore amongst legal practitioners on the factors influencing magisterial
decisions. In addition to the anecdotal research concerned with evaluating the
factors involved in the sentencing process.
Such research has typically focussed on legal and sociological factors
which inﬂuence the decision making process (See pages 13-18) and has
contributed relatively little in a pragmatic manner to the magistrate who must
continue to prescribe sentences notwithstanding, or despite, the exhortations
and reasoned logic of academics.
There have been notable exceptions to this trend. For example, The
Sentence 0f the C0urt3i adopts an informative approach to the problem of
sentencing disparity aimed at the practitioner rather than the academic. In a
related ﬁeld, the development of practically oriented decision models in the
parole area has proved extremely usual,4 as has the use of multi-judge'panels.5
 
1. It is not always appreciated that in any one year almost half those sentenced to terms
of imprisonment are sentenced by magistrates. See Baldwin, J. The Compulsory
Training of the Magistracy. The Criminal Law Review, 1975, pp634-643.
See: Zumwalt, W. J., The Anarchy of Sentencing in the Federal Courts, Judicature,
1973, 57, pp97-104.
H.M.S.0. Home Ofﬁce, The Sentence of the Court. H.M.S.O. London, 1969.
Carter, R. M. and Wilkins, L. T. Probation, Parole and Community Corrections.
Wiley, N.Y., 1976.
Martin, W. L. The collective sentencing decision in judicial and administrating
contexts: a comparative analysis of two approaches to correctional disparity.
American Criminal Law Review, 1972-73, 11 p700.
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Another approach that has been commonly utilised is the sentencing
exercise or seminar in which participants discuss the appropriate sentences with
respect to a number of “model” cases. A variety of approaches have been used
in sentencing seminars: reading from transcripts, tape recordings, simulated
trials and so on. The major problem associated with these techniques have been
dealt with in a previous article6 and it is clear that sentencing seminars based on
videotaped cases exhibit the greatest cost/benefit effectiveness from an
analytical and participants point of view.
In the following pages the theoretical and practical utility of the videotape
modular technique in the development of legal guidelines is discussed.
\
Simulated trials in which \the defendants pleaded guilty were videotaped in
a professional television studio set up as a court. The shooting scripts for the
films were arrived at after consultation with senior stipendiary magistrates of
New South Wales and Victoria and the film director. These scripts were based on
cases already dealt with in the Central Court of Petty Sessions in New South
Wales. Only the names of those involved and the date of the offence were
changed. The defendants in the films were actors: all the other persons involved
were real practitioners portraying their actual occupations. Thus, a magistrate
portrayed a magistrate, a police prosecutor portrayed a police prosecutor and so
on. Care was taken to ensure that the maximum amount of verisimilitude was
obtained in the ﬁlming and the preparation of the scripts.
Specific sections, or modules, of the tapes were re-shot to incorporate
different legal and non-legal factors. For example, the appearance of an older
and younger defendant; the presence of a psychiatric report; the type and
number of prior convictions; and extenuating circumstances relevant to the
defendant’s actions. This approach was economical in that only portions of the
tape required shooting; for a fuller report see Coyle and Francis.7 The master
tapes were then edited on to “Sony U—matic” colour Videocassettes to produce
a number of cases.
In the study reported here the defendant portrayed in the simulated
trial was a young female charged with “shoplifting” (i.e. theft) of goods to the
value of $99.28 from a large department store. The defendant was presented
as having prior convictions for similar offences.
This videotaped case was shown to stipendary magistrates in Victoria
and Western Australia, where the authors had been invited to conduct sentencing
seminars as part of magistrates’ conferences in the respective States. In addition,
a group of senior management personnel, attending a course at the Australian
Administrative Staff College, Victorian police cadets, and Victorian justices of
6. Francis, R. D., and Coyle, 1. R.,Consider your verdict: Applications of the videotape
modular technique1n SentencingA.N.Z.J. Crim., 1976, 9, pp181-186.
7. Coyle, 1. R. and Francis, R. D. Sentencing. Applications of videotapein analysis and
training. J. BehaviouriaIScience June, 1976, pp172- 174.
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the peace participated in the study. A total of 72 magistrates (59 Victorian, l3
Western Australian), 31 justices of the peace, 20 police cadets and 59
management personnel viewed the simulated trials.
After the participants had arrived at a decision and ﬁlled in the standard
response forms, they were divided into small groups of between five and ten
people to discuss the case, the sentences they considered appropriate and the
factors that inﬂuenced them in their decision.* Fifteen to twenty minutes was
allowed for discussion. '
Following the group discussion, the participants were again instructed to
re-sentence the defendant and indicate the factors considered relevant. Provision
was made on the response form to indicate whether further information was
required, either of the case or of the defendant’s background, as a result ofthe
group discussion of the case.
 
 
Table 1
COMPARISON OF SENTENCES PRIOR TO-GROUP DISCUSSION'**
Magistrates Police
Vic. W.A. Total J.P’s Cadets M’ment
Proportion
sending to 60% 8% 50% 6% 45% 19%
Prison
Median
Prison 4 4 8 12 8
Sentence weeks N /A weeks weeks weeks weeks
Proportion
Imposing 24% 31% 25% 23% 10% 65%
Bond
Median 104 104 104 104
Bond weeks weeks weeks N/A N/A weeks
Proportion
Imposing 170/0 700/0 250/0 710/0 650/0 460/0
I Median
Fine $300 $400 $300 $250 $200 $300
 
 
*For the purpose of the study the sentencing options of the relevant N.S.W. State legislation
were utilised. All participants were informed of the available range of penalties prescribed
by the appropriate law. The possible sentencing options under this leglislation range from
dismissal of the case to 12 months imprisonment and/or a $1,000 ﬁne. Provision is also
made for the imposition of a recognizance or “bond”.
"Explanatory notes.
In a number of cases, participants elected to impose some combination of sentences such as
a prison sentence and a fine. For the purpose of illustration, these responses have been
double scored: thus the percentages indicated will not necessarily equal 100% in all
columns. For the purpose of statistical analysis, the more severe option was evaluated in
the rank order: prison > ﬁne > bond. ,
In some cases not enough participants imposing a sentence indicated the length of the
recognizance or period of imprisonment: these have been indicated as N/A.
This explanatory note also applied to the other tables.
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The Empirical Findings
A comparison of the sentences prescribed by the different groups of
participants taking part in the study prior to discussion of the case are shown in
Table 1. For the purpose of illustration the Victorian and West Australian
magistrates are shown by individual States and as a common group. Because of
the relatively small number of Western Australian magistrates viewing the case,
it was not considered meaningful to analyse their responses separately to the
Victorian magistrates; accordingly, these two groups were collapsed and analysed
as one entity. , _
From an inspection of Table 1 it is apparent that the various groups of
participants gave different patterns of sentences prior to discussion of the case.
Analysis of the respective proportions of participants sentencing to
imprisonment, fine or bond revealed a highly signiﬁcant effect due to
occupational status ( X2 = 47.42, d.f. = 6, p < 0.001).8 In general terms,
magistrates and police cadets tended to impose "a prison sentence more
frequently than did the other. groups. Conversely, justices of the peace and
management personnel were more disposed to ﬁne the defendant.
Comparison of the sentences imposed by the various groups of
participants in the study after discussion of the case revealed the same general
pattern.
Participants from differing occupational backgrounds applied signiﬁcantly
different sentences to the defendant ( X2 = 81.36, d.f. = 6, p < 0.01).8'
 
 
Table 2
COMPARISON OF SENTENCES AFTER GROUP DISCUSSION
Magistrates Police
Vic. W.A. Total .J.P. ’s Cadets Mment
Proportion .
sending to 640/0 80/0 530/0 130/0 400/0 80/0
Prison
Median
Prison 4 1 4 4 12 4
Sentence weeks week weeks weeks weeks weeks
Proportion t
Imposing 24% 46% 28% 6% 10% 65%
Bond
Median 104 104 104 104
Bond weeks weeks weeks weeks N/A N/A
Proportion .
Imposing 120/0 460/0 180/0 740/0 600/0 270/0
Fine
Median
Fine $400 $300 $400 . $250 $500 $300
 
8. X2 test for k independant samples.
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Again, police cadets and magistrates were more inclined to impose a gaol
sentence than justices of the peace and management personnel who tended to
opt for a fine.
When the proportion of participants changing their sentence as a result
of the group discussions of the case Were analysed, it was found that there was
no significant difference prior to and after the group discussion with the
exception of the management personnel. This group was more prone to apply
a ﬁne rather than a bond after discussion of the case (X2 = 32.03,d.f.=l,p<0.01).9-
In an attempt to further elucidate the nature of the sentences applied by
various groups, the relative proportions of individuals requiring further
information about the background of the defendant and/or the nature of the
case prior to and after group discussions were analysed. The proportion of
magistrates wanting more infomation about the nature of the offence and the
background of the defendant decreased signiﬁcantly after the group discussion.
( X2 = 4.08 and l0.24 respectively, d.f. = l, p < 0.05 and 0.01 respectively).
Table 3
THEFT CASE: PARTICIPANTS REQUIRING FURTHER
INFORMATION ON OFFENCE AND/OR OFFENDER.
 
 
Prior to Magistrates Vic. Police
Group Discussion Vic. WA». Total .J.P. ’s Cadets M’ment
Proportion
enquiring re 24% 38% 31% 61% 30% 39%
Offence
Proportion
enquiring re 56% 92% 63% 13% 25% 90%
Background
After Group
Discussion
Proportion
enquiring re 14% 23% 15% 55% 20% 36%
Offence
 
Proportion
enquiring re 36% 38% 36% 58% 25% 61%
Background
The other participants did not significantly change the amount of
additional information they required as a result of the group discussion.
 
9. McNemar test for the significance of changes.
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Although a signiﬁcant proportion of participants required further
information on either the nature of the offence or the defendant’s background
(see Table 3) it did not prove possible to further quantify the nature of the
information required. Indeed it proved extremely difficult to quantify the
factors considered by participants in imposing sentence.
In evaluating the factors considered by participants in imposing a sentence,
nine categories were chosen on the basis of a preliminary analysis of the data.
These were: the nature of the offence; the previous criminal record of the
defendant; future prospects of the defendant rehabilitation; expressed
contrition; general deterrence; financial and employment factors pertinent to
the defendant’s commission of the crime; probation consideration relevant to
the defendant; miscellaneous factors.
The authors assigned the reasons stated on individual response sheets to
one or more of these categories independently. A check on interobserver
agreement on a sample of 20 response sheets indicated an interobserver
concordance of 80%. Since this was considered unacceptable for the purpose
of analysis, the authors evaluated each response sheet independently, then,
using these individual assessments as a basis, arrived at a consensual judgement.
The relative occurence of factors that inﬂuenced participants in the
determination of the sentence are summarised in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4
RELATIVE PROPORTIONS OF FACTORS INFLUENCING DECISION-
MAKING IN SENTENCING: PRIOR TO DISCUSSION
 
Magistrates . Vic. Police
Vic. W.A. Total J.P. ’s Cadets M’ment
Nature of
Offence 11.8% 15.6% 17.9% 19.4% 36.8% 19%
Prior Record 36.3% 26.3% 34.2% 30.6% 34.2% 30.6%
Rehabilitation 4% 10.5% 5.4% 11.3% 13.2% 14.8%
 
Contrition 1% 7.9% 3% . 9.7% 2.6% 4%
Deterrence 9% —- 7% — — 1%
Financial/
Employment 4% 7.9% 5% — —- 2.5%
Personal 9% 13.2% 9.8% 11.3% 13.2% 16.5%
Probation .
prospects 17.8% 18.4% 18% 17.7% — 5%
Miscellaneous — — — — — 2%
 
. Explanatory note:
The percentage ﬁgures expressed in this table are approximations: rounding errors are in
the ﬁrst decimal place.
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Table 5
RELATIVE PROPORTIONS OF FACTORS INFLUENCING DECISION-
MAKING IN SENTENCING: AFTER DISCUSSION
Magistrates Vic. Police ,
Vic. W.A. Total J.P. ’s Cadets M’mem‘
Nature of
'
Offence 16.9% 16.6% 16.8% 10.9% 21.2% 6%
Prior
Record 30.3% 23.3% 29.3% 23.6% 39.4% 18%
Rehabilitation 5.6% 13.3% 6.7% 10.9% 21.2% 16%
Contrition . 1.0/0 3.30/0 1.40/0 5.50/0 — 30/0
Deterrence - 7.8% 3.3% 7.2% 1.8% — 1%
Financial /
Employment 5.0% 3.3% 4.8% 5.5% 3% 7%
Personal 7.8% 13.3% . 10% 20% 18.2% 35%
Probation
prospects 16.3% 16.6% 16.3% 20% —— 14%
Miscellaneous 8.9% 6.6% 8.7% — — —
Cross-tabulation of these factors with each other and. the sentence imposed
failed to reveal any consistent pattern in a predictive sense although it was
apparent that certain factors were highly correlated with each other (but not the
sentence). For example, although the factors “Prior Record” and “Nature of
the Offence” occurred together 83% of the time, no signiﬁcant correlation could
be established between this pair of factors, or any combination of factors
involving this pair, and sentencing options.
Conclusions
The signiﬁcance of the ﬁndings reported here logically fall into two
separate, though related, domains. In the ﬁrst place, the general issues raised in
the preceding pages are relevant to the development of legal guidelines in the
dispositional aspect of the legal process.
Secondly, there is the question of the practical utility of videotape/
sentencing seminars in legal education.
Taking the ﬁrst of these issues, the empirical ﬁndings reported here
reinforce the anecdotal observations of variability in sentencing. Further, they
suggest that the factors underlying sentencing are variously interpreted by
magistrates. The failure to ﬁnd a consistent sentence, or any consistent pattern
of factors related to speciﬁc sentences indicates that the informative approach
if
}.
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adopted by The Sentence 0f the Court, 1° for example, is unlikely to be
successful in reducing sentencing disparity. Even if such an analysis could extract
all the pertinent factors (both legal and non-legal) in a particular case, it does
not follow that individual magistrates would apply the same sentence when
presented with an identical case; even if they agreed on the factors that should
be considered in sentencing.
To illustrate this point, it seems appropriate to refer to an example of the
range of sentences applied by magistrates in the present study who cited the
same factors as having inﬂuenced their decision. Thus, four different magistrates
citing the factors “Prior Record” and “Probation prospects” imposed sentences
of 24 weeks in gaol, a $300 fine, a recognizance extending over 2 years, and 4
weeks in gaol. The same words either mean different things to different
magistrates, or individual factors are weighted differentially in determining the
sentence. (Lest it be interpreted that this is undue criticism of magistrates, it
Should be emphasised that the variability among non-magistrates in-sentencing
was at least of the same order).
To the behavioural scientist, such variability is not surprising. indeed it
would be surprising if there was less variability. There is an abundance of
literature which demonstrates that human decision making in complex, relatively
unstructured situations, is notoriously unreliable. (For example: Freedman
etal., pp 31- 61).11
Even in highly structured situations, variability remains, but it is markedly
reduced, The implications are obvious: development of legal guidelines which
will reduce the uncertainty associated with sentencing by structuring the
situation.
This approach is likely to be unpalatable to many legal practitioners who
want to see magistrates retain their discretionary powers. Nonetheless, legal
history is replete with examples of judges and magistrates being divested of
discretionary powers and having them circumscribed by legislation. From the
behavioural science point of view, this historical process can proﬁtably be
regarded as an increasingly structured approach to the legal process.
Of course, it would be neither feasible nor appropriate to remove all
discretion in sentencing and replace it with precisely specified penalties.
Idiosyncratic factors do occur in legal cases and no legislation on sentencing
could hope to allow for all the diversity of human transgressions of the law.
The approach adopted by Carter and Wilkins12 in parole board decisions seems
to overcome this objection by leaving a reduced amount of discretionary power
in the hands of the administrators of the legal system subject to the highly
specific guidelines laid down by the sentencing model.
——
10. H.M.S.O. Home Ofﬁce, op. cit.
Il, Freedman, J. L., Carlsmith, J. M., and Sears, D. 0. Social Psychology. Prentice
Hall, New Jersey, 1970.
12. Carter and Wilkins, op. cit.
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Having regard to the practical utility of the videotape sentencing seminars,
two issues are particularly pertinent. to what extent are these types of seminars
a useful adjunct to legal education; and to what extent can they reduce
sentencing disparity? Considering the efﬁcacy of the sentencing seminar
approach in legal education, the relative proportions of magistrates and
non-magistrates requiring further information about the nature of the case and
the background of the defendant prior to and after the group discussion should
be noted. The signiﬁcant decrease in the proportion of magistrates requiring
further information following the group discussion indicates that the seminar is
a useful information-exchange medium. This not-ion is consistent with the
literature on information-rich communication systems and previous studies of
sentencing seminars13 ,‘4. The failure to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect in this regard
among the other participants reflects their relative ignorance of the legal system
and may represent a base line effect (Le. no change is observable owing to high
initial level of uncertainty about sentencing). The fact that the Victorian justices
of the peace fell between the magistrates and other groups with respect to
information requirements supports this contention, since they had a signiﬁcantly
greater knowledge of the legal system than the police cadets or management
personnel.
The failure to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant change in the sentences applied before
and after the discussion of the case with the exception of management
personnel, is noteworthy. To put it bluntly, those groups which had exposure
to the legal system were more reluctant to change their sentences. (This was not
due to a general uncertainty about the case since the proportion of magistrates
requiring further information declined after the group discussion). One possible
explanation for this lies in the notion of cognitive dissonance‘.15 That is, it was
less signiﬁcant, in personal terms, for the management group to admit that their
initial decision was in error than it was for the agents of the legal system. Indeed,
it is encouraging that there was any movement at all! The pragmatic outcome of
this ﬁnding is to suggest that sentencing seminars adopt an approach whereby a
group decision has to be reached after discussion of the case. The process of
reaching a consensual decision is more likely to facilitate a shift in individual
attitudes than individual reconsideration of the case.
The development of behavioural science techniques that can aid in the
equitable and effective enforcing of the law holds great promise‘16,ll7. Hopefully,
this development will continue and, without overlooking the elements of
judgement and personal assessment that are involved, there seems little doubt
that the Australian legal system will move increasingly towards a more scientiﬁc
approach to sentencing.
 
13. Chapanis, A. Interactive Human Communication, Scientiﬁc American, 1975,232,
pp3642. , ‘
14. Francis and Coyle, op. cit. _
15. Festinger, L. Conﬂict decision and dissonance. Stanford, Stanford, Califorma, 1964
16. Tapp, J. Psychology and the Law, Annual Review of Psychology, 1975, 26, pp
481-507. ‘
17. Russell, R. W. Environmental Stress and quality of life. Australian Psychologist, in
press.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Dr. I. R. Coyle
I will be concerned here to put Dr Francis’ paper into a broader context
as well as presenting some of the empirical ﬁndings that we have obtained.
It is probably fair to say that criminology has three main inputs into it:
legal, sociological and psychological. It is also probably fair comment to say that
the psychological input into the study of criminology has been rather poor. It
has been lacking both in quantity and in quality. In Particular there has been
little real attempt to apply the ﬁndings of the vast amount of psychological
research to the study of criminology.
In 1977 there was an article in The Annual Review of Psychology by
June Tapp on psychology and the law entitled “An Overview”. To my
knowledge it is the first time that an article on psychology and the law dealing
with the relationship between the two disciplines has appeared in an
international journal of any substance in psychology. I think it is significant
that it has happened fairly recently. I also think it is signiﬁcant that there has
been considerable research particularly in the United States of an applied nature
concerned with applying psychological principles to criminological investigation.
In looking at applying behavioural science to the study of the law there
are a number of approaches that one can utilise. The one that Dr Francis has
presented is one of many. 1 should re-emphasize the point and make it very clear
that I am not a lawyer. I am completely ignorant of most legal maxims and most
legal processes. Equally strongly I do not believe that prohibits me as a
psychologist from the study of criminology and the study oflegal processes. The
emphasis is one on direction and one on attitude. In terms of the approaches
that have been utilised in studying criminology from a psychological point of
view video tape is a fairly recent one. It is a publishable sort of medium, it is a
marketable medium and there is a tendency .to treat it in some cases as a
technological toy. I do not believe that that need necessarily be the case.
Let us look at some of the other approaches. In an article entitled “The
Nose Knows Best” dealing with environmental pollution recently published in
Japan there is mention given to the use of psychological scaling procedures in
the legal determination of pollutants. Trained “sniffers”, for want of a better
word, who work .within a framework of odour detection developed by
psychologists with a very precise set of rules, determine whether or not there is
a cause for legislative complaint. The procedures that are laid down for those
“odour detectors”, who are humans, is based on psychological research that is
anything up to ﬁfteen to twenty years old. The basis behind the research that
Dr Francis and I have been concerned with is something of the order of ten to
twelve years old. There is always, of course, a gap in applying research ﬁndings
to applied situations. However the gap appears to be markedly exaggerated
when there is a cross discipline situation such as we have here.
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Looking at the video tape situation in psychological approaches to
criminology there have been a number of studies overseas. Some of you may be
aware of them. Let me reiterate a few:
Videotape has been used to provide feedback to judges as to the effect of
their behaviour on the defendant. In other words a judge in a mock trial
situation has been taped and he has then had to observe himself. How does he
come across? Is he overbearing? Is he displaying the sort of behaviour that is
appropriate for the position? The evidence on that study indicates that the
majority of judges who took part in that found it a signiﬁcantly useful exercise.
Videotape has also been used in recording evidence and playing it back to the
court.
In terms of applying video tape to the study oflegal processes we are not
doing anything new. What I think we are doing, that is somewhat new, is to look
at it in a very applied situation. As was indicated in the previous talk there are
two ways of looking at this technique. One from a research point of view and
one from a practical orientation.
Table 1
ASSAULT CASE: COMPARISON OF FOUR PRESENTATION CONDITIONS
Video and Transcript Video/ Audio
transcript only audio only
No. magistrates 24 25 18 17
No. sending to prison 4 3 3 2
No. giving bond 4 6 3 3
No. ordering compensation 3 0 0 1
No. fining 14 17 13 10
Modal fine ($) 100 100 100 100
This table shows how the use of video tape and other modes of
presentation was perceived by the magistrates who took part in the study which
you have seen. On a ﬁve point rating scale it was found that showing video tapes
plus a transcript of the case was by far the most useful as perceived by the
magistrates approach.
Table 2
POSSESSION OF INDIAN HEMP: PREVIOUS USE
Mean s. d.
N0. Module No. sending No. giving No. ﬁne ﬁne
magistrates difference to prison bond ﬁning $ $
37 First offender 1 7 22 133.64 69.98
49 Habitual user 11 6 31 353.23 135.36
X22684 X2=0.40 X22002 t=7.73
p<.01 (n.s.) (n.s.) p<.001
Comparison of the presentation conditions in terms of the sentences given
revealed no major signiﬁcant difference. That surprised me at ﬁrst but on
reﬂection it should not appear too strange. What that indicates simply is that
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regardless of the mode of presentation the magistrates who took part in our
study tended to go on the facts presented to them.
Table 3
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF THE USE OF
VIDEO AND TRANSCRIPTS
Video plus Transcript Video I All
transcripts ~ only only groups
How useful are transcripts? 4 4
How useful is video? 4 4 4
How useful is video with
transcript? 5
How realistic is video? 4
A ﬁve-point scale was used: 1 = no use/realism; 2 = little; 3 = some;
= considerable; 5 = greatest use/realism. The values quoted in table are the
median scale values.
This is dealing with the case of possession of Indian hemp (one of our
Mark 11 series of ﬁlms) and shows one .of the possible comparisons that can be
obtained from data of this sort. I must emphasize that this in the research
context: ﬁrst offender - mean ﬁne of $133 or thereabouts: habitual user -
mean ﬁne of $353. Those differences are of course highly signiﬁcant in a
statistical sense. . '
~A lot of research data can be generated from studies of this kind and
unless it is backed up in my opinion with some applied ﬁndings it is just research
data with no practical utility. What are the practical applications of this
approach? Dr Francis has mentioned some. I raise a few others as referred to in
my paper « they may appear as being somewhat presumptive of me to put them
forward. '
I think the evidence that we have to date indicates very clearly that
magistrates and other people taking part in sentencing are less prone to change
their attitudes, change their reasons for giving sentences and the sentences they
give, if they do not take part in some sort of group discussion of the reasons
they applied to a sentence and the sentence they have applied. 1 think that is one
very practical note. So group discussion with some attempt at reaching a
jcommon consensus would seem to be something that could be incorporated
without too much in the way of hardship in the currently existing sentencing
seminars run by magistrates.
It is also highly likely having regard to research evidence from other ﬁelds
that there is some optimum time for discussion. There is some optimum number
of sentencing seminars for each magistrate. It is possible that the technique that
we have used, this video tape modular technique, can be utilised in such a
fashion. There are other implications ﬂowing from it. It is very difﬁcult without
actually going out and using this technique as a tool, as an aid in training or as
an aid in reducing disparity in sentencing, to show exactly how effective it will
be. But I am quite convinced that the evidence to date indicates that something
of this nature is certainly worth trying.
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SENTENCING: ONE JUDGE’S VIEWPOINT
Adrian Roden, Q.C., LL.B., DipCrim. (Syd).,
Judge, District Court, New South Wales.
In all forms of organised society there are rules with which those living
within the society are expected to comply. And there are consequences of
non-compliance. Whether it be a matter of tribal custom or of a sophisticated
criminal code, whether they be founded upon religious belief, humanist morals
or mere pragmatism, such rules exist; and whether it be payback in Papua or
penal servitude in Parramatta, whether they be as formalised as
ex-communication in Rome or as spontaneous as ostracism in Broken Hill,
such consequences also exist. Whatever their source, and whatever their method
of imposition, the existence of such rules and such consequences is an essential
part oflife within an organised society.
There may be considerable debate, and emotions may run high, in the
course of disputes as to what the rules should be, and there may be similar
debate and emotional involvement in questions as to what the consequences
of non-compliance should be. But there is a demand and requirement that there
be such a Rule/Consequence system in operation.
Within our society, sentencing under the criminal law is the means
whereby such consequences, provided by the Legislature, are imposed.
I begin by stating those rather obvious and thus often overlooked facts,
because I believe that no consideration of the sentencing process or sentencing
policy can take place in a realistic context if regard is not had to the fact, as I
believe it to be, that the prime function of sentencing in our society is simply to
provide the appropriate flow of consequences for breaches ofits rules.
It is a matter of putting fact before theory. For theories of sentencing and
its objects there certainly are. With the classical theories of retribution,
deterrence and rehabilitation we are all familiar; with theorising that seeks to
combine the three or allocate relative degrees of importance to them we are
also familiar. That deterrence and rehabilitation are desirable goals is
unquestionable. But to my mind it would be unproductive to approach the
question of sentencing in terms of any such theory without appreciating that the
sentence is primarily society’s reaction to unacceptable, and thus proscribed,
conduct within it. The sentence must be seen to be an appropriate reaction;
it must suitably proclaim our disapproval of that conduct.
That I believe is “what the community demands” ofits sentencers.
The judge or magistrate who performs this task does so on behalf of the
' society by which he was appointed and in whose name he acts. Such judge or
magistrate, in my view, no less than the representative leaders of that society
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in the legislative ﬁeld, ought to see himself as bound to have regard to the
attitudes of that society, and at the same time to act as a responsible leader in
the development of those attitudes. No mere delegate, nor yet autocrat.
If then I were asked to describe the prime object ofsentencing in terms of
one of the conventional labels, I would unhesitatingly opt for “denunciatory”.
The sentence is certainly the means by which society says what it thinks of the
particular breach of its rules, and it does so, I believe, as much for its own
comfort as for any purpose related to the particular offender, or other potential
offenders, or offenders in general.
This is not to rule out all consideration of deterrence and rehabilitation.
Rather to put them in what I see as their proper perspective. Frequently, andI
believe more frequently than is generally conceded, references to the objectives
of deterrence and rehabilitation with regard to legislative provisions and court
decisions on sentencing are rationalisations. Frequently the chance to deter or
reform arises as a side-effect which occurs incidentally, or which is created when
the opportunity presents itself, at the time of fulfilment of the basic function of
the sentencer.
Pursuit of the denunciatory objective does not mean that over-riding
regard is necessarily to be had to the nature of the offence rather than the
circumstances of the offender. For despite massive evidence to the contrary, I
believe we have some claims to be regarded as a humane society. And Ibelieve
it does no violence to “what the community demands” if:
(a) on all occasions in determining the denunciation appropriate to a
particular offence, we have regard to subjective factors touching the
offender;
(b) on some occasions when assessing that appropriate denunciatory sentence,
we give special consideration, within an allowable scale, to a desired
deterrent or rehabilitative effect; and
(c) on rarer occasions, which we must always be careful to label “exceptional”,
we allow the subjective factors to exempt the particular offender from a
denunciatory sentence, either in the interests of rehabilitation, or on
purely compassionate grounds.
The sentencing process then, as I see it, involves a series of steps.
1. Become informed of the objective facts of the offence, and the relevant
subjective factors affecting the offender.
2. Assess the appropriate sentence, probably to be expressed in the terms of a
range, applying the denunciatory principle and having regard to
conventional modes of expressing disapproval by sentence.
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3. Determine whether in all the circumstances there ought to be a departure
from such sentence or range, in particular to enable the particular offender
to receive individualised treatment.
4. Fix the penalty within the range, or design the individualised treatment, as
the case may be.
The aim I believe is to denounce the particular illustration of the particular
offence on behalf of the community and in terms which the community will
understand. In the course of so doing advantage should be taken in all cases of
any opportunity to deter or to rehabilitate; and in appropriate cases, which will
necessarily be in the minority, either of these objectives, especially the
rehabilitative, may be allowed to displace the demand for a denunciatory
penalty by individualised treatment. The process involves a conscious or
instinctive adoption of the “Tariff/individualised” approach so ably expounded
and espoused by Thomas.
It is in the light of that appreciation of the objects and process of
sentencing that I turn to some particular areas of concern.
The Factual Basis
I have described the first step in the sentencing process as becoming
informed of the relevant facts, both objective relating to the offence and
subjective qua the offender. This is a step the importance of which is often
under-estimated, and on which the sentencer often receives far less assistance
than might be expected. The rules of evidence are often forgotten at this stage,
principles of fairness scrupulously adhered to in the process of determining guilt
are departed from, and there is no consistently applied rule as to onus and
standard of proof with regard to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
which can have an enormous effect on sentence. The problems occur with the
ambiguous verdict, and with the plea of guilty which admits the offence “but
not the facts alleged”.
Every verdict and plea of guilty establishes or admits the minimum facts
necessary to constitute the offence and negatives all facts which if present would
constitute a defence. But within the limits so established there may be a variety
of versions available the choice among which will have a significant bearing on
the sentence decision. To establish the appropriate factual basis after a plea‘
the sentencer will require further material; to do so after a trial he may.
The courts in England and in South Australia in particular, have gone a
long way towards establishing a code for the purpose. Drawing heavily upon
Law v Deed (1970) SASR 374 and later decisions of the South Australian
Supreme Court, and a series of English decisions from 'R v Van Pelz (1943)
KB 157 to R v Denniston (1977) Crim. LR 46, I regard a reasonable and proper
basis for establishing the facts for sentencing purposes as requiring adoption
of the following principles:
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All facts must be taken to be established which are necessary to
constitute the offence, and all facts negatived which would provide a
defence.
No further fact by way of aggravating circumstance ought to be taken
into consideration unless admitted or proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Except with the consent of the offender no fact may be taken into
consideration which (alone or in conjunction with other facts proved)
would constitute a further or more serious offence; and such facts are
absolutely debarred from consideration where the offender has been
acquitted upon such charge, or a lesser plea has been accepted.
The starting point to a determination of facts following a plea should be
the depositions or the “Sec. 51A Brief” statements, provided that insofar
as any matter therein is disputed it becomes a matter for evidence and
subject to the same onus and requiring the same standard of proof as
aggravating circumstances referred to in 2 above.
The starting point to a determination of facts following a verdict should be
the evidence in the trial, upon which thejudge may make his own finding
not inconsistent with the verdict, subject to the same onus and standard of
proof, and subject to the right of the parties to call evidence on any
matter not in issue at the trial, e.g. a mitigating factor not constituting a
defence.
In the case of mitigating subjective factors and mitigating circumstances
surrounding the offence, established practice allows some relaxation of
the strict rules of evidence. This practice, in my view, ought not to be
encouraged, and certainly the more substantial the potential effect upon
sentence the greater the need for evidence and the opportunity of testing
it. In respect of such matters the onus of proofshould be upon the Crown
to negative the matters contended for. beyond reasonable doubt, subject
to an evidential burden on the prisoner, the material necessary to discharge
such burden being “credible evidence”.
Mutual exchange of material prior to the sentence hearing seems to me to
be highly desirable so that the parties may know what is conceded and may
prepare to meet what is contested. In this regard it is unfortunate that
Pre-Sentence Reports are‘ generally withheld from the defence until the last
moment and that in consequence the court is often informed through hearsay
of matters which are disputed and which accordingly ought not to be before the
court except by way of admissible evidence.
Practices which have developed in New South Wales and which I believe
should be firmly discouraged are:
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1. On the part of the Crown, the presentation of “P.16” Antecedent Reports
which list acquittals and even “No Bills” along with convictions, and
which, even when prepared by ofﬁcers to whom the prisoner was not
previously known, contain adverse general observations as to his character.
2. On the part of the Defence, replacement of the oath and evidence by the
formula “I am instructed that” and a statement from the Bar Table on
matters of which the Crown can have no knowledge and which are only
capable of challenge by cross-examination.
R v Robinson (1969) 53 CAR 314 and R v Bibby (1972) Crim.LR 513
specify limitations on the reception of adverse material as to facts and as to
general character which might well be more closely followed here.
Although much of what follows verdict or plea and precedes sentence
calls for adherence to the'strict rules of evidence and involves questions of
onus and standard of proof between the parties, the proceedings should to a
large extent be regarded as no longer strictly adversary in nature. This applies
particularly to circumstances extraneous to the facts of the offence. The court
is enquiring and may properly require material which neither party volunteers.
In R v Butterwasser (1947) 2 All ER 415 at 417 Lord Goddard referred to the
different forms of oath administered to witnesses during trial and after verdict
as indicating that in the enquiry relevant to sentence evidence is not limited
to matters in issue between Crown and prisoner, and “the Court can then
demand any information it thinks fit”.
Tasmania’s Criminal Code Act (No 4) of 1973 imported into the Code of
that State guidelines to the reception of such information. The then (December
1973) newly enacted sub-sections of Section 386, which deals with sentencing
powers, provide:
“ (7) Before exercising any of the powers conferred on the court by sub-
section (1) of this section the judge may receive such information, in
oral or documentary form, as he thinks ﬁt; and, in so doing, he is not
bound by any rules of evidence.
(8) It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the convicted person has
knowledge of, and the opportunity to challenge, any information
received by the judge under sub-section (7) of this section.
(9) ...(exceptions to sub-section (8) re certain medical reports).
(10) If the person convicted challenges the truth of any information
received by the judge under sub-section (7) of this section, the
judge may require that information to be proved in like manner as
if it were to be received at a trial.”
It is submitted that it is in rare circumstances if at all that the “may” in
sub-section (10) ought not to be read as mandatory.
‘V
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Punishment Fit The Crime?
To this point I have considered what the sentencer is seeking to do and
how he goes about it. Assuming that he sees his prime purpose as to denounce,
and assuming that he has established the relevant facts and circumstances,
what is to determine how loudly he denounces? What makes one illustration of
a particular offence more or less serious than another?
Generally there is a conglomerate of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances to be considered; and to say that the sentencer has to weigh and
assess them, apply his sense of judgment and come up with a conclusion that
gives the particular offence a place in the range from the least to the most
serious, is to say everything and to say nothing. I have no observation to offer
here on any particular factor among the limitless array that can and do arise,
beyond drawing attention to one matter which causes me some concern.
I believe that in prescribing and assessing sentence both the Legislature
and the courts give too much weight to the chance outcome of criminal conduct,
and insufficient to the blameworthiness of the conduct itself. One outstanding
example relates to drink-driving.
The offences of “P.C.A.” or “D.U.I.” under the Motor Trafﬁc Act,and
“D.U.l. Culpable Driving” under the Crimes Act, are not infrequently
distinguishable only by their chance outcome. The fact that grievous bodily
harm or death ensues may bear no relationship to the extent to which the
offender is under the inﬂuence, or to the quality or intrinsic dangerousness of
his driving. It is very difficult to see how the chance presence on the road ofa
pedestrian or another vehicle, and an ensuing accident, can change the character
of the offence to the extent reflected both in the maximum penalties provided
by the Legislature and in the actual penalties generally imposed by the courts.
That is but one of many available illustrations. Assault can become
manslaughter, and attempted murder the completed offence, both with
considerable bearing on the available sentence, without any change in the
conduct of the offender. And on the other side of the coin, what in fact is an
attempt to commit an offence may, it seems, be no offence in law at all, if
though the mens is present, an unsuspected fact (? the empty pocket) may
make the actus impossible.
“The community”, on whose behalf we do our denouncing, not
unnaturally tends to measure criminality by its visible result. This is an area, I
believe, in which the sentencer has a duty to attempt to lead public attitudes.
Reverting to the drink-drive offences, it could be argued that excessive
leniency in the Motor Trafﬁc Act cases enables the conduct to retain a degree
of social acceptability and may in turn increase the number of offences with
tragic consequences; whilst undue severity in the Crimes Act cases can divert
attention from the conduct to which both pieces of legislation are directed,
and involves an over--weighting of penalty in favour of the worst aspect of the
retributive approach, primitive revenge.
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And it seems that insofar as we may be seeking to deter or to reform,
our assessment of sentence, to be relevant must be related to the conduct we
are seeking to discourage, rather than to its chance outcome over which neither
sentencer nor offender has any control once the conduct has been indulged in
Appeals and Anomalies
Sentence appeals provide a basis for the establishment of a body of
principles which hopefully will result in a ﬂexible uniformity of approach.
Some degree of perceived uniformity is necessary to avoid that “burning sense ,
of grievance’ referred to in the disparity cases (see, e. g. R v Dickinson (1977)
Crim.LR 303); flexibility is both inevitable and desirable so long as we are
concerned with passing human judgment on human conduct
The appeal process in this State does not allow for the establishment of
such body of principles so far as matters dealt with summarily are concerned,
by reason of the nature of the appeal provided Why there should be an as--of-
right de novo hearing on either or both of conviction and sentence after
proceedings before a magistrate, whilst there is no such provision with regard
to matters dealt with on indictment, I ﬁnd difﬁcult to understand. This is but
one of three apparent anomalies in our appeal system as it affects sentencing
which I believe are worthy of examination.
The three situations I perceive as anomalous are:
l. A Crown‘‘appeal” against acquittal does not affect the position of the
“respondent”. A Crown appeal against sentence does.
2. The Crown may appeal against sentence in indictable matters. In summary
matters it may not.
3. A person sentenced to penal servitude for five, ten, twenty years or life
may not have a second bite at the sentencing cherry unless he can show an;
error of principle etc. A person sentenced by a magistrate to a few months
in prison or even to pay a small ﬁne has only-to ask for it to be entitled
to a second assessment.
 
_As to Anomaly NQL Whether it has grown out ofthe double jeopardy rule or
simply from a sense of fair play, the principle acknowledged by Section
5A(2)(d) of the Criminal Appeal Act seems firmly entrenched and I for one
would not seek to have it removed. So long as we adhere to that principle it
is hard to see the justification for allowing a Crown appeal against sentence to
' affect the position of the respondent to that appeal. The observation of Murphy
J1n Grifﬁths v The Queen (1977) 15 ALR l at 33,
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“It is inhuman to send a man to gaol for six years when he "had been
released a few months earlier for the purpose of reforming him and was
observing the conditions of release and trying to reform. This drastic
reversal offends ordinary standards of fairness ...” .
is equally applicable, it is submittedjto the respondent who has paid his fine or
served his short term of imprisonment, or who is serving a term of periodic
detention and complying with all conditions as he goes about a law-abiding
life.
Whether or not that view is taken, it is submitted that if a trial judge errs
in law in favour of an accused, and if the Crown has the error rectiﬁed by an
appellate court, the same rule should apply as to whether the appeal decision
affects the person concerned, irrespective of whether the error had resulted in
an inappropriate acquittal or inappropriate leniency.
As to Anomaly No 2: I see no logic in the distinction. The right should, it seems,
exist either at both levels or neither. Consistently with the views expressed
elsewhere, I would of course propose that any Crown “appeal” against sentence
allowed at summary level be subject to the stipulation that it have no effect
upon the particular “respondent”.
As to Anomaly No 3: The as-of-right rehearing of summary matters on “severity
appeals” to the District Court may owe its origin to the days of the unqualified
magistracy, or to a belief that a “summary hearing” involves a sacriﬁce of
traditional safeguards and wholesale departure from the rules of evidence; but
whatever its origin it seems to me to have little justification in present
circumstances, and none at all when compared with the position with regard to
indictable matters. This observation applies equally, though with less relevance
for present purposes, to the as-of-right de novo re-hearing (misnamed “appeal”)
from summary conviction.
One would be entitled to think it would go without saying that the greater
right of appeal, if there were to be a distinction, would be available for the more
serious charges and the heavier sentences, but of course the reverse is the case.
Sentencing is an area for the exercise of the court’s discretion. And
generally sentence appeals are approached in the same way as appeals in respect
of other matters involving the exercise of discretion. The classical statement,
frequently made and repeated, is to be found, among other places, in the joint
judgment of Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan J] in Cranssen v The King (1936)
55 CLR 509 at 519, cited by Dixon CJ, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor J] in Harris
v The Queen (1954) 90 CLR 652 at 655:
“...the appeal if from a discretionary act of the Court responsible for the
sentence. The jurisdiction to revise such a discretion must be exercised in
accordance with recognised principles. It is not enough that the members
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of the Court would themselves have imposed a less or different sentence,
or that they think the sentence over-severe. There must be some reason
for regarding the discretion conﬁded to the Court of ﬁrst instance as
improperly exercised ...”
and the application of this principle is ensured in the case of appeals to the
Court of Criminal Appeal by the requirement of leave (Oiminal Appeal Act,
Section 5 (l) (0)). For what reason does this not also apply to the generally
lower level of sentence imposed by magistrates?
Two advantages, I believe, would flow from putting all appeals from
magistrates’ courts onto a proper appellate basis. One is a reduction in the
workload of the appellate court. The other, and more important for present
purposes, is that through the appellate process there would hopefully be
developed a body of principles which would effect some movement towards
standardization of approach and a removal of the feeling ofinjustice that arises
through different treatment being received at different hands. If we cannot
all be treated by the same hands, at least we can endeavour to see that the hands
are all clothed in similar gloves. At present an appeal from a magistrate’s
sentence will be heard by any one of the 30-odd District Court judges, who
sits alone and is called upon to do no more than substitute his own discretion
for that of the magistrate. Such a process by its very nature, it is submitted,
cannot give rise to the development of a body of principles. It could even work
in the opposite direction by tending to undermine anything achieved towards
standardization through magistrates’ conferences.
In South Australia appeals from magistrates are true appeals (see S.A.
Justices Act, Sections 163 et seq). The provision that those appeals are to be
“heard and determined in a summary way” has resulted in decisions on
questions of fact being accorded something falling between the “untouchable”
status of a jury’s verdict and the contemptuous ignoring of the magistrate’s
decision with which we are familiar in New South Wales. The South Australian
provision relevant to sentence appeals is contained in Section 177(2),
“Upon hearing the appeal the Supreme Court may (b) mitigate any
penalty...”
It seems that the principle there applied is that the appellate court will not
enquire whether the sentence is one which it itself would have passed, and
provided there was no error of principle it will not interfere unless the sentence
was “manifestly excessive”.
A move in the same direction in New South Wales would in my view do
away with a lot of pointless and frequently minimal interference with what has
been a proper exercise of a magistrate’s discretion, and could create a useful
body of true appellate decisions.
In passing 1 note that the South Australian Justices Act provides in Section
168 for discretionary release of an appellant who is in custody pursuant to the
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conviction or order appealed from. This seems eminently reasonable compared
with the as-of—right release that can be achieved by entering a recognizance
under our Section 123. I have always found it strange that a defendant awaiting
summary trial may be refused bail and held in custody while presumed innocent,
whilst he has a right to be at liberty after that presumption has been displaced
by his conviction, by the simple means of giving notice of appeal and entering
a recognizance.
One Law For The Poor?
I believe that imprisonment in default of payment of fines, or at least as
a direct result of nonpayment, ought to be abolished.
The present position is governed by Section 82 of the Justices Act which
(except in the case of corporations) requires magistrates, when imposing fines
or ordering moneys to be paid by way of penalty or costs, that they,
‘ ...adjudge that, in default of payment the person against'whom the
order is made shall be imprisoned and so kept for a period calculated
(with reference to the amount to be paid) ...” '
It is interesting to contemplate who the people may be who may lose their
liberty in consequence of that provision. I see them as falling into four
categories:
1. Those who cannot afford to pay.
2. The “martyrs".
3. Those already in custody who can “cut out” their fines.
4. In theory at least, persons who have the means to pay but value those
means more highly than their liberty. ‘
An appreciation that those are the people likely to be affected is enough, I
believe, tojustify abolition of the provision.
As to the first class, it is repugnant and ought to be unthinkable in our
society that in given circumstances a person, if poor, will go to gaol, but if
with means, will not. To suggest that the fine and the imprisonment are
reasonable (and thus comparable) alternative forms of punishment for the same
offence in similar circumstances is to value human liberty very poorly indeed. ,
At present the “going rate” for liberty in New South Wales is $5 a day. As 1
write, the news is breaking that it will shortly be increased ‘to $25 a day. Nothing
it seems is immune to the ravages of inflation! If on the other hand the sanction
of imprisonment is intended not as an alternative form of punishment but as
a means of enforcing payment, it is meaningless when applied to the poor.
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As to the second class, the “martyrs”, it seems absurd that the offender
is allowed to choose his own “penalty”, or, more accurately, to use facilities
created by the State for one purpose for an entirely different purpose of his
own; and at our expense. It is even more absurd when the disposition of the
offender is determined, as it sometimes is, by the action of a third party who
pays the ﬁne.
The third class defeat the object of the imposition of the ﬁne, and avoid
the penalty altogether.
The fourth class, if they exist, ought not to be given their own choice
of penalty any more than the second.
It is sometimes said that the default provision is merely a threat which
ensures payment in the case of those who can afford to pay, whilst those
genuinely without the means are not pursued. Any who believe that to be the
case may be interested in some statistics. The 1975-76 Prison Statistics of New-
South Wales, the most recent available (to me), show total receptions into
custody under sentence from Lower Courts during the year as 6,456. Of those,
3 231, or just over 50%, were ﬁne defaulters. Indeed of receptions under
sentence from all courts during that year those ﬁne defaulters represented
38.5%. The corresponding percentage during each of the four preceding years
was 1971-72 43.6%; 1972-73 38.6%; 1973-74 34.8% 1974-75 34.7%. Is this
fourth quarter of the 20th century too early to suggest'that we abandon this
form of Debtors’ Prison?
A magistrate may impose a ﬁne, (a) where that is the only penalty
provided, or (b) where the Legislature has provided for punishment by ﬁne
or imprisonment or both. In the first class of case imprisonment in default
brings about a situation of a penalty ultimately being imposed which the
Legislature itself deemed inappropriate. In the second class of case it must be
assumed that the magistrate has directed his attention to the question-whether
deprivation of property (ﬁne) or deprivation of liberty (gaol) is appropriate to
the particular circumstances and has opted for the former; yet operation of the
default provision would reverse that decision. I believe that it cannot be
seriously argued that with relation to any of the four categories of default'er
referred to above, such reversal of the decision of the Legislature or the court
is justiﬁed, whether the cause of the reversal be the poverty or the choice of the
offender.
If there is any place for imprisonment as the ultimate sanction after
imposition of a ﬁne, it can only be, I believe, after the intervention of some
other offence in the nature of contempt or resistance to the process of the
court. Where deprivation of property is the penalty imposed, deprivation of
property ought to be the penalty we seek to exact. It should not be beyond our
legislative skill and administrative ability to create and apply a method for the
enforcement of ﬁnes as civiljudgments or in some similar manner.
Among Australian jurisdictions, New South Wales and the A.C.T. alone,
I believe, have abolished distress. We preserve it, or its equivalent, in the case
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of corporations only, and we exempt the ofﬁcers of corporations from liability
to imprisonment in default. It is interesting to compare this position with that
provided in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute which deals
with ﬁne default at Section 302.2. The American proposal requires a summons
to show cause, and allows of committal (on the contempt principle) only if the
refusal to pay is “contumacious”. In the case of corporations and
unincorporated associations it provides for similar treatment of ofﬁcers shown
to have authority to pay and to be “contumacious” in the non-payment.
Schemes have been devised for testing means, both before the imposition
of fines and before the imposition of sanctions for default. English legislation
from the Criminal Justice Administration Act 1914 through to the Powers of
Criminal Courts Act 1973 has striven to reduce committals to prison and to
abolish them in cases of non-payment through lack of means, and a similar
philosophy is to be seen in the Tasmanian Justices Act Sections 78, et seq.
Such schemes all present their problems, but I believe that we ought to be able-
to do better than the reproduction and retention of legislation which Was
up-to-date in England in 1879 and is still to be found in Section 83 of our
Justices Act 99 years later. The ineptitude of that provision is highlighted by
sub-section (1) (c) relating to sureties for the payment of fines. When was it
last invoked? And if it were, upon whom would the penalty be imposed?
It is argued that many with the means to pay would not if the sanction
of imprisonment were removed. The validity of that proposition is open to
question and may well depend upon the effectiveness of enforcement measures.
But basically the imposition of a ﬁne creates a debt. And in-our society the
threat of imprisonment is not the accepted means of securing payment of a
debt.
It is argued that without the alternative ofimprisonme'nt, the poor would
_be immune from punishment for minor offences. I would think that with
social services as they are today, there are very few indeedjn respect of whom
a fine cannot be assessed within their means. Fines as low as one dollar have
been imposed. Additionally there are other forms of treatment to which I
believe New South Wales should give serious consideration. Community service
orders suggest themselves as possible alternatives totines in certain cases. In
other cases the indigent defaulter is likely to be a person for whom we would
hope for the same mature treatment as is now given to “drunks" and “vagrants”.
Whatever the arguments against abandonment of. the sanction of
imprisonment for fine defaulters, there is none that I have heard; or read,
which justifies the imprisonment of thousands of persons in this State each
year in circumstances that would gladden the pen of a latter day Dickens.
Many of those whose liberty is so carelessly equated to a few dollars belong, I
suspect, to the same section of the community as those who spend their remand
in custody for want of a $50 or $100 surety. We should have better means of
dealing with the disadvantaged, and better things to do with our gaols.
 
 55
I believe that our priorities should be such that even if we are left with
some offenders we don’t know how to punish appropriately,‘that should
concern us less than the prospect of continuing to imprison defaulters as we
now do.
Measures and Effectiveness
to serious crime yet devised. And it seems likely to be with us for some time to
come in its role as a “last resort” sanction for less serious offences. It is the
task of the legislators, their penologist advisers and the administrators of our
corrective services, rather than of the sentencers, to seek to minimise its
dehumanising effects and to seek new alternatives. The sentencer can play his ,
part by minimising its incidence and making maximum use of available I
alternatives.
Prison,,-it is generally agreed, is the least unacceptable form of response
l
I offer the following observations on some measures which are available
and some which are not.
Words are not without significance, and “penal servitude” are two that
I would like to see disappear from their present place at the head of our
catalogue of penalties. With them would go the anachronistic distinction
between “felonies” and “misdemeanors” (two further words we could well do
without). A modern penal code should have no difficulty in overcoming any
consequential problems with ancient common law offences, which badly need ‘
re-appraisal in any event.
I would like to see provision for suspended sentences restored. I believe
that there is roomﬁgvfor both, (a) the suspended sentence, which subject to
compliance with conditions represents a final disposal of the matter and thus is
“a sentence”, and (b) a deferring of sentence, which delays the-final decision
and is not “a sentence”. The present Section 558 ofthe Ch‘mes Act, introduced
in 1974 when suspended sentences were done away with, appears to me to
involve a confusion of the two concepts. The recent decision in Grifﬁths (supra) ”77 ’5
highlights the neceSSity to distinguish between orders which do and orders
which do not amount to sentences. The language of Sections 1 and 22 of the
English Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 makes clear the respective places
in the sentencing process of a deferral of sentence and a suspended sentence. l
Each has its place and serves its own valuable purpose. The Mitchell Report
recommends the availability of both for South Australia, with a recommended
six months limit on the Grifﬁths-type deferral. I believe we should have both
available in this State. Legislation is necessary to provide for a clear statement
of the two processes in place of the present confusion and overlap within
Section 558 and between that section and Griffiths.
More use, I believe, could well be made of the conditional discharge.
The unconditional Section 556A dismissal has long been popular in Petty
Sessions; far less of course is seen of that section at District or Supreme Court
level. I see the conditional Section 556A discharge as having some advantages
over the Section 558 “deferral”. The promise of no conviction, coupled with,
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the threat of punishment, must be an added incentive to compliance with
the conditions imposed. I accept that the nature of the offence dealt with on
indictment will frequently make it inappropriate not to proceed to conviction.
I believe nonetheless that that course could properly be followed more often
than it is.
Periodic detention is another useful means of keeping down the prison
population and saving some offenders (and their families) from some of the
worst consequences of prison sentences. It seems a pity that its application
is so strictly limited to shorter terms and that it carries no parole or other ,
supervision process when the term ends. Sometimes a multiplicity of counts
enables a term of periodic detention to be combined with a bond for a
substantially longer period. This seems such an attractive sentencing procedure
that thought might usefully be given to making it available in the case of single
offences.
Probation, parole and work release are other prison de-populating
measures with much to commend them on both humane and practical grounds,
and l have referred elsewhere to community service which may yet find its way
into our system.
All the above alternatives to sentences of continuous imprisonment
ought, I believe, to be employed wherever the application of the principles
referred to earlier in this paper allows. As I make these observations on the
type of sentence or sentencing procedure that “ought” to be employed, I
seem to hear voices calling for facts and figures to prove their “effectiveness”;
and I seem to recall those studies which tend to show that carefully designed
sentencing achieves very little, as one form of treatment is no more effective
than another. I have no such facts and ﬁgures. And I dispute those ﬁndings
which take recidivism rates as the measure of effectiveness. Effectiveness can
only be measured with reference to the purpose one is seeking to serve.
Recidivism rates may well provide a measure of effectiveness of attempts at
deterrence or reform. But as I have indicated. earlier, important though those
objectives are, they are not in my view the sole or the prime objects of
sentencing. Human conduct will always be influenced by many factors, of which
the decisions of criminal courts form but a small part. ‘
“Heavy” sentences, I believe, have their place in appropriate cases as
fulfilling the denunciatory function required of the Legislature and the courts.
Such sentences are in that respect both appropriate and effective in such cases,
however the offenders may behave on their release and however they. may have
behaved if dealt with differently. “Humane” sentences have their place too.
The way in which we treat our fellow human beings is important in itself.
Whether by our treatment of them in the sentencing process we discourage
further criminal activity is signiﬁcant, but it is not the only consideration.
If it is desirable to minimise suffering, even among those whose conduct offends,
then sentencing decisions that have that effect are in respect both appropriate
and effective. The sentencer’s task is and always will be to strike a balance.
It is important that as he strives to do so he be not confined by a narrow view
of what constitutes effectiveness in sentencing.
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Post Script
As I look back over this paper a few comments upon .it suggest themselves
to me.
I may appear to have over-stated the part played by the denunciatory
aspect in the sentencing process. If I have, it is because I believe that that is what
sentencing is primarily all about. The other objectives, which we all seek to serve
whenever we can, are bonuses we seek to achieve on the way. It may well be
that “what the community demands” is satisfied by what are seen as general
sentencing levels, with more scope than the earlier pages may suggest for
individualised treatment and compassionate departure from those levels.
The “rules” I have suggested for the pre-sentence fact finding exercise
may make sentencing a more time-consuming process than it presently often
is. If that is so, that is as I believe it should be.
My observations on default imprisonment and appeals from magistrates
are directed to areas in respect of which I believe serious and urgent
consideration should be given to legislative reform. Indeed many of the fines
which are presently subject to the mandatory provisions of Section 82 of the
Justices Act ought not in my view to be part of the criminal process at all. I
believe that there is a whole array of minor offences, particularly relating to
regulatory matters, be they parking or poultry farming, cockroaches in
restaurants or bread in sausages, television licences (if we had to have them),
shop hours, dogs without collars or companies without returns, which may
attract penalties by all means as part of the regulatory process, but should not
be the basis of criminal proceedings. I see them as some sort of “civil wrong”
against the State. Recovery of the penalties should be, and generally is, for
some authority other than the police. And if recourse to the courts proves
necessary, a civil style procedure similar to that employed by the
Commonwealth under the Customs Act seems suitable. It need not even involve
the same magistrates as are concerned with summary criminal matters. The
assessment of penalties (often fixed) for such transgressions ought not to be part
of the criminal sentencing process.
Matters that do belong within the criminal sentencing ﬁeld will always be
the subject'of concern and controversy. There will also from time to time be
“goals” that we pursue, at times so absorbed in the pursuit that we too readily
accept the goals as worthy. Two of today’s goals are Effectiveness and
Standardization. In the paper Ihave referred to the narrow view of effectiveness
sometimes held. The search for standardization also has its hazards. Iwould not
have sentencers seek it as though it were an attainable goal, although working
towards it is a valuable means of minimising the injustice sometimes done by
disparity. No more is there a single sentence that is “right” in given
circumstances than there is a single “community attitude” by which the
sentencing decision should be coloured.
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Offenders are inﬁnitely varied, as are sentencers. The ultimate in
standardization will be achieved only by removing the human qualities possessed
by the sentencer and ignoring those possessed by the offender. I have always
regarded the criminal law, and sentencing in particular, as being concerned
essentially with humunness. May the sentencing process long be preserved from
Komputer control.
Epilogue
For with what judgment ye judge,
Ye shall be judged; and with what
measure ye mete, it shall be
measured to you again. ”
St. Matthew, vii, 1,2.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
His Honour Judge A. Roden, Q. C.
It has been suggested to me that in the approach that I have adopted
in the paper I have given insufﬁcient .prominence‘ to deterrence, in particular,
and to rehabilitation, to some extent, in the matters that I say are of importance
in the assessment of sentence.
My own View is that both the concepts of deterrence and rehabilitation,
and the words themselves, are very much misused and abused in many a judicial
utterance when sentences are passed. A reading of a number of judgments
on sentence would justify one in believing that in ‘judicial parlance the words
“deterrent? and “rehabilitative” are synonymous respectively with “heavy”
and “light”. That is not the position, but we must be very careful or we will
find ourselves using the words in that way. That is what I meant when on page
44 I said that as often as not they are no more than a rationalization of what is
in fact an otherwise unexplained heavy or light sentence.
Let me give a few illustrations of how the principle of deterrence is
referred to in at least questionable, if not completely inappropriate,
circumstances as the basis of a heavy sentence.
Take the very familiar scene of a judge handing down a heavy sentence,
describing it as a “deterrent” sentence, and referring to the need for deterrence
in respect of that particular class of crime. The only comment I make is by way
of rhetorical question. “How often in those circumstances does the sentencing
judge have any real knowledge capable of supporting the proposition, implicit
in his remarks, that his chosen level of sentence will have a deterrent effect
with regard to that particular class of offence?”
I refer to another matter that was in the paper by way of illustration of
misuse or abuse of this notion of the principle of deterrence. You will find that
one of the illustrations that I used is the drink-drive type of offence. I have
said on page 48 that if sentences are to be effective as deterrents they must be
directed towards the conduct that we are seeking to deter, and not to the
chance outcome of that conduct, over which people have no control. If you
look at the drink-driving offences you will see that in New South Wales over
a number of years, for the standard “D.U.I. Culpable Driving” causing death
a gaol sentence of some years is the norm. That is a sentencing principle by
which we are now bound. When sentences like that are passed in cases like that,
it is customary to hear a reference to the principle of deterrence; yet these
sentences are imposed by the same judges from the same bench as those who
frequently look sympathetically on appeals from the “severity” of magistrates
who have imposed a fine of a couple of hundred dollars and a disqualification
of a few months for a P.C.A. in which the conduct constituting the offence
is indistinguishable from the conduct constituting the Crimes Act offence.
 
 60
To me the simple fact appears to be this: you cannot by sentence or in
any other way deter drink-driving from causing death, but you can meaningfully
try to deter people from drink-driving. Yet a distinction is made in the sentence.
I am not saying that that distinction is wrong, but when it is made. I say it is
absurd to seek to justify it on the basis of the principle of deterrence. Andjust
as I think that the discrimination or differentiation in sentence level in such
cases is attributed to the principle of deterrence quite inappropriately, so there
are other occasions when I think that violence is done to what the principle of
deterrence demands through a failure to discriminate in sentencing levels.
If you think in terms of the ordinary robber, you can distinguish him
from the armed robber. If you think in terms of the escapee, so called, from a
minimum security or open institution, you can distinguish the one who delivers
himself up after a very short period of liberty from the one who does not.
If you think of persons determined to make money out of trafficking in drugs,
you can distinguish between the one who contents himself with trafficking in
cannabis and the one who turns to heroin. In each of those three situations you
have one type of conduct which most of us would agree is very much worse
than the other; and one thing that you can do by sentences, (if we are capable
of deterring people from conducting themselves in a certain way by the sentence
we impose) is to seek to divert the energies of, for example, those who are
determined to rob, to unarmed robbery, by a meaningful and significant
distinction in the level of sentence for robbery and for armed robbery. You can
do the same by a significant distinction in sentence between the absconder from
an open institution who gives himself up within a few hours and the one who
does not, and the same with the trafficker depending on the type of substance
in which he trafficks.
If you do not make a significant distinction, if you concertina the penalty
range either by being too severe at the bottom end or too soft at the top end,
then you are limiting the opportunity that your sentencing policy has of
deterring people from the more undesirable type of conduct, or of encouraging
them, if they are determined to offend, to the less undesirable type of conduct.
Where I think we go wrong in talking of deterrence, is when we make the
mistake of being too severe at the bottom end ofthe scale,and seek tojustify it
by a reference to the “need to deter”. If that need is there, then I think it is a
need to distinguish and differentiate in the sentences we pass.
Turning to the factual basis for sentencing, the comment has been made
that what I regard as appropriate is really asking too much of the courthonce a
person’s guilt has been established. It is suggested that one does not have to be
as careful in scrutinising facts, applying rules ofevidence, or having an onus and
standard of proof, when it is only a matter of deciding whereabouts in the scale
the particular offender is to be put. It is a very easy thing to say that the facts
constituting the offence will be found by the jury, and it is only facts that are
relevant purely to sentence which need concern the sentencing judge. What is
overlooked is that the legislature has a completely free hand in determining
where it is going to draw the line between facts necessary to constitute the
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offence and facts which are only relevant to sentence; and our legislatures,
both State and Federal, have been extraordinarly erratic in their‘line drawing.
The line has been drawn in such a position in some cases as to deny in effect
the right to trial by jury. It may sound an astonishing statement to make but,
at this moment, for what is probably the most serious offence under
Commonwealth law, treason apart, it is impossible to get a trial by jury.
Let me explain very brieﬂy what I mean. There are two different ways
that the legislature goes about separating facts that are for the jury and facts
that are for the sentencing judge.
First think in terms of the offences of “malicious wound” and “malicious
wound with intent to do grievous bodily harm”. Under our Crimes Act they
are two separate offences. “Malicious wound” carries a maximum penaltyof
seven years, “malicious wound with intent to do grievous bodily harm” carries
a maximum of life, and there is a provision that if you are charged with the
more serious you can be convicted of the lesser offence. By that method of
legislating, the aggravating circumstance, namely the “intent to do grievous
bodily harm”, becomes ajury question because it is an ingredient in the offence.
If you look, on the other hand, at the statutory provision relating to
kidnapping you will see that the position is different. The person who is guilty
of the offence of kidnapping is liable to a maximum of twenty years, unless
the judge is satisfied that no undue violence was used, or whatever the proviso
'may be, in which case the maximum is fourteen years. The effect of that is
that although the ingredients of kidnapping are matters for the jury, it is a
matter for the judge to determine whether the aggravating circumstance
increasing the maximum from fourteen years to twenty years is present.
Let us turn our attention now to the Customs Act and the provisions
relating to the importation of narcotic goods Section 233B, and the penalty
provision Section 235. If a person imports heroin into Australia, or is knowingly
concerned in the importation or possesses it after it has been imported, he is
liable to a penalty, and the maximum penalty will be two years or twenty ﬁve
years according to whether the court is satisﬁed that the purpose of the offence
was not sale or other commercial dealing in the commodity. In other words,
and in simpler terms, there is a two year maximum for the drug user who
imports his own, and there is a twenty ﬁve year maximum for the drug
trafﬁcker. You may think the penalties are too high or too low, but I think
everyone would agree that it is reasonable to have such a distinction.
Now, imagine the position of the person who ﬂies back from Penang to
Sydney, with 20, 30, 50 grams of heroin strapped to his body. He says, “I am a
user - it is for my own use”. He is caught by the customs at the airport. No
pretence that he did not bring it in. He might even say, “I’m glad I’ve been
caught. The time I will have to spend in custody might involve somecompulsory
‘cold turkey’ and it might get me off the stuff”. There he is admitting that he is
a drug user in possession of the substance or having imported the substance,~but
 
ﬂsaying, f‘It is for my own use”. He is charged with importation or some other
offence under Section 233B. He is up for a twenty ﬁve year maximum penalty
as a drug trafﬁcker unless he satisﬁes the court that in effect he is not a drug
trafﬁcker. Leave aside the complaints you may have about the “onus of proof”
situation, there is no way in which, before he becomes liable to be sentenced
as a drug trafﬁcker, he can have a jury determine whether he was guilty of
drug trafficking or not.
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In the circumstances that I have given,.where he makes no bones about
the fact that he brought the substance in, he presumably pleads “guilty”, and
it is for the sentencing judge to decide whether he is satisﬁed that the purpose
was other than for a commercial dealing. If he chooses to plead “not guilty”
the jury will determine either that he imported it or that he did not, and
assuming that he is convicted it will still be a question for the judge to determine
whether he is a trafﬁcker or not for the purpose ofpenalty If you compare that
with the position under our Poisons Act for the so called “deeming” provision
you will see that it is exactly the opposite. A person who'15 found1n possession
of more than the prescribed quantity and says, “It is only for personal use”
has the matter go before a jury
This is but one illustration of the extremes to which, quite unwittingly,
the legislature can go in putting into the judge‘s court, as distinct from the
jury’s, the determination of critically important facts. It is for that reason
that, to my mind, the idea of solicitor or counsel standing up at the Bar table
and saying, “I am instructed that” followed by all the obvious things that
would be wonderful if only they were true, should be quite unacceptable; and
it is equally for that reason that I think presentation of the“P.l6”Antecedent
Reports with the defects to which I have referred in the paper should be
regarded as unacceptable.  
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SENTENCING: A MAGISTRATE’S VIEWPOINT
K. R. Webb, Dip.Ch'm. (Sydney)
Stipendiary Magistrate,
Central Court of Petty Sessions, Sydney, N.S.W.
I have been unable to locate any articles by recognized authors - or
pronouncements or ﬁndings by eminent judicial persons - in which it has been
asserted that the passing of sentence upon a convicted offender presents as an
easy or rewarding task.
The President’s Crime Commission had this to say:-
“There is no decision in the criminal process that is as complicated and
as difﬁcult as the one made by the sentencing Judge. A sentence prescribes
punishment, but is should also be the foundation of an attempt to
rehabilitate the offender, to ensure that he does not endanger the
community, and to deter others from similar crimes in the future. Often
these objectives are mutually. exclusive and the sentencing Judge must
choose one at the expense of others.”1
Undoubtedly one would aspire to achieve all of the recognized objectives
when passing sentence, however, it appears to be a task which requires the
sentencer to wend his way warily between what, in many instances, seem to be
conﬂicting and even competing goals of punishment.
Sentencing in Magistrates’ Courts differs in (some respects from the
Supreme and District Courts. Magistrates are required to deal with a huge
volume of offences for which the penalty provided is a ﬁne and where the
defendant seldom, if ever, appears before the court. In these circumstances
it is difﬁcult to imagine that the sentence imposed will have any lasting deterrent
effect upon either the defendant or members of the community at large, the
prospect of the offender’s imprisonment only arising if there is a default in
payment of the ﬁne.
Magistrates are, from time to time, criticised for the sentences they impose
- on occasions for alleged misconceived leniency, on, others for resorting to
harsh penalties. Any person aggrieved by a decision of a magistrate is given the
right to appeal to a judge in the District Court where the matter is heard de
novo, this should provide a safeguard against magistrates imposing harsh
penalties. If reference is made to the last report of the New South Wales Bureau
of Crime Statistics (covering the year 1976) it will be seen that appeals were
in the order of 1.5% which, I would suggest, gives an indication that the majority
of offenders accept magistrates’ penalties in New SouthWales as at least being
within the bounds of reasonableness.
 
1. U.S. President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
Task Force Report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967) p141.
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There is another aspect of sentencing in magistrates’ courts which could
be open to criticism and arises out of the large number of cases listed at each
sitting and also from the fact that most offenders either appear and plead
guilty or allow the case to be disposed of in their absence. This aspect is referred
to, in a slightly different context, by Professor R. M. Jackson in his book The
Machinery ofJustice in England:-
“An English criminal trial, properly conducted, is one of the best products
of our Law, provided you walk out of Court before the sentence is given;
if you stay to the end you may ﬁnd that it takes less time and inquiry to
settle a man’s prospects in life than it has taken to ﬁnd out whether he
stole a suitcase out of a parked motor vehicle.” 2'
‘Persons attending at a magistrate’s court while cases are being dealt with
under the provisions of Section 753 of the Justices Act must ponder how the
magistrate’s learning and experience could possibly equip him to pronounce
the penalty on the material presented within the brief period of time that the
entire proceeding occupies.
It has been said that as late as the turn of this century the problems of
sentencers were few - that they were guided largely by a theory of retribution.
I am unable to accept that this is a supportable proposition in relation to present
day sentencers in the various jurisdictions operating within the State ofNew
South Wales. It is clear from the reported decisions of the Court of Criminal
Appeal in this State that regard is had to each of the objectives of punishment
when important matters of sentence are considered.
The absence of proper information relating to a particular offence or
insufﬁcient material as to the background of an offender increases the
difﬁculties faced by the sentencer. Lord Kilbrandon has said.-
“The assessment of sentence, punishment, treatment - call it what you
will - on inadequate information, without professional assistance and
without proper time to think, is one of the most painful and unrewarding
of the functions of the Judge.”
It is only upon rare occasions that inadequate information as to an offence
is available in magistrates’ courts in New South Wales and on these occasions a
short. adjournment usually sufﬁces to enable all details to be provided. There
are many occasions when the position is different so far as adequate information
about the offender’s background is concerned. This is particularly evidenced
when an offender presents at court, unrepresented, on the day when the matter
is ﬁrst listed and indicates that he desires to enter a plea of “guilty” and have
the matter ﬁnalised there and then. The increase in the availability of the
services of ofﬁcers from the Parole and Probation Service in magistrates’ courts
has made available professional assistance in many needytcases, and the continual
 
2. Jackson, R. M. The Machinery of Justice in England 7th Edn., Cambridge. C.U.P.
1977.
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expansion of the various legal aid schemes will certainly ensure that magistrates
are provided with valuable information as to the offender’s background and
any special circumstances which require to be drawn to the attention of the
court before sentence is pronounced.
Work Load of Magistrates
Being in the position to afford sufﬁcient time for the consideration of
the proper sentence looms as a real problem in many magistrates’ courts. In New
South Wales in the order of 98% of criminal cases are concluded in magistrates’
courts and one of the results is that the case load for each magistrate 'is
particularly high. The ﬁgures available from the 1976 report of the New South
Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics show the total number of charge and summons
cases dealt with during 1976 as in excess of 600,000. On these ﬁgures the case
load for each individual magistrate would be in the vicinity of 7,000. Not every
magistrate would be required to deal with that number of cases in a year -
some of the matters take but a very short time to ﬁnalise. It must also be borne
in mind that magistrates are required to preside over cases which are not
included in the charge and summons case ﬁgures.
In his book Sentencing as a Human Process John Hogarth published a
study of the magistrates of Ontario and had these comments to make:-
“The work load of a magistrate has a direct inﬂuence on the way in which
he makesvdecisions. It affects not only the time he has to consider each
case, but also the degree to which he is able to devote time and thought
to general considerations in sentencing, to attend lectures and seminars,
and to‘read.
The work load of a magistrate is reﬂected in his sentencing behaviour.
Busy magistrates tend to use ﬁnes in criminal code cases more frequently.
They not only use ﬁnes. frequently in lieu of probation and suspended
sentence, but also in lieu of short-term institutional sentences. This is
understandable, as for a busy magistrate ﬁnes have the advantage of
requiring less thought or consideration than either probation or
institutional sentences. Fines ﬁt more easily into a tariff system in which
the penalty imposed is automatically determined by the nature of the
offence. Fines may be justiﬁed either as deterrent, or as a punishment,
and they avoid the damaging effects of imprisonment on the offender.
This, means that, regardless of penal philosophy, magistrates can ﬁnd
adequate justiﬁcation for heavy reliance on this form of sentence.” 3-
 
3. Hogarth, J ., Sentencing as a Human Process. University of Toronto Press: Toronto,
197 1.
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I am unaware of any other studies which indicate that the ﬁndings of John
Hogarth are of universal application - there does however sound a ring of
reality about his comments.
No matter how astute an individual magistrate may be he can have no
ﬁnal control over the number of cases which will be before him at a particular
sitting nor over the type of offences which will be charged. Every care is taken
by the administration to see that magisterial time is used to the fullest, however,
it is difﬁcult, especially where a magistrate sits at a suburban or country court
on his own, to assess in advance the number of persons who will be arrested
and brought before a court on a given day. Every person arrested and charged,
who is not released to bail by the police, has to be taken before a justice at the
earliest convenient time. The number of these persons varies from day to day
and from court to court. The Supreme and District Courts exercising criminal
jurisdiction do not face this problem - they are usually aware, well in advance,
of all persons committed to appear before the court.
It would appear essential that the work load of magistrates be kept at a
level which will not deprive them of sufﬁcient time to contemplate sentences
with the utmost care. There is a wide range of alternatives now available between
discharge and imprisonment and selecting the one which meets the requirements
of a particular offender for a given offence is no mean feat and certainly not one
that should be hurried.
Typical Cases Heard in Magistrates’ Courts.
There are certain types of cases which occupy a great deal of magisterial
time and are responsible for the actual bulk of cases listed before magistrates’
courts and I refer to such offences as “parking”, “non-lodgment of company
returns”, and similar classes of offences. The offender seldom appears at the
court and the cases are disposed of ex parte or under the provisions of Section
75B of the Justices Act. It is impossible to contend that a magistrate follows
the principles of sentencing when dealing with these type of cases, it would be
more true to say he adopts a tariff system. The question that needs answering
is whether these cases should be dealt with in some other way. I understand
that in one American state unpaid traffic ﬁnes are recorded and when the
driver’s license is due for renewal, if the ﬁnes remain unpaid, the license is not
renewed. The system appeals as being more economical than the present method
in New South Wales where a warrant is issued for the recovery of any unpaid
ﬁnes, it has the added built in advantage of conserving valuable magisterial
time. The system could only be appropriate to those classes of offences for
which a ﬁxed penalty is provided, for example, offences against the Motor
Trafﬁc Act where “on the spot” infringement notices are issued.
A problem area for magistrates, not experienced by judges, is the
sentencing of persons charged with offences such as drunkenness and vagrancy.
In a majority of these cases the offenders are unlikely to do harm to anyone but
themselves, certainly their appearance in public places may be objectionable,
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but experience indicates that no matter the number of times they are
“punished” (if it can be considered punishment to confine them in a prison for
a short period and provide them with good food, a bed, adequate medical care
and a fresh outﬁt of clothes for their return to the community) or indeed how
severe the punishment imposed (within the allowable limits) they keep
returning before the courts on a regular basis. Perhaps this problem could be
resolved by selecting a suitable alternative system of “providing for” these
persons. Would such an alternative necessarily be any more expensive to the
community than the present usage of magisterial time, the time of law
enforcement agencies and custodial facilities?
Role of Legislation
The legislature continues to create new offences and cast jurisdiction
upon magistrates to hear and determine them in a summary way. It does appear
there is a belief on the part of the legislature, accepted by the public, that if
some activity is unacceptable all that it is necessary to do is pass a law declaring
it to be an offence, and the heavier the penalty provided the less it is anticipated-
the unacceptable activity will continue. To those engaged in law enforcement
of course it would be obvious that such is not the case. The number of offence-
creating statutes continues to grow with each sitting of Parliament, both Federal
and State, with no corresponding reduction in those offences already in
existence. As a consequence the wider the range of subjects a magistrate has to
make himself conversant with, and of course the less time he has available for
the purpose, if he is to give proper consideration to all aspects when imposing
sentence.
To date it has not been the practice of the legislature of New South
Wales to subject the penalty sections of offence-creating statutes to regular
periodic review, hence it can be found that some statutes contain provisions
for fines, for example the Motor Trafﬁc Act, 1909, which although providing
an adequate range of penalties in 1909 (the general penalty section providing
for a maximum ﬁne of $200 for offences ranging from “parking” to “negligent
driving”) is totally inadequate in 1978. Of course, when considering appropriate,
monetary penalties for statutes passed in 1978, for example the various
“pollution” Acts, the legislature is thinking in present day monetary values and
authorises ﬁnes, at magisterial level, in the order $2000. The anomalies which
occur as a result of this type of legislative behaviour only serve to make the task
of the magistrate more difficult when striving to keep a balance in the
imposition of proper sentences.
Looking at the general penalty section of the Motor Trafﬁc Act, as it
presently stands, from another angle; a maximum fine of $200 to meet the
least significant breach of the parking regulations through to the worst
conceivable act of negligent driving (not amounting to dangerous or culpable
driving) leaves little margin available for the consideration of a proper penalty
if one is endeavouring to deter a persistent offender in 1978 when the average
weekly wage is in the order of $200.
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Of course, resort can always be made to the provisions of the Act for
suspension or cancellation of the driver’s license but there are numerous cases
when an appropriate monetary penalty, appropriate that is to 1978 conditions
not 1909, is called for.
Increased Demands on Magistrates
The jurisdiction of magistrates in New South Wales has been increased
considerably in recent years, more particularly by the amendments to the
Crimes Act in 1974. Magistrates are now called upon to deal with classes of
offences calling for the imposition of sentences which were previously the
province of District Court judges. These cases have brought with them greater
demands upon magisterial time, resort must be made to pre-sentence reports
and in many instances medical and psychiatric information about the offender,
and further it has been necessary for the magistrates to familiarize themselves
with the work being done in psychiatric research to enable better comprehension
of the information provided. Research into criminal behaviour is ongoing and it
is now essential for magistrates to keep abreast of present day knowledge in
this area as well as all other relevant fields if they are to be competent
sentencers.
In recent times “diversionary schemes” have been introduced to the
majority of Metropolitan Courts and the larger country centres for persons
charged with the offences of “drink driving” and “use of hard drugs”. In these
cases persons charged, after entering a plea of guilty - and providing they meet
certain other criteria - are afforded an opportunity to attend, on a voluntary
basis, centres where assessment is made of the degree of the problem, the most
effective known way of treating it and to minimise the likelihood ofsubsequent
offences. Upon agreeing to enter the programme the charge is adjourned for
eight weeks and the defendant required to enter a recognizance conditioned, in
addition to the usual conditions, that he attend at the assessment centre,
undertake any treatment or counselling prescribed and accept supervision from
officers of the Parole and Probation Service. These schemes are not specifically
provided for by any statute and therefore do not relieve the magistrate from his
responsibility to impose an appropriate sentence in due course and in fact in
many instances they tend to.complicate the already difﬁcult task. They do
serve as an additional means of providing the court with further information
about the offender, his background, any particular problems he might be
experiencing and the likelihood of any worthwhile response if a deferred
sentence is considered appropriate. In an area as complex and changing as
sentencing practise there must necessarily be experimentation and resort to
schemes which, even though they do not finally prove to be successful, at
least provide further insight to the problems of offenders.
Magistrates generally take advantage of all of the methods of sentencing
provided by the various statutes including good behaviour recognizances,
deferred sentences and week-end detention in appropriate cases. However,
they are always searching for new alternatives to imprisonment. By the
provisions of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act, 1973, a recommendation
contained in the 1970 Wootton Committee’s Report that courts be given power
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to order offenders to carry out a speciﬁed number of hours work for the
community in their spare time, supervised and administered by the probation
and after-care service, was translated into law.
Alternatives to Imprisonment: The Community Service Order
Brieﬂy the community service order scheme, as it came into being in
1973, required a court contemplating a community service-order to be satisﬁed
the following conditions are met:-
1. the offender is aged 17 or over;
2. the offender has been convicted of an offence for which a sentence of
imprisonment can be given;
3. the offender consents;
4. the offender’s home is in an area where arrangements exist for people
to work under community service orders and the court has been
notiﬁed of the arrangements by the Home Secretary;
5. the court has considered a report by a probation officer on the offender
and' his circumstances and is satisﬁed that he is suitable to carry out
work under an order;
6. provision can be made under the arrangements which exist in the
offender’s home area for him to carry out work.
If these conditions are met the court can make an order that the offender work
for from 40 to 240 hours within a maximum period of twelve months. There
are provisions for breach, review, transfer of orders and numerous other aspects
for the effective operation of the scheme. The Home Ofﬁce Research Unit
closely monitored six pilot schemes which came into operation in 1973 and
concluded on the evidence of the ﬁrst years working that the arrangements were
viable. It would_be fair to say that some of the reports coming back indicate
that there have been a number of successes achieved.
It would seem that the community service order is another form of non-
custodial sentence which, although it deprives the offender of his leisure time,
does not have the traumatic effect of a term of imprisonment either on the
‘ offender or his family. Perhaps the legislature of this State would be prepared to
give consideration to the introduction of enabling legislation with a view to
introducing a pilot scheme to study the prospects of success in New South
Wales. '
Sentencers require a great deal of information and professional assistance
to enable them to perform their functions as successfully as can reasonably be
hoped. The provision of pre-sentence reports and adequate legal representation
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for offenders are two services which have assisted magistrates greatly in more
recent times. Without these aids the process of determining a proper sentence
becomes cumbersome. If the court itself is cast with the responsibility of
extracting information from the offender it can be asserted that the court
only seeks information which supports the course of action determined to be
taken and completely overlooks important aspects about the offender’s
background which ought properly be taken into account before passing
sentence. ,
Changes in Community Attitudes
Society is constantly undergoing change in all areas and this is reﬂected
in sentencing in magistrates’ courts as well as the fashion houses of London
and Paris. In 1966 persons appearing before the court charged with the use or
possession of marihuana were likely to be imprisoned upon their ﬁrst conviction
and almost certainly would be for the second conviction. Today it would be
highly improbable that a person charged and convicted of use or possession of
marihuana, providing the possession was of a quantity for personal use, would
be imprisoned on the ﬁrst or second conviction. Many matters have bearing on
the reasoning of magistrates before changes of sentencing policies occur.
Magistrates are inﬂuenced by community reaction, they gain knowledge from
their own research and the published results of professional studies and, of
course, they have an opportunity to see at ﬁrst hand the effectiveness of the
sentences which have been imposed. New South Wales usually follows criminal
behaviour patterns that have been experienced in other Western countries and
resort can be had to the methods used in those countries to combat the
problems, especially if they have proved effective. To enable change to take
place on a reasoned basis, and not simply for the sake of change, it is essential
magistrates keep abreast of developments, not only as to new laws introduced
by the legislature and decisions handed down by the superior courts, but also
the progress being made in the ﬁelds of penology, sociology, psychiatry and
technology. If computers can be programmed‘to assist in any way which could
lead to the more efficient handling ofcases resulting in more time being available
for magistrates to devote to considering sentences before they impose them,
then magistrates should be prepared to make use of them immediately they are
available. '
Magistrates in New South Wales are creatures of statute being appointed
under the provisions of the Justices Act and, relying upon various statutes for
jurisdiction. When dealing with matters for sentence there exists in nearly all
cases a maximum sentence that can be imposed. There is a present tendency
for the legislature to provide maximum ﬁnes in the order of $2000, under
the Crimes Act the maximum term of imprisonment is a total of three years.
The more common terms of imprisonment authorised range between three and
six months. Although on occasions publicity is given to cases where magistrates
have imposed sentences which are referred to as “inadequate” the sentence,
to be lawful, has to be within the limit prescribed by the statute.
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There has been an argument raging for many years as to the relative merits
of “short” sentences. In view of the limitations imposed in most statutes in
New South Wales if a magistrate considers the appropriate sentence to be of a
custodial nature then by reason of the statute it will, in a majority of instances,
be of short duration. There is an article published in the 6th August, 1977,
Justice of the Peace, Vol. 141 No. 32 titled “Short Sentences” which highlights
the controversy which exists about the principles of sentencing:
“We have long suspected that criminology is more a matter of fashion
than a science and this suspicion is reﬂected in the latest (interim) report
of the Advisory Council of the Penal System which recommends shorter
sentences of imprisonment. The debate about long or short sentences
has been going on for some time. In 1957, for example, the Advisory
Committee on the Treatment of Offenders in its report, Alternatives
to Short terms ofImprisonment observed that'-
‘The short sentence has a deﬁnite and necessary place in our criminal
law. There are many cases in which a sentence of imprisonment is
inevitable, but the nature and circumstances of the offender do not
require a long sentence. There is thus nothing inherently wrong in a
short sentence being the only sentence of imprisonment open to
magistrates’ courts, the courts which deal with over 98% of criminal
charges. Nor is there any reason why a short sentence should not be
socially and penally usefulin certain circumstances.’
There then followed an about-turn with publication of the Home Ofﬁce’s
guide to sentencing entitled The Sentence of the Court which took the
view that:-
‘The disadvantage of short sentences of imprisonment are especially
marked, as it is impractical in the space of a few months to give a
prisoner any effective remedial treatment and such sentences are subject
to special statutory provisions ...... ’ ” ‘
The article proceeds to comment on aspects of “short” sentences and'refers to
other material relevant to the topic.
Current and‘Future Developments for “Training” of Magistrates
In New South Wales for many years magistrates have gathered once a
year at three day conferences to which have been invited prominent ﬁgures
from the various professions as well as ofﬁcers of the Parole and Probation
Service, the Health Commission, the Australian and New South Wales Institutes
of Criminology, the Department of Corrective Services, the Police Department
and so the list could continue. At these conferences magistrates are given the
opportunity of hearing ﬁrst hand the current thinking and movement in many
ﬁelds relating directly and indirectly to sentencing. Each second year a live-in
seminar has been conducted attended by magistrates on a rotational basis.
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Here again papers are presented and lectures delivered on a wide range of topics,
a great number of which serve to provide magistrates with further information
to strengthen their individual expertise in the sentencing field. It is not only
hoped that these conferences and seminars will continue but perhaps,
optimistically in the present economic climate, that they will be held more
frequently. It is my personal view that one of the greatest aids to uniform,
consistent and proper sentencing is the opportunity of sentencers to discuss
problems and experiences with persons engaged in the same or similar fields
of interest. '
At the Central Court of Petty Sessions there is provided an excellent Law
Library serviced by a competent librarian to which all magistrates in the State
have access. With the increasing volume of statutory offences, the extended
use of summary jurisdiction under the Crimes Act and the continual growth
of work loads, magistrates have less time to devote to reading the huge volume
of material which is currently available on a wide range of relevant subjects.
It would no doubt be of material assistance if the library staff were increased
and given time to prune out those matters which would be of particular interest
to magistrates and circulate them throughout the State.
I am aware of the work being done by Ronald Francis and Ian Coyle on
variation in sentencing having participated in the making of the video tape
exercises in sentencing. This is an area which could be developed to provide
worthwhile assistance in preparing magistrates for their duties in court and
also to assist in minimising disparity in sentencing. Sentencing exercises have
been carried out by magistrates in New South Wales over a number of years
and the indications have been that there is no great disparity between the
sentences of various courts. Exercises of this nature are interesting but must
be looked at with some reservations. Mr. W. J. Lewer, Deputy Chairman of
the Bench of Stipendiary Magistrates, said in a paper delivered in 1969:-
“Sentencing discussions at all levels are useful but one might be cautious
before concluding that the view point expressed with most felicity or
force is necessarily correct. The whole area is devoid of blacks and whites,
there are different shades of grey.” 4
A real problem in discussing variation or disparity if sentence is the need
to consider the existence of a “right” sentence for an offence committed by
a particular individual. Dr. Glanville Williams (1963 Crim. L.R. 733) says:-
“Brieﬂy, the attitude of the Courts has always been that there is in gremio
judicis a moral scale which enables the Judge to pronounce what quantum
of punishment is justly appropriate to what offence. This is the
punishment that fits the crime.”
—
4. Lewer, W. J., Modern Development in Sentencing Australian Institute Criminology,
Canberra, 1974. p211. .
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One ﬁnal matter which occurs to me might be worthy of discussion is
the right of appeal given to a person aggrieved by the decision of a magistrate
to a judge in the District Court. The relevant provisions are contained in the
Justices Act and provide that the appeal is to be by way of a de novo hearing.
Sentences imposed by Supreme and District Court judges are subjectto appeal
to the Court of Criminal Appeal and that Court in decisions handed down from
time to time, lays down principles in relation to the imposition of appropriate
sentences which provide a standard for judges in the ﬁrst instances to follow.
These decisions are valuable as guides to magistrates in certain areas of their
- sentencing responsibilities, however, they do not deal directly with the major
problems of sentencing experienced by magistrates in their daily duties.
Because of the nature of the appeal provided for under the Justices Act
the decision of the District Court Judge is not binding upon the magistrate in
future cases and, indeed, it would be unusual for a magistrate to be aware of
the result of an appeal - much less the reasons for any alteration to the decisiOn,
or sentence, appealed against. Perhaps it would be of assistance to magistrates
if the system of appeal was altered to provide that, when the appellate court
concluded it was proper to interfere with a decision or sentence of a magistrate,
the reasons for such conclusions to be stated on the record. Even if it could
not be said that a magistrate would be bound to follow such reasons they would
be very persuasive.
7 5
PRESENTATION OF PAPER
K. R. Webb, S.M.
The principles and problems of sentencing in criminal matters, I refer
~mainly in New South Wales to those provided for under the Crimes Act, are
the same in magistrates’ courts as they are in the Supreme and District courts.
I feel the area of sentencing which should come under discussion and be
examined in magistrates’ courts is that of the statutory offences, especially
those for which only a ﬁne is ﬁxed as a penalty. Perhaps at least some part of
those offences should not be classiﬁed as criminal offences.
Is it possible to ﬁnd satisfactory alternative methods of imposing and
collecting penalties for such offences as parking, failing to lodge company
returns, and similar offences? Judge Roden in his paper mentioned a number
of offences for which a ﬁne is the only penalty provided. While bearing in mind
the necessity to provide for the individual’s right to contest the breach and to
have his particular case considered judicially, is there an acceptable and practical
system available to deal with people found drunk in public places, or people who
are apparently without sufﬁcient legal means of support, without bringing them
before a court in the ﬁrst instance? It must be remembered that these people
may wish to deny guilt as to any allegation made against them, and, of course,
it must also be borne in mind that it would not be the wishes of the community
to leave these people to their own devices in the state they are in in public
streets and public places. There must be some protection provided for welfare
ofﬁcers or social workers who may, in the interests of the individual, take the
particular person into some type of care or custody situation. It is not difﬁcult
to imagine the hue and cry of the wrongful arrest if these people are not given
proper safeguards.
Should the legislature adopt a different approach when examining what
amounts to unacceptable behaviour in the community and provide some viable
alternatives to discourage that behaviour rather than to simply continue the
long accepted procedure of fixing a ﬁne recoverable in a summary way before a
justice? I think we may have had one example in more recent times under the
Jury Act of an attempt to provide some different form of penalty, but most
statutes, if you examine them, make the same means of recovery of the penalty
prescribed available, i.e. before a magistrate or justices in a summary way.
On examining ﬁgures that have been produced from time to time as to
workloads in magistrates courts, most of these ﬁgures relate to sentence matters,
it will very shortly become necessary to appoint additional magistrates, which,
of course, in turn will require additional accommodation, expensive equipment
and more support staff. ‘
The legislature should be moving more positively to provide forms of
punishment in substitution for imprisonment. Work release orders, are, as I see
3
‘
.
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it at the moment, a ﬁne example but there must be other forms available.
Perhaps in cases of vandalism, it would not be unreasonable to expect, so far
as the person was capable, of making an order for him upon conviction to
restore the wrong that he had done, if that were possible. In a number of cases,
such as we have seen recently at the cenotaph and on the walls of the Central
Court of Petty Sessions, it would not be too hard for aidefendant to get a
bucket and the necessary ingredients and scruboff the words he wrote, and it
may well deter a lot of people if they were required to take this step in the
full view of the public. Perhaps these type of orders should be considered by
the legislature.
Magistrates, of course, have been experimenting with behaviour
modiﬁcation programmes for some time. The current drink driver and hard
drug users schemes are instances. I feel here again the legislature should assume
some responsibility by introducing programmes of this type in order that they
are available throughout the State. At the present time of course they are
conﬁned to certain areas.
A system for the periodic review of all penalties, and I think more
especially those authorising the imposition of a ﬁne should be introduced.
Monetary penalties appropriate to 1909 are not suitable in 1978, more
particularly when you consider them alongside the monetary penalties
authorised by the 1978 statutes. I think the Motor Trafﬁc Act is probably
the most glaring example, although there are certainly others. The regulations
under the Government Railways Act where the maximum penalty that can
be imposed in one of $40.00. This might apply to some person who has
satisfactorily travelled from Gosford to Sydney for three months on an expired
ticket - hardly discouraging if you can pay a ﬁne of $40.00 every three months
for free travel.
In conclusion, I would like to refer to a matter that Judge Roden has
dealt with in his paper far more competently than I could, and that is the
question of appeals from magistrates’ courts dealt with by judges in the District
Court. I believe that there is some need to change the present system. Whether
Judge Roden’s ideas in this respect are acceptable or not I do not know but it
seems to me that there is a wastage of essential material in the present appeal
system. Magistrates are operating in the dark, as it were, as to the way in which
judges are imposing penalties or upholding appeals against magistrates’ decisions.
And, of course, the same thing occurs in the District Court. Each judge is
virtually unaware as to what his brother judge is doing in the appeals that he
is dealing with.
There must be a wealth of information available somewhere in this system
that should be accessible to magistrates and judges for one very good reason,
and this gets back. to the theme of Dr Francis and Dr Coyle, that is to try and
ﬁnd some way that like offences are being dealt with uniformly and in a
constant way. And, of course, that is only to a certain practical level: it can
never be perfect by any means. In particular, (in this State at any rate) there
is a need so far as offences under the Motor Trafﬁc Act are concerned, where
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we are dealing with not only ﬁnes and terms of imprisonment but also the
suspension or cancellation of drivers’ licenses. No feedback is provided, no
information is provided, no publication under the present system of appeals.
It is a hearing de novo. The judge simply substittites his view at that time for
that of the magistrate, and I think it is a waste if something cannot be done
to use the results and provide us all with more knowledge when we are dealing
With like cases. '
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DISCUSSION PAPER
Probation and Parole
Ofﬁcers’ Association of
New South Wales.*
Towards an Alternative Approach to Sentencing
Over the last few years in North America and elsewhere, there has been
controversy over indeterminate sentencing whereby such bodies as Parole
Boards determine the release of a prisoner after part of a gaol sentence has
been served.
Just recently the Royal Commission Report into New South Wales prisons
(page 608 and page 615)1 recommended inter alia that release to parole should
be automatic on sentences of less than four years and it also made
recommendations aimed at reducing the uncertaintities surrounding Life
Sentence prisoners and Governor’s Pleasure detainees. This paper discusses
the issue of indeterminancy as it affects prisoners and parolees at the present
time in New South Wales. The conclusion reached is that the existing system
of parole hinders the efforts of probation and parole officers because it leads
to unfairness and uncertaintities which confuse and demoralise prisoners.
The solution proposed is that the Parole of Prisoners Act 1966 should
not be amended, but abolished, and replaced by a system involving determinate
sentences and after-care recognizances to be attached at the discretion of the
court.
In February, 1978, a conference of senior probation and parole staff
involved in institutional work was surprised by a late agenda item which
recommended “automatic parole” and the return to full judicial control of
sentences. This item stimulated such widespread criticism of the present parole
system that a wider conference of probation and parole staff was held in March
at which a majority opinion expressed the view that New South Wales should
move towards a system of determinate sentencing.
Here then, was a Service charged with, and eXperienced in, carrying out
the parole function saying that the parole release system was not working
effectively and that the time for change was at hand. What has happened to the
aspirations and efforts of the initiators of the 1966 Parole of Prisoners Act?
Has the whole exercise been a failure?
 
* Prepared by a Committee of the Association in the light of the resolution of a staff
conference on 2nd May, 1978:
“There appear to be good reasons for considering the introduction of legislation to
provide ﬁxed sentences with automatic release to parole supervision if such
supervision is considered necessary by the original sentencing authority”.
This paper does not necessarily reﬂect a unamimous viewpoint.
1. Report of the Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons. The Honourable
Mr Justice J. F. Nagle. Government Printer, Sydney, 1978. (The Nagle Report).
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Not a bit! Rapid change has caught up (with the parole system) in an age
which probably holds many more “future shocks”. If the system itself has been
the subject of some controversy the basic idea has not. It is considered by
probation and parole ofﬁcers to be, in essence, a resounding 'success. The Royal
Commission, echoing the recommendations of the Swedish Commission into
prisons in 1972 best sums up the essence of parole by stating that,
“Imprisonment should be a last resort and those imprisoned should be
kept in the lowest appropriate security.”2i
If the community can achieve its aims by minimum levels of imprisonment
of certain categories of offenders, then it should do so, not only for positive
and humane reasons, but also because of the economics involved. The balance
of research indicates that conditional liberty assessments are at least as effective
as imprisonment in preventing recidivism.3, 4‘. Moreover, New South Wales
with an imprisonment ratio of 69 per 100,000 of population5' has a long way to
go in exploring alternatives to imprisonment compared to Holland and Sweden
with respective imprisonment ratios of 12 per 100,000 and 32 per 100,009.
Before examining the reasons for discontent with the current parole
system let us look at probation in New South Wales, the concept of probation
as a conditional liberty system being little removed from that of parole. Few
people in the community, even those working in the criminal justice system,
realise that there are approximately three times as many probationers as there
are prisoners in this State. Very few indeed would be able to recall headlines
or incidents involving a probationer. Yet many people in the community, when
discussing criminal justice can recall incidents when parolees have committed
serious crimes while on parole. Is it only the concept of the “prisoner in the
community” which arouses the press and alarms the public and politicians?
If those prisoners we now parole were placed under the mantle of a general
conditional liberty system such as probation, the punishment and deterrent
sentence of imprisonment already having been served according to a determinate
sentence practice, would the community distrust of conditional liberty such as
we have seen recently in regard to parole and work release, abate? Or would the
opprobrium then attach itself to probation? It is questions such as these which
admittedly, must be considered when evaluating the proposals for change
outlined in this paper. What, then, are the major issues which have led to
discontent with the working of the parole system?
_
2. ibid. Chapter 38, Recommendations, p701.
.3. Hood, Roger and Sparks, Richard. Key Issues in Criminology. World University
Library, London, reprinted 1974, p186.
4. _Morris, Norval and Hawkins, Gordon. The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime
Control. Sun Books, Melbourne, 1971, p121.
5. 'Rinaldi, Flori. Australian Prisons. F.M. Publisher, 1977, p37.
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A. The first major issue is the uncertainty caused by the non-parole period and
assessment for release. When the prisoner commences his sentence he sees
before him the goal of an early release to parole. Usually the prisoner with
. a non-parole period will not be concerned about remission calculations because
these are deducted from his “head” sentence. He is much more concerned
with the attitude of the parole officer or of anybody else who may assess his
ﬁtness for parole. The effects of this are multiple:
1. Prisoners become increasingly anxious as their time of assessment
draws near and news of parole refusals, few though they are, aggravates
the situation.
2. There is a tendency for prisoners “to play safe” and avoid discussing
crucial problems lest these militate against parole. Prisoners sometimes
tell their parole ofﬁcer only what they think he wants to hear.6
3. Under these circumstances counselling of prisoners on the one hand
and their assessment for release on the other are rendered incompatible.
4. The effect of remissions aimed at encouraging good behaviour in
prisons is negated by the existence of a non-parole period whereby
release to parole may be effected well ahead of a remission release.
Prisoners and prison officers alike have remarked on this factor which
involves internal discipline and security.
5. Release planning by prisoners and parole ofﬁcers is handicapped in
the more difﬁcult cases because release to parole is not certain.
B. The second major issue relates to the validity of parole assessments. There
can be a great deal of variation amongst assessing ofﬁcers in regard to whether
a prisoner is ready for release or not, even though the known facts of the case
remain constant. The Parole Board has acknowledged prediction difficulties in.
the 1976 Annual Report where S. H. Simon’s quoted opinion is that, (p. 1975):
“for a large ‘middle range’ of offenders it is unlikely that future criminal
behaviour can be predicted to a useful extent from a knowledge of past
history.”
Also in the 1976 Parole Board Report in regard to unstable and dangerous
behaviour, the following is recorded: 7
“The Board has found itself increasingly involved in the question of
assessing potential ‘dangerousness’ for parole candidates, Life Sentence
Prisoners and Governor’s Pleasure detainees. In the case of the latter,
I
 
6. Manson, J. R. “Determinate Sentencing”. Journal of Crime and Delinquency.
April, 1977, p205.
7. Annual Report of the Parole Board of N.S.W. 1976
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the experience has been that to be certiﬁed ‘not mentally ill’ no more
guarantees lack of ‘dangerousness’, than to be certified ‘mentally ill’
indicates its presence.”
Strong support was found for such observations in the 1977 Institute of
Criminology Seminar entitled, “The Dangerous Offender - Prediction and
Assessment” - where Roman Tomasic’s paper 8 quoted the results of studies
where two out of three (Kozol) and nineteen out of twenty (Wenk) predictions
of dangerousness were wrong.
It would seem obvious from recent figures of parole breakdowns
(approximately one-third) that there is a wide margin for possible error in
assessing, prisoners for parole, whether favourably or infavourably.
C. The third major issue is the confusion over the rationale for releasing
prisoners to parole and the perceived fairness of the system in regard to
commonly held views of justice.
1. The difficulty of reconciling requirement of punishment and deterrence '
with reasonable expectations for rehabilitation should not be
underestimated. Presumably a sentencer would have at least as much
difficulty looking ahead to the expiry of a non-parole period as a
Parole Board would have in looking back to see what had happened.
Because of the need to maintain present discipline it has become
necessary to insist upon acceptable prison behaviour reports before
granting parole. The system of remissions reflects this need but
remissions do not work on the non-parole period. The subjective
elements such as age, upbringing, character and intelligence as outlined
by John A. Morony in A Handbook of Parole (page 16) are not
reconciled to objective limits, such as prison regulations, but are
subordinate to them. This can result in the paradox that experienced
prisoners, habitual criminal types who are most likely to offend again,
often manage satisfactory institutional reports but receive parole
reports with poor prognoses. Could not the opposite occur?
3. There must be a question mark against any system which releases
to parole approximately 90% of eligible prisoners because they are
assessed as acceptable risks while it allows the remainder to be released
on remission, sometimes only months later, without the safeguard of
supervisiOn. Should not the unacceptable risks be supervised as well
as the acceptable?
Many prisoners have Seen the assessment procedures and Parole Board
determinations as a rather frightening “second trial” undertaken by a
“Star Chamber” system at which they have no rights of representation
8. Syd. Inst. Crim. Proc. No. 32. Government Printer, 1977, p17.
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and where knoWledge of evidence being put to the Board is not
available to them. A return to full judicial control of sentencing would
solve this problem.
D. The fourth major issue of dissatisfaction with the present parole system to
which this paper addresses itself, is the adverse effect indeterminate sentences
have on the running of a correctional system.
1. The Parole Board has released in recent years the great majority of.
eligible prisoners, for which their courage and persistence in times
of criticism needed to be commended. The following figues are taken
from the Report of the Parole Board in 1976 (printed 13th October,
 
1977)
Year Parole Granted~ Parole Refused Parole Revoked
1974 1,283 163 464
1975 1.198 241 419
1976 1,236 315 373
The Royal Commission into New South Wales prisons has commented on the
heavy workload of both the Parole Board and the Probation and Parole Service.
From the above statistics it can be argued that much effort has been spent on
investigation, report preparation and assessment of prisoners prior to release
in order to identify a small minority of prisoners who may be a risk to the
community. A determinate sentencing system with an appropriate provision for
after care recognizances would eliminate much needless effort and would direct
attention to the problem of deciding whether a person should be returned to
gaol rather than whether he should be released.
2. Non-parole periods add several variables to an already complicated
prison programme system. A prisoner can be released to parole, to
deferred parole, on licence, by remission, from work release, or
transferred within the prison system for a variety of reasons. The
result is that prison'staff can seldom be sure of exactly how long a
prisoner will be in their system. This makes it difficult to plan
educational and industrial courses. One hesitates to criticise any point
in such a thorough and well balanced report as is the Royal Commission
especially as automatic parole has some advantages over the present
system. However, the Royal Commission’s recommendation of
automatic parole for prisoners with sentences of under four years
would add yet another variable to a system that has been criticised for
its uncertainty. Planning arrangements for employment and
accommodation of a parole release could be thrown into chaos with a
last minute loss of remission. On 1974 prison census ﬁgures only
28.4% of prisoners would be eligible for automatic parole as
recommended, leaving 39.1% of prisoners including Life Sentence and
Governor’s Pleasure detainees under the old system.
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3. The focus of the present parole system on early release encourages
in prisoners insincere efforts aimed at impressing their parole officers.
It would be preferable if prisoner treatment were of a voluntary nature
where motivation was assured and the quality of rehabilitation
programmes higher in consequence.
The above criticisms of the parole system are in no way intended to
belittle the extent of its valuable contribution to correctional thinking. It is
considered that such a contribution is beyond dispute.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully detail the system of
determinate sentencing in New South Wales but a broad proposition could run
as follows,
The judiciary would decide on a determinate sentence in the knowledge
that the offender’s stay in prison would only be varied by remission
earned or lost for behaviour whilst in custody. The humane principle of
the individualisation of sentences would be preserved by the enactment
of legislation to ensure that the judiciary would have discretion to attach
recognizances to the determinate prison sentence where this was
considered appropriate.
The advantages of such a proposition would be that;
1. The uncertainty of time of release caused by indeterminate sentences
would be removed, giving the public, the prisoner and criminal justice
system staff a clear understanding of the nature and length of sentence.
2. Doubtful assessment for release procedures would not be required,
removing a major source of prisoner grievance and contributing to
prison harmony and discipline. A vast assessment machine could be
redirected to a more effective role. ~
3. Counselling and treatment of prisoners would not be constrained by
the need to assess for release, making the recognition of prisoners
who want to help themselves an easier task.
4. The main thrust of counselling and treatment of offenders against
the criminal code wouldbe in the community in realistic settings
rather than in artiﬁcial prison conditions,
5. The criticism of the present parole system that justice is done in camera
would be removed and accountability for evidence given in regard to
release of prisoners would be a natural result of normal court
proceedings.
In the April, 1977 edition of the Journal of Crime and Delinquency,
there was an excellent series of commentaries both for and against determinate
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sentencing i‘n America. This paper supports a statement made. by John R.
Manson'9, a proponent of determinate sentencing:
“Proponents of ﬁxed sentencing are too often inclined to attribute the
ineffectiveness of the existing system at least, in part, to the unfitness,
ineptitude and weaknesses of Parole Board members. 'My own experience
with Parole Board members, past and present, has almost without
exception, been positive and rewarding. The problem is not with the
qualifications and character of the Parole Board members, but with the
state of the art of a criminal justice system that will not allow itself to
function effectively in its present form”
In approaching reform and seeking ways to implement the Royal
Commission ﬁndings, we should not allow the existence of institutions such
as Parole Boards and Parole Services, and current acts of Parliament, to obscure
the direction in which sound concepts such as conditional liberty have taken us.
It may be that we need to form new institutions around the concepts rather
than modify old institutions to attempt to ﬁt the concepts. Some institutions
are just not that flexible. It is suggested that the 1966 Parole ofPrisoners Act
is one such institution and that it should be replaced by a system of determinate
sentencing with provision for after-care recognizances with supervision. '
 
ii
Manson, op. cit. p206
Other References used in preparing paper:
Census of Prisoners 1974. New South Wales Department of Corrective Services.
Current Sweden No. 87, August, 1975. ”The 1973 Correctional Court Reform”
published by the Swedish Institute.
Directory of Corrective Service, 1977. Statistics complied by the Research Division
of the New South Wales Department of Corrective Services. '
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PRESENTATION OF DISCUSSION PAPER
Peter Coleman, MA, Probation and
. Parole Ofﬁcer
This is a collective effort of the Association, and the point that I would
like to make in connection with this paper is that so far there has been useful
discussion on the problems associated with sentencing, or leading up to, the
sentencing process, but we should be aware that there are many serious problems
consequent to the sentencing process and these involve the Probation and
Parole Ofﬁcers.
The second point that I wish to make is that this paper, and the proposal
in it, represents a widespread and deeply felt conviction that the parole system
in New South Wales is in need of urgent review and the reasons for that are
set out quite clearly in the paper. This conviction is the result of some thousands
of hours of ﬁrst hand experience in custodial institutions and in face to face
contact with prisoners, the people who have been sentenced. It also represents
the point of view that theory or principle, ideal or philosophy should be shaped "
by, and tested against, practical experience especially practical experience
within custodial institutions. Rightly or wrongly, within our institutions, there
are tremendously high levels of anxiety associated with the parole system and
those levels of high anxiety make it very difﬁcult to do any effective work with
the people involved.
And the third point 1 wish to make is to link the proposals outlined with
this paper to the statement of His Honour Judge Roden when discussing the
sanction of imprisonment and I quote: “It is the task of legislators rather than
sentencers to seek to minimise prisons dehumanizing effects of prisons and to
seek new alternatives”.
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DISCUSSION PAPER No. 2
C. R. Briese, B.A., Dip. Ci'im. (Cantab. ),
Stipendiary Magistrate, Central Court ofPetty Sessions, Sydney.
The question of community service orders being introduced into New
South Wales as a court sanction was raised by Judge Roden and Mr Webb in their
papers. Last year I spent some time in the United Kingdom looking at the
operation of community service order schemes there and, convinced of their
value, I would like to summarise the case for their introduction to New South
Wales.
Over the years a considerable number of evaluative studies have been made
of most of the sentencing sanctions available to western courts. A number of
people (e.g. Martinson1 (U.S.A.), Brody2 (U.K.) ) have reviewed these studies,
and one of the conclusions ﬂowing from their work is that no one sanction is
better than any other in terms of recidivism. True it is that two or three studies
suggest otherwise but with those very few exceptions the remainder support
that general statement. It follows that in the employment of sanctions now
available to courts and when considering the introduction of others, we should
look to matters other than recidivism as the over-riding criteria for their
selection.
The ultimate penalty for offenders continues to be a prison sentence
and it is widely used. In terms of correctional efﬁcacy and recidivism, prison
of course gives no better results than other sanctions but there are a number
of valid reasons which need not be noticed here why, for the forseeable future,
prison sentences will necessarily be required and used by the courts. Having
said that, it must also be emphasised that it is now generally recognized there
is a need to develop sanctions of a non-custodial and semi-custodial nature to
take out of the prison populations those offenders who can be safely and
satisfactorily penalised in other ways, ways which are acceptable to society as
a whole and to individual members of society.
The position in N.S.W. is that offenders are being sent to prison for some
relatively minor offences and also for some relatively serious offences because
there are no satisfactory alternative sanctions the courts might uSe. Speaking
as a stipendiary magistrate with some 12 years experience it is my view that
the range of non-custodial sanctions available to N.S.W. courts is not large
enough. The recent Royal Commission Report into N.S.W. prisons3 makes
it plain that prison should be used as a last resort but recognises that the
problem is to devise alternatives which will attract political and public support.
 
1. Robert Martinson, “What Works? Questions and Answers‘abou't Prison Reform.”
The Public Interest, Spring 1974, pp22-54.
2. Brody, The Effectiveness of Sentencing, Home Ofﬁce Research Unit, 1975.
3. The Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons: The Honourable Mr Justice
J. F. Nagle, (The Nagle Report) Government Printer, Sydney, 1978.
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Other States and countries have devised some alternative sanctions which have
that support and it is important in the present climate in N.S.W. that the best
of these be introduced into N.S.W. In my opinion the one alternative measure
to prison which demands urgent introduction in N.S.W. is the Community
Service Order Scheme presently operating in Tasmania, Western Australia
and the United Kingdom. The way in which it operates was summarised in Mr
Webb’s paper, but for convenience sake I will provide a further summary.
N.S.W. does have the semi-custodial sanction of week-end imprisonment,
generally called periodic detention. It seems to be proving a viable way of
dealing with some offenders who, but for the existence of this sanction, would
have been given a full-time prison sentence. Unfortunately no proper evaluative
study of periodic detention has yet been made anywhere to my knowledge;
it is to be hoped this deﬁciency might soon be remedied. One criticism which
can be made is that periodic detention is underused by some courts, either
because of lack of facilities or insufficient knowledge of its existence and value
on the part of some sentencers. It seems to me, however, that periodic detention
suffers from one inherent defect and that is the necessity for accommodation
to house offenders for the periods they are undergoing detention - usually
week-ends. This means:
1. The scheme is expensive to administer and so it is not available to
many courts in N.S.W. because it is not economic to provide facilities.
2. Offenders undergoing periodic detention establish considerable contact
. with each other in that residential environment, and from what we
know of prisons we can assume that the inﬂuences of fellow prisoners
in periodic detention schemes will be seldom wholesome or beneﬁcial.
I suspect that for this reason Tasmania, Western Australia and the United
Kingdom bypassed periodic detention and opted for community service order
schemes instead. Under the latter schemes offenders continue to reside in their
own homes.
In British Commonwealth countries Tasmania was the first pioneer of the
community service order idea. It introduced its “Work Order Scheme” in 1972
as an optional alternative to short terms of imprisonment. It allows an offender
to be sentenced to a maximum of 25 Work Order days which he must work
one day per week on community projects without pay. An evaluation of the
scheme was made by Mackay and Rook4 (funded by the Research Council,
Australian Institute of Criminology) which concluded that “the scheme is
considered a successful, unique and viable alternative to imprisonment, with
numerous benefits to both the offender and the community.” Similar schemes
have since been set up in the United Kingdom and in Western Australia.
'\
4. Mackay and Rook, “Evaluation of the Work Order Programme in Tasmania”, Aust.
Inst. Crim. Info. Bull. 2(1) 1975. '
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In England and Wales a community service order schemelcame to be
enacted as the result of a recommendation in 1970 by the Wootton Committee,5
a subcommittee of the Advisory Council on the Penal System. The Wootton
Report was written against a background of a rising prison population and a
limited range of alternatives to custody. The recommendations of that Report,
with some amendments, were finally incorporated in Sections 15-19 of the
Criminal Justice Act of 1972, and later in the Powers of Criminal Courts Act
of 1973. The main provisions are as follows:
1. A person aged 17 years or over, convicted of an imprisonable offence,
may be ordered with his consent to undertake unpaid work for any
total number of hours between 40 and 240, within a period of one
year.
2. A court cannot make an order unless (a) arrangements for community
service have been made in the petty sessions area where the offender
will reside; (b) the court is satisfied, after considering a probation
officer’s report about the offender and his circumstances, that he is a
suitable person to perform work under such an order; and (c) the
court is also satisfied that arrangements can be made for him to ‘do so.
3. So far as is possible, community service arrangements should not
conﬂict with the offender’s work, educational or religious
commitments.
4. Failure to comply with the order makes the offender liable to a fine
up to £50 without prejudice to the continuance of the order, or the
court may revoke the order and deal with the original offence.
5. Provisions is made in the Act for the appointment of a Community
Service Sub-Committee of a Probation and After-care Committee.
The Sub-Committee acts as a policy controller for the organisation of
community service in a probation area. The committee is made up of
lay magistrates and certain ex-ofﬁcio members whose experience in
community affairs is thought relevant to the administration of the.
scheme.
During the period of my stay in the United Kingdom 1976-77 on a Winston
Churchill Fellowship I spoke to many persons and officials from the probation
services and courts about community service orders, and I made a study of the
growing literature on the subject. The impression I gradually formed was that
the community service order scheme was proving itself to be a valuable weapon
in the sentencing armoury of the magistrates’ courts and also of the Crown -
courts. Fortunately provision was made at the outset to evaluate the working
of the scheme in England and Wales,. the monitoring being done from the start
by the Home Office Research Unit. Two evaluative studies have been made by
this body and the results published, the ﬁrst in 1975 and the second a year
later. Already in 19756 the Research Unit was able to say:
 
5 Non-custodial and Semi-custodial Penalties. Report of the Advisory Council in the
Penal Section, London, H.M.S.O. 1970.
6. Hgome Office Research Study No. 29. Community Service Orders London, H.M.S.O.
1 75.
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“The community service experience shows that the scheme! is viable;
orders are being made and completed, sometimes evidently to the benefit
of the offenders concerned...At best, community service is an exciting
departure from traditional penal treatment.”
And in 1976:7
“In this second report, an analysis of the aims of the community service
scheme has been attempted. An estimate was made of the proportion of
those given community service orders who were diverted from custody.
This estimate is within the range 45%-50% of those given orders. A study
of one-year reconviction rates of those given community service orders
during the scheme’s ﬁrst year of operation in each of the six experimental
areas was reported. It was found that 44.2% of all those sentenced to
community service in six experimental areas during the first year of the
scheme were reconvicted within a year of the sentence. The reconviction
rate of the community service group is within the same range as that of
a group recommended for, but not given, a community service order.
There is no evidence of systematic change in the level of seriousness of
offences committed after a sentence of community service, nor in the time
at risk before reconviction amongst those reconvicted.”
Whilst the people that I spoke to in the United Kingdom had varying views as to
the best way to operate the scheme, rarely did I hear a voice which was opposed
to the idea altogether. Indeed there are very few opponents of the scheme and
those that there are make their criticism from the extreme left of the political
spectrum. Opinion as to the desirability of community service orders being made
available to courts throughout the United Kingdom was unanimous. According
to latest information, the sum of £08 million has been made available by the
Government to provide for the extension of the scheme to those few areas
left in England and Wales where it is not yet operating. Scotland is introducing
its own version of the community service order scheme, the orders there to be
made as conditions of probation orders.
In 1977 Western Australia introduced its community service order scheme
modelling it on the English experience but with some important modifications.
It is too early for any evaluative work to have been done in Western Australia.
What is now known of the operation of community service order schemes
elsewhere makes it inevitable, in my judgment, that they will eventually appear
in all Australian States, the only question being when and in what form. With
the appearance of the Royal Commission Report into N.S.W. prisons8 the
climate in N.S.W. is such that the scheme should be introduced forthwith.
The fact that Tasmania, Western Australia and the United Kingdom do not
have the sanction of periodic detention and N.S.W. does, is not in my view
 
7. Home Office Research Study No. 39 Community Service Assessment in 1976.
London H.M.S.O. 1977.
8. “Nagle Report” op. cit.
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a sufficient reason to refrain from introducing community service orders in
N.S.W. Indeed there is every reason to believe that an enlightened criminal
justice system should as part of its range of sanctions include both periodic
detention and community service orders, the former being administered by
prison officers and the latter by selected officers of the probation service.
The fact that community (service order schemes are relatively cheap to introduce
and administer may mean in practice that the existing facilities for periodic
detention in N.S.W. are sufficient, those facilities being confined to large
population areas. The provision of further expensive accommodation to extend
the periodic detention scheme to other parts of N.S.W. may be obviated by
setting up community service order schemes for the whole of the State. In
those parts of the State where periodic detention facilities are available as
well as community service order arrangements, the courts may prefer periodic
detention for some offenders and offences rather than community service
orders. It would be a matter for these courts to develop proper criteria for the
use of periodic detention as opposed to community service orders. However
if community service orders are made available to N.S.W. courts and they
are used to the point where the operation of the periodic detention scheme
remains static or withers away, I suggest that development would pose no
administrative problems of any weight.
The value of community service orders can be better understood when
the following matters are appreciated:
1. The scheme appeals to all kinds of people on a wide spectrum,
including those who administer it, for different reasons. The Wootton Reportg
foreshadowed this feature of the scheme in these words:
“But in general the proposition that some offenders should be required
to undertake community service should appeal to adherents of different
varieties of penal philosophy. To some, it would be simply a more
constructive and cheaper alternative to short sentences of imprisonment;
by others it would be seen as introducing into the penal system a new
dimension with an emphasis on reparation to the community; others
again would regard it as a means of giving effect to the old adage that
the punishment should fit the crime; while still others would stress the
value of bringing offenders into close touch with those members of the
community who are most in need of help and support .....These different
approaches are by no means incompatible.”
This factor can be ’used to great advantage in obtaining the support of all
sections of the community for the implementation and subsequent operation
of the scheme. As it is a sanction involving the community, much effort should
go into explaining the scheme and its operation to the public via the media and
other channels, as well as into obtaining the support of the voluntary agencies,
 
9. Non-custodial and Semi-custodial Penalties, op. cit.
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the labour movement, the courts and the probation service, Preparatory work
of this kind is vital to its success. It should be pointed out that any
administration introducing the scheme can ultimately expect to reap
considerable support from the community as the community comes to
understand the problems associated with penalising its offenders and joins in
the efforts to deal with those problems in an enlightened fashion.
2. The cost of setting up and administering the scheme is relatively cheap.
For example, the investigation by Mackay and Rook1o into Tasmania’s Work
Order Scheme found:
“The cost of operating the Work Order Scheme, $4.50 per man per week,
is considerably less than the cost of imprisonment, $117.11 per man per
week, an estimated saving to the State of $1,175,000 for 1975.”
3. Flowing from the operation of the scheme is the value of the work
performed for the community, work which generally speaking would not
otherwise by done. In Tasmania, the Mackay and Rook study found that:
“Currently 25 years of.work is provided annually for charitable
institutions and needy individuals.”
In England and Wales it is anticipated that when the scheme is in full operation
approximately 15,000 orders a year will be made. Generalising the English
experience to N.S.W. one can expect something in the vicinity of 1,500 orders
to be made annually, giving up to 200,000 hours of unpaid work to the
community. Whether or not these figures are reasonably accurate predictions
matters little; introduction of the community service order scheme to N.S.W.
will certainly mean that a large reservoir of untapped manpower is made
available to charitable bodies and needy individuals in N.S.W.
4. Recidivism of offenders placed on community service orders is no
worse than if they had been sent to prison. (See the above passage taken from
the Home Office Research Unit Study of 1976.) In Tasmania the Mackay and
Rock study found:
“A comparison of recidivism rates between the 1974 Work Order and
short-term imprisonment groups showed that 47% of the Work Order
group committee further offences and 19% subsequently went to prison,
compared to 62% and 40% respectively for the short-term imprisonment
group. However, as the prison group had a more extensive criminal record,
it could not properly be compared with the Work Order group.”
 
10. Mackay and Rook. op. cit.
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5. Community service avoids some of the negative effects of
imprisonment. These are so well known (e.g. the loss of responsibility and
decision making) there is no need to dwell on this matter.
6. Community service orders involve the public in the penalising of
offenders in a way which is entirely constructive. They offer to offenders the
opportunity to contribute in various ways to the community, thereby gaining
for themselves some status and approval for their activities from individual
members of the community. Whilst I believe the proper approach to community
service orders means administering the orders primarily and essentially as
penalties, there is no doubt that many offenders respond positively to the
opportunities offered them to help other persons. For these offenders the
scheme provides a “treatment” effect as a side beneﬁt; some of them become so
involved with the work they are required to do they continue with it on a
voluntary basis after completion of their orders. One former offender I spoke
to at Nottingham is now employed as a supervisor in the Nottingham
community service order scheme. I was informed there are others similarly
employed elsewhere.
7. Finally a word of caution. It should not be thought that community
service orders are a panacea for the problem of crime. The most that can be
claimed for them at this stage of our knowledge about them is that they provide
a better way of penalising some offenders than using other sanctions. I would
not expect the availability of the community service order sanction to take
out of the present prison population of N.S.W. any more than 5-10% of the
prisoners now there. But that is a considerable number of men and women -
some 300 to 600 people - the population of one to two large gaols.
I propose to deal now with some important questions which may give
rise to queries or concern.
(1) Who should administer the community service order scheme?
Not all offenders are suitable to perform community service. The six
experimental schemes set up in England in 1973 as pilot projects in different
areas did not use the same criteria of suitability although there was considerable
overlapping. The important point, however, is that it was agreed there are
offenders who cannot be employed in community service. Included in those
regarded not suitable are:
(a) violent offenders; (b) the heavily addicted - to drugs or alcohol;
(c) mentally ill or highly disturbed offenders; (d) sexual offenders.
The people who are presently entrusted with the task of making inquiries about
offenders and supplying the courts with information about them are the
probation officers. In furnishing a presentence report to the court attention is
given to the offender’s background, his family and social environment, his
strengths, weaknesses, problems, the type of person he is. Ofﬁcers of the
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probation service through their training and experience ought to be, and usually
are, more qualified than others to judge whether a particular offender is suitable
to perform community service. In England the probation officers are encouraged
to consult with the local community service organiser, himself a former
probation officer, when offenders are being considered for community service.
After such consultation the probation ofﬁcer is in a position to inform the
court:
(a) whether the offender is thought suitable, giving reasons;
(b) whether suitable work is available for the offender to perform.
On the basis of this information the court is in a position to make a rational
judgment as to whether a community service order should be made.
It is sensible, therefore, to entrust the task of administering the
community service order scheme to selected personnel from the probation
service. By appointing as the community service organiser for each area a
qualified probation officer and making him responsible for the running of the
scheme, is to ensure as far as this can humanly be done, that only suitable
offenders are permitted to perform community service.
(2) Will the scheme clash with the interests of the trade unions?
The schemes now operating in the United Kingdom, Tasmania and Western
Australia are doing so with the full support and co-operation of the trade union
movement. In these places the work performed is for charitable bodies and
needy individuals e.g. pensioners. Generally speaking it is work which would
not otherwise be done were it not for the existence of community service
orders. To obtain the support of the trade union movement it is essential that
representatives from that movement be included in the committee which must
be set up to implement and oversee the scheme. In day to day activities the
community service organiser must consult with the trade union representative
in those cases where the work under consideration might offend the legitimate
interests of a trade union or its members. In England the organisers I spoke to
about this matter indicated they had no problems with the unions, and claimed
that this was because they rigorously pursued a pOIicy of . close contact with
the committee representative from the unions and refused to consider any
work which was normally performed by union labour, or which could be.
I should indicate that I have already discussed the question of the possible
introduction of community service orders into N.S.W. with Mr Barry Unsworth,
the Assistant Secretary of the Labour Council of N.S.W. Providing adequate
representation and participation is permitted to the Trade Unions he sees no
objection to the scheme from the point of view of the labour movement. Indeed,
properly administered, he believes the scheme will receive the full support of the
trade union movement.
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(3) Should the community service order be used only as a genuine
alternative to imprisonment, or might itbe also used in those cases
where imprisonment is not being considered?
In England this question continues to be debated, with some theorists
maintaining that to the extent that community service orders are not used as an
alternative to imprisonment, so their position in the scale of tariffs is weakened.
Continued misuse of the sanction in this way, so the argument goes, will
eventually mean the sanction is not seen by the community and the courts as
a sufficiently credible alternative to imprisonment. I do not agree with this
view. Fines are today used for both minor and serious offences and in the case
of serious offences the use of a fine is often employed as an alternative to
prison. I think that community service orders should be made available to
courts on the same basis as fines, to be used for suitable offenders as the court
sees fit. The experience in England indicates that the community service order
sanction is being used as an alternative to imprisonment in only 50% of the
cases where it is used. That does not surprise me. As a magistrate one can point,
for example, to those cases where a fine is not suitable because of the financial
circumstances of the offender, those circumstances being often aggravated by
his requirement to support a family. In some of these cases the availability of
the community service order sanction would be the best answer to the problem
of how to penalise the offender effectively. It should be remembered in this
connection that the imposition of a fine upon an offender who is not able to
afford it, may mean that the offender eventually goes to prison for non-payment
of that fine. Prison statistics suggest that this happens only too frequently.
For example, in the 1975-1976 ﬁgures, total receptions into custody under
sentence from the lower courts during the year are given as 6,456. Of that
number, 3,231, orjust over 50% were fine defaulters.
(4) Should the scheme be introduced as part of a probation order or as
a sanction in its own right, not part ofa probation order?
Scotland is introducing the scheme in such a way that when a community
service order is made it will be as one of the conditions of a probation order.
It is my view that the English approach, followed by Western Australia,
is better, and there the scheme was enacted by special legislation making the.
community service order a sanction in its own right. I believe, however, that
N.S.W. should follow the Western Australian example of permitting the court
to put an offender on a probation order in addition to ordering community
servrce.
(5) In the event of a decision being made to introduce the scheme, what
practical ﬁrst steps must be taken?
The first step to be taken is to set up a committee with responsibility for
making policy decisions how the scheme is to be operated in N.S.W. That
committee should be impowered to set up the scheme and supervise its
operations. Representation on this committee should come from all sections of
the community which will be connected with, or affected by, the scheme.
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This means that the committee must have representatives from the voluntary
agencies, the service organisations, the trade unions, the courts, probation
officers and the corrective services. Upon establishment, the committee must
familiarise itself with the literature which is available on the subject and examine
the various ways in which the scheme could be operated. It will then be in a
position to make an informed judgment as to the best method of operating the
scheme in N.S.W. with due regard for N.S.W. conditions.
It is my view that the scheme should be introduced in three or four
different areas of N.S.W. as a pilot project, so. that the experience of
administering the scheme in those areas can be used to determine how the
schemes should ﬁnally be operated and administered throughout N.S.W. The
proposed committee should be asked, therefore, to consider and recommend
three or four areas in N.S.W. and the committee empowered to set up the
scheme in those areas.
In conclusion I should indicate that at a seminar held in Canberra at the
Australian Institute of Criminology in March, 1978, I was present when the
subject of community service order was discussed. Judges and magistrates
from every State and Territory in Australia were in attendance. No one spoke
against the use of community service orders as a court sanction and the
impression I gained was that judges and magistrates are not opposed to the
idea and will use the sanction if it is available to them.
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PRESENTATION OF DISCUSSION PAPER
C R. Briese, S.M.
Judge Roden has referred in his paper to the need for a sufficient range
of alternatives to imprisonment so that prison might, in fact, be used as a last
resort for the less serious offences. Mr Webb also outlined the community
service order scheme and how it operates in the United Kingdom. My paper
provides a summary of what I believe to be the main arguments for the
introduction of the further alternative to prison, namely: community service
orders.
Versions of the community service orders scheme are in fact operating
in the United Kingdom as I have indicated, also in Western Australia and
Tasmania. They are also available to some States of the United States. Indeed,
I understand in California they have been operating as early as 1966, but in the
British Commonwealth countries it is Tasmania that first pioneered the idea.
Generally speaking community service orders are working well and
providing the courts with a valuable sentencing tool. I believe there are many
reasons why New South Wales should introduce community service orders
and the main ones are set out in my paper.
I want to refer again to the question of unemployment or unemployed
offenders before summary courts. In the present economic climate, with many
people out of work, a considerable number of offenders before the courts
are unemployed. Often they have a family to support, and other financial
commitments. It is really not appropriate in many of these cases to use the
sanction of the fine. The availability of the community service order scheme
would be an ideal penalty in some of these cases.
A recent publication from America entitled Sentencing to Community
Service (October 1977) sponsored by the National Institute of Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice sums up what I believe to be the case for the use of
community service orders as opposed to a fine in many cases:
“Plainly many offences and many offenders neither deserve nor will
benefit from a gaol or a prison sentence of any sort. Yet a suspended
sentence, perhaps with probation, may not be sufficient to impress either
the offender, the victim, or the public, that the offence involved is not
trivial and that the offender has been held to account for his behaviour.
In such circumstances statutes often permit the assessment of a fine. In
fact, where the offence is a violation rather than a misdemeanor, the
ﬁne may be the only sanction available. For the middle class or afﬂuent
offender, a ﬁne may have little signiﬁcance. And for the indigent offender,
found disproportionately in the lower criminal courts payment of a fine
may be an undue burden....or an impossibility. Often the real effect of
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a fine is to penalise the family and friends of the offender. The legislatures’
omission of a range of ﬂexible sentencing tools has been described ‘as a
failure of the highest order’.” '
I believe from the discussions that I have had with interested persons in
New South Wales (e.g. Mr John McAvoy from the Probation Service who is on
a committee investigating the feasibility of community service orders for New
South Wales, also with representatives of the trade union movement) that
there is practically no opposition to the introduction of community service
orders as a court sanction for New South Wales. I understand that the Nagle
Report has recommended its introduction and I believe that it will not be
long before New South Wales will have the sanction of community service
orders. I would be interested to know if anyone, after reading my paper, would
like to oppose, as a matter of principle, the idea of community service orders
as a court sanction being introduced into New South Wales. Mr Unsworth
has informed me that personally he is very much in favour of the scheme and
endorses the whole paper. He is conﬁdent that the scheme would receive the
wholehearted support of the trade union movement which is, of course, vital
to its success.
I would also like to refer to the question of appeals from magistrates’
courts being placed on a proper appellate basis. I support that suggestion
wholeheartedly. From time to time we hear of disparities which appear in
magistrates’ courts as a result of their sentencing decisions, and there is a great
deal of criticism about why one defendant got one penalty and an identical
offender got another penalty even though one would have expected them to
receive similar penalties. One method, of course, of improving the sentencing
performance of sentencers is to provide adequate training. We have heard how
the video tape might be effectively used in the training of sentencers, and
magistrates might be able to use this technique in their training programmes
but, even more important than proper training for sentencers in summary
courts, is the need to establish a Court of Appeal which will supervise
magistrates’ sentencing decisions by the gradual establishment of principles
and criteria in reported decisions over the years. If no principles and criteria
for summary court sentencing is developed by a superior court (which would
have to be considered by the summary court as a matter of law) then the
training of magistrates will not reduce disparities in sentencing to acceptable
limits. To allow matters to continue as they are means that the present
sentencing structure guarantees inacceptable disparities in sentencing to take
place regularly. While the sentencing decisions of the District Court are
supervised by the Court of Appeal in accordance with principles established
over the years through case law and precedent, and judges of the District Court
are able to turn to those principles for guidance in sentencing considerations,
very little guidance is available to magistrates.
David Thomas1 suggests this solution which is similar to the solution
suggested by His Honour Judge Roden. He puts it this way:
 
I. D. A. Thomas, “The Control of Discretion in the Administration of Criminal
Justice”, in Roger Hood (ed.), Crime, Criminology and Public Policy; Essays in
Honour of Sir Leon Radzinowicz, Heinemann, London, 1974, p151.
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“The major weakness in the use of case law techniques of structuring
sentencing discretion in the English system is that the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeal does not extend downwards to the Magistrates’
Courts where the overwhelming majority of cases are tried. It may be
that the solution to structuring sentencing decisions by magistrates is
to be found in the thoughtful development of legislative techniques
supported by a more centralised appeal system.”
The late Sir John Barry2 from Victoria has said:
“The existence of the Court of Criminal Appeal may not have resulted
in achieving the impossible a science of sentencing, but unquestionably
it has put an end to illogical and fortuitous variation between sentences
where the variation errs in the direction of excessive severity.”
It seems to me that there is no reason why appellant review of the same kind
for summary courts could not do the same for “illogical and fortuitous variation
between sentences” imposed by magistrates, be that for reasons of excessive
severity or excessive leniency.
 
2. Sir John Barry. The Courts and Criminal Punishments, Government Printer,
Wellington, New Zealand, 1969, p39
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. DISCUSSION PAPER No. 3
John P. McAvoy, Probation and Parole Ofﬁcer.
References have been made by several of the seminar participants to
the possibility of introducing a Community Service Order Scheme which
would add to the range of sentences available to the courts in New South
Wales. This brief contribution outlines the involvement of the Department
of Corrective Services in the preparation of a recommendation for such
a scheme.
A departmental Working Party of Community Service Orders was set up
about eighteen months ago and submitted an interim report in October,
1977. The final report, however, was to await the outcome of a study
tour by myself under the auspices of a Public Service Board Fellowship,
granted for the purpose of investigating Community Service as used in
Tasmania and New Zealand. I was also able to visit and observe
programmes in. Devon (UK), California, and Oregon. Written material
was obtained on successful schemes in operation elsewhere.
My report on my ﬁndings was recently submitted to the Departmental
Working Party and it is anticipated that its ﬁnal report will be completed
within a few weeks. The scheme recommended does not substantially
differ from that outlined by Mr Webb and Mr Briese, and it is hoped
that it will be operated by the Probation and Parole Service before the
end of the year.
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DISCUSSION PAPER
' Paul Byme,'B.A., LL.B., Dip.Crim.,
Research and Advising Division, Public Solicitor’s Office.
The Impact of Grifﬁths v The Queen (1977)
15 A.L.R. 1.
In a recent matter heard in the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South
Wales the court considered the inﬂuence of the judgment of the High Court
of Australia in Grifﬁths v The Queen. In the course of argument the Chief
Justice expressed the view that the Court of Criminal Appeal may not, by virtue
of the decision in Grifﬁths, have jurisdiction to grant to an appellant to the
Court of Criminal Appeal the beneﬁt of a recognizance to be of good behaviour
in substitution for a determinate sentence of imprisonment.
The opinion expressed by the Chief Justice would appear to be an
inevitable conclusion from a consideration of the various judgments in Griffiths
case and the terms of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1912, as amended. Perhaps the
most emphatic statement and the one which most concisely summarises the
view of the High Court is the following, taken from the judgment of Mr Justice
Jacobs, at p29:
“... I am of the opinion that neither a so called“common law bond’ nor
the order made by Judge Goran in this case is a sentence properly so
called nor one within the meaningof that word in the Criminal Appeal
Act, 1912.” h
In Grifﬁths case the determination of the appeal involved an exhaustive
analysis of the meaning of the word “sentence” as it was deﬁned by 5.2 of the
Act,'name1y -
“ ‘Sentence’ includes any order made by the Court of trial on conviction
with reference to the person convicted, or his property, and any
recommendation or order for deportation in the case of a person
convicted; and the power of the Court of Criminal Appeal to pass any
sentence includes a power to make any such order or recommendation.”
Although in Grifﬁths case the High Court’s decision related to an appeal
brought by the Crown pursuant to s.5D of the Cn'minal‘Appeal Act, it would
seem that it is equally relevant in considering the Court of Criminal Appeal’s
powers under s.6(3) of the Act, which deals with appeals brought by convicted
persons, and which reads as follows:
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“On an appeal against a sentence, the court, if it is of the opinion that
some other sentence, whether more or less severe is warranted in law
and should have been passed, shall quash the-sentence and pass such other
sentence in substitution therefor, and in any other case shall dismiss the
appeal.”
The short point which seems to have been accepted by the Chief Justice
is thus if the deferment of sentence on the condition that the convicted person
enter into a recognizance is not a sentence against which the Attorney General
can appeal under s.5D then it is not a sentence for the purpose of s6(3) and
hence the power to defer sentence and order the convicted person to enter
into a recognizance is not among those possessed by the Court of Criminal
Appeal.
In an appeal where a sentenced prisoner seeks the intervention of the
Court of Criminal Appeal on the basis that at the court of sentence he might
reasonably have expected to have been given the beneﬁt of a recognizance,
and that the failure to do so was manifestly unjust, what means can the. Court
of Criminal Appeal now employ to give the effect of such an order? It is
submitted that the court could sentence an appellant to a period of time which
the appellant has already served in custody so that his or her immediate release
might be effected. There is one signiﬁcant and obviously disturbing omission
from such an order and that is that the speciﬁcation of a parole period is
eliminated. An order for a determinate term of imprisonment cannot, it would
seem, be conditioned upon the prisoner subjecting himself to certain conditions
which might prevail at the end of his sentence. The desirability of maintaining
supervision over people who have already served part of their sentence in
custody has been emphasised many times over in various courts. Since a court
cannot specify a non parole period of less than 6 months, consequently it may
' be with reluctance that the Court of Criminal Appeal will interfere with any
sentence which carries a non parole period of 6 months as to do so would
automatically withdraw that appellant from being subject to the provisions
of the Parole ofPrisoners Act.
The situation which apparently exists since Grifﬁths case is thus it is
submitted unsatisfactory. The restriction in the number of appeals by the
Crown may have been the desirable object of the decision in that case but it
seems that a laudable aim has in the ultimate produced a lamentable situation.
To restrict the Crown’s right of appeal to cases in which the sentencing judge
has imposed a gaol sentence or ﬁne, and to deny them the right to appeal in
cases where the sentencing judge has deferred passing sentence is illogical and
of little assistance to those charged with the responsibility of administering
' justice in the higher courts of this State. Moreover the decision in Grifﬁths
case has withdrawn from the Court of Criminal Appeal the power to grant
a recognizance in substitution for a gaol sentence in a case where the court
considers such a course appropriate. This unfortunate corollary of the decision
was not adverted to in any of the judgments in the High Court. By itself it
threatens to cause more hardship to prospective appellants to the Court of
Criminal Appeal than has been caused by the proliferation of appeals brought
by the Crown in recent years.
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It would appear that the most effective remedy available to the legislature
is to amend the Criminal AppealAct‘ by adding to the deﬁnition of “sentence”
in 5.2 of the Act the following:
“For the purposes of the Act ‘sentence’ includes any order deferring or
postponing sentence.”
Such an amendment would of course render the judgment of the High
Court in Grifﬁths case a matter of historical interest on this point, but it would
also return an element of rationality to the‘administration- of justice in the
Court of Criminal Appeal.
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DISCUSSION
Greg Smith, Commonwealth Crown Solicitor’s Ofﬁce, Prosecution Section.
Unfortunately due to the pressure of Commonwealth crime (and we are
winning that race at the moment) we have not had a chance to prepare a paper
but we thought of speaking about the problem of dealing with aliens in
Australia. I think it has been set out fairly clearly recently in the case of the two
“grannies” that there is a problem of dealing with people who commit serious
offences against Australian legislation as to how you treat them once they are
due for discharge. This matter is probably sub fudice at the moment because
the reasons for not granting non--parole are still not available The problem is
illustrated in a recent decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
of Regina v Pierre Alaine Riche reported at 17 ALR 227. Riche was a french
citizen who spent a lot of time in South East Asia and who brought into
Australia a large quantity of opium. At ﬁrst instance he pleaded guilty before
a magistrate and was subsequently sentenced by a District Court Judge to five
years imprisonment, without a minimum term being ﬁxed. He appealed and '
I think the Court of Criminal Appeal ﬁxed a 2% year non-parole period but
kept the head sentence as it was. The problem which the court did not solve
is how do you use the services of the Probation and Parole Service for aliens
once they are released?
I have not done any research on this but I understand that there is no
international convention that covers dealing with these people once they return
to their own countries. If that is the case I would suggest that the Australian
and the New South Wales governments and the other governments should be
urging the setting up of a convention similar to the Singles Convention relating
to drugs insofar as we can persuade governments of other countries to sign and
comply. We also have conventions for extradition, but we have gaps there too.
There is another problem that has been foreshadowed in Mr Byme’s
paper on Griffiths case of a situation where a Section 20 Commonwealth Crimes
Act recognizance is used in lieu of non-parole period. I think the case he was
adverting to was The Queen v Camgham reported 16 ALR [1977-78], which
is a Commonwealth case where a man brought in $% million worth of heroin
and was sentenced to 2% years imprisonment, but was ordered to be released
after 6 months pursuant to entering into a Commonwealth Crimes Act Section
20 recognizance. The Commonwealth’s Attorney-General appealed on the
ground that the sentence was inadequate. A problem arose when the matter
came before the Court of Criminal Appeal for hearing. On that occasion a
preliminary point was taken by Counsel for Carngham that in view of the
High Court’s decision in Grifﬁths case it was not available to the Crown to
appeal against inadequacy of sentence, because the Section 20 recognizance
order was not part of the sentence under the NSW. Criminal Appeal Act.
A majority of the Court accepted this point and so the appeal was dismissed.
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Mr Carngham had already been released at the time, but the Commonwealth
Crown made application for special leave to appeal in the High Court, which
application was heard several weeks ago and the Court reserved its decision
after two days argument.
The question remains whether Griffiths or Camgham’s case is right.
Those working in the ﬁeld of presecution under Commonwealth Law
have this problem in that they are using a pot-pourri of legislation to cover
the prosecution, punishment and treatment of Commonwealth offenders.
There appear to be contradictions between the various Commonwealth Acts,
the Judiciary Act, and the various Crimes Acts and Criminal Codes as to how
you deal with these people (i.e. Commonwealth offenders); whether weekend
detention is available; whether Section 20 is the same as a common law bond
or a Section 558 bond (1 submit that it is not because it is a separate offence
to breach Section 20). I believe there is a need, not only for an international
convention, but for a call from high sources in the judiciary in this State that
the Commonwealth set its own penal provisions and its own methods of
punishment so as to make it easier for the judges, the magistrates, the
prosecutors and last but, certainly not least, the counsel and solicitors advising
those accused of these crimes, to know the real answer. You cannot do it by
legislation, but perhaps a better effort could be made than has been done so
far.
J. Parnell, S.M.
I do not wish to seem to be detracting from Judge Roden’s paper, which
I think was the most signiﬁcant paper presented at this Institute and ought to
be universally adopted by sentencers, but on page 47 he raised the contents
of antecedent reports. My recollection is that adverse hearsay comments were
dealt with and outlawed by the Court of Criminal Appeal about 1959 inHitchock v The Crown (an unreported decision) although they seem to be
still accepted when given without objection as set out in Mottrz'ck in 1976,
another decision of our Court of Criminal Appeal.
As to these matters of acquittals and no bills, this is accredited
information and I suggest should be received on the basis that it represents
information within the knowledge of the offender and at the very least denies
an offender the opportunity of playing down the seriousness of his actions.
Furthermore dealing with both those aspects within the admissable parameters
of repute the sentencer ought to be aware of matters within the peculiar scope
of those who prepare antecedent reports. This has been instanced before this
Institute in the invaluable papers prepared in the past by Detectives King,
Morrison and Craig and I think it is expertise which ought not to be lost at
the sentencing stage. There is ample material in the use of normally admissible
factual matter by the use which is made of Markham/Osborne type similar
fact evidence and Section 420 evidence which is evidence of previous convictions
even to show propensity. This material is used to secure a conviction so that I
do not feel that the use of the material now questioned to assist in sentencing
after conviction ought to be forbidden.
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I would like to take up a matter which appears never to be touched
upon in these judicial seminars, and that is whether a slavish adherence to the
advocacy system throughout the entire criminal process is the ideal. Whilst I
do not advocate any modiﬁcation to the conviction process I do not see any
justiﬁcation for denying innovations in the sentencing process. Some years
ago in the Ch'minal Law Review the Swedish Criminal Court proceedings were
discussed. In relation to pleas of “guilty” these follow a process of confrontation
between their bench and the offender with the advocate adopting a passive
role until called upon. Such a procedure is only available now in childrens’
courts and with unrepresented offenders. It has in my view a valid and a valuable
use in all courts and ought to be tried.
His Honour Judge .A' Roden, Q. C.
It seems to me that confrontation between bench and accused is nothing
strange to the courts of New South Wales, but I might be using the term in a
different sense from John Parnell. I acknowledge in the paper with a reference
to something that Lord Goddard said some years ago that the process of fact
finding for sentencing purposes is not limited to a continuation of the adversary
procedure. The adversary procedure must be continued I believe for matters
which are circumstances surrounding the offence. You can have with an
! ambiguous verdict, or with a plea of the type that I mentioned “I admit the
offence but I do not admit all the facts alleged”, a dispute between a
prosecution witness and the accused as to what happened. On both versions
the accused is guilty. I think you need apply the adversary procedure in order
to determine that fact. When you want to find out things about the person
that you are about to sentence, then you give effect to that formal oath to
which I referred (and to which Lord Goddard referred): “You shall true answer
make to all such questions as the Court shall demand of you”. That is the
form we use at sentencing time, and that is because it is not a matter of giving
evidence in the adversary proceedings between the Crown and the accused.
The court does, in fact, demand all sorts of things of these people who give
information. In simple terms in answer to what was put to me: Yes it is a good
idea, but a great deal of that already goes on.
As far as the other matter that Mr Parnell mentioned is concerned I am
afraid I do not agree. I think that “No Bills” and acquittals are not a relevant
piece of information at all. I think that hearsay is something that should be
out of the window if it does not refer to an agreed fact. There was a rumour
some time ago that there was a gentleman sitting upon one of the benches in
New South Wales who had an arrangement with the police officer who sat in
the back of the court, and as he came to deal with each matter for sentence
there was a surreptitious “thumbs up” or “thumbs down”, and that obviated
the necessity for any “P. 16” report at all.
Rodney N. Purvis, Barrister, Member Advisory Committee, Institute of
Criminology.
The paper presented by Mr Briese was of particular interest especially
in the context of his having seen in operation in the United Kingdom,
Community Service Orders.
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There are two aspects of it that leave me with some reservations. Firstly,
is the sentencing of a person into the community and his being there compelled
to render some service a matter of selection on the part of a magistrate, or is
it a matter of work of a particular kind only being available?
Secondly, if there is a choice, is any thought given to rehabilitation in the
nature of the work that he might do?
C. R. Briese, S.M.
The procedure that is followed in England is as follows: when a person
is remanded for a pre-sentence report the Probation Officer who is preparing
the report will have in mind the question of a community service order for
appropriate offenders. If, in the enquiries that the Probation Officer makes,
he or she believes that the offender is a suitable person to perform community
service (not all people are eligible to perform community service, see page
91), the Probation Officer will normally consult with the community service
organiser who runs the scheme, and in England this person is usually a former
Probation Ofﬁcer. If he agrees with that assessment and is able to indicate
that suitable work is available a recommendation is then made to the Court
that the Court consider a community service order in that particular
case.
In the process of determining whether or not a person is a suitable
offender for community service it is proper for the Probation Officer to discuss
with the offender the question of him performing community service and
ascertain if he is agreeable. In all community service order schemes the consent
of the offender is essential. If the offender agrees to performing community
service the various types of work which are to be done and which are available
in the community will be indicated to him. Whether it be for an old age
pensioner, whether for a crippled children’s hospital and so on, and the offender
himself will be given an opportunity to indicate the particular job that he
considers that he would be better able to do, and which would be more useful
to him and the community. If he is given this opportunity, I believe that there
is the real possibility of the treatment element coming into this sanction for
some offenders, because these offenders go to work in ajob which they have
had some opportunity to choose for themselves. It will not always be agreed
that the work that they choose will be allowed to them, but if they have had
some opportunity to consider the work that they are doing and consent to
doing it, it is amazing how they can get involved in the work and in helping
other people even though they are not paid for it. To some extent they become
rehabilitated.
Rodney N. Purvis
I would like to put forward two suggestions.
The first relates to what was said by Mr Briese in his paper, and especially
at pages 96 and 97, where he outlines steps that might well be taken in New
South Wales if a scheme of community service orders is introduced. The
structure of the Committee there proposed would seem to be deficient in that
no representative of legal practitioners is included. Iwould have thought that
practitioners might well have a contribution to make in this field.
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The matter of appeal from magistrates is the other aspect upon which
I would like to make a suggestion. For some time the current position in the
United Kingdom consequent upon the introduction of new provisions of the
Criminal Law and the manner of. its administration, especially whereby an
appeal lies to a magistrate’s court of appeal, has commended itself to me. Such
a court is constituted by a Judge and two magistrates; the magistrates can
over-rule the Judge. This form of appeal is one that may provide an answer to
some of the criticisms that have been raised referable to the current form of
appeal in New South Wales.
Finally, might I make some comment upon the matters raised by Mr
Smith, especially as they relate to aliens who commit crimes in Australia and
are thence subject to the jurisdiction of our Courts and penal institutions.
The Australian Branch of The Internation Law Association has recently
promoted the setting up of an International Criminal Law Committee of the
Association. One of the matters on the Committee’s Agenda is consideration
of questions of international parole and probation, and the devising of a
convention dealing,inter alia, with a convicted person serving his sentence,
or a portion of his sentence, in the country from which he came. The matter
is presently very much the subject of consideration by the Committee of the
Association.
Chairman
One of the matters that has not been seriously discussed in regard to
these alternatives, such as community service orders, is the question of to what
extent should they be generally available in the sentencing ﬁeld. As I understand
it they only have a limited availability. You can only give a community service
order where you would give a sentence of no more than twelve months or two
years, and one wonders why when there is to be an alternative to imprisonment
there should be a barrier such as that; in other words, should not the type of
alternative be related to the individual more speciﬁcally than to the crime
that he commits? We all know that there are many situations where you feel
that certain persons committing serious crimes would respond and would be
effectively punished by this type of order but at the moment it is not possible
to do it. The thinking seems to be that once you get beyond twelve months or
two years gaol sentence, you forget about alternatives to imprisonment, and
you are faced with either imposing a sentence or granting a bond.
John P. McAvoy
'I was very interested to hear Mr Purvis question Mr Briese on the possible
rehabilitative content in a Community Service Order Scheme.
I was in England at the time that the English programme was started
and I remember that one of the most telling criticisms of the infant scheme
was from a left wing group known as Radical Alternatives to Prison, which
claimed that the Scheme was likely to become a “chain-gang” operation
emphasising the punitive element. During the ﬁrst two years of the scheme the
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criticism was silenced because, in most instances, work of a “rehabilitative”
nature was chosen for the offender, perhaps in response to R.A.P.’s criticism.
An example suggested by R.A.P. and taken up by at least one of the schemes
was work for a housing association providing accommodation for families in
straitened circumstances. The offender would be ordered to assist in the
conversion of a house into ﬂats. On a number of occasions a further positive
factor was introduced when an offender with long standing accommodation
difficulties was offered a flat on which he had been working. Efforts are
generally made in existing schemes to introduce tasks of a similarly rehabilitative
nature.
A problem likely to be encountered in New South Wales is the small
number of voluntary agencies in the State compared with other States and
countries with Community Service Order Schemes. The programmes in
California, for example, usually have at least 600 voluntary agencies on their
books, and act simply as referral agents, directing the offender to report to
one of these agencies for work and informing the court in the event of his
non-compliance. Some English schemes report that a number of offenders
continue to work with the voluntary agency after their sentence has expired.
One scheme claims that, in one year, as many as 40% of Community Service
offenders continued to work beyond expectations. I ﬁnd this number hard
to believe, but know personally that some offenders do this and have their
lives changed as a consequence.
Finally, I should like to comment on the Chairman’s reference to the
need for an alternative to longer periods of imprisonment. In California, the
measure is used mostly at the lower end of the range of possible sentences;
very often as an alternative to a fine, even a very small fine. Judges impose
orders in this way according to the current hourly wage; instead of imposing
a fine of, say $30.00, an order would be made for ten hours service where the
wage is $3.00 per hour. At the other end of the range, a sentence of 3,000/4,000
hours might be imposed for serious offences such as involuntary manslaughter,
where the court feels that imprisonment is inappropriate. In England 240 hours
is the maximum, and this is imposed only for serious offences. In both California
and England, the effectiveness of long periods of community service is being
questioned.
J. Parnell, S.M.
One aspect of sentencing in the lower courts which is highlighted by the
ﬁgures in Mr Webb’s paper is that lower courts deal extensively with recidivists
in minor issues. These are people who never appear in the superior courts where
in view of the serious nature of the offences large scale recidivism is just not
possible. It is these minor matters which cause the problems. Sentencers ought
to go about their task within the framework provided by parliament, is cases
of unacceptable harm the parliament of New South Wales has sought to ensure
that criminal actions do not occur by prohibition with appropriate sanctions
in the case of unacceptable harm. A system of licencing is not involved with
unacceptable harm.
Criticism is often made of lower courts for introducing a licensing
system to unacceptable areas by the use of tariffs in non-tariff areas. One area
recently referred to in the press was prostitution, others concerned were various
lists in lower courts, motor traffic, corporate affairs which has been referred
to, taxation, main road, etc. Dealing with the first there have been queries as to
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why more severe sentences including imprisonment are not used in the case
of recidivists in an attempt to ensure that some offences at least'do not recur
and thereby further the primary object of the government.
K. R. Webb, SM.
The only comment I could make would be that there are a number of
instances where a maximum penalty is ﬁxed by the legislature, and, of course,
on the principles that we are not expected to impose maximum penalties except
in the worst possible case of the worst possible nature that one could envisage,
the maximum penalty would seldom be availed of in practice. I think in answer
to the prostitution question, it is unlikely to be discouraged by the maximum
penalty provided by the legislature. In any case one would have towait a
long time to get a prostitute whom one felt was committing the mostserious
offence of soliciting that could possibly be imagined, and that is why we
probably fall short of imposing maximum sentences. The legislature allows a
sentence of three months for soliciting or a fine of $400.00 and Iwonder if
it would assist in any way to deter the prostitutes convicted by sentencing them
to three months or whether it would act as a deterrent to prospective
prostitutes.
His Honour Judge J. S. Cn'pps, Q.C.
I am a newcomer to the District Court Bench, and before I went there
I did not have a great experience in the Criminal Law. It has been very apparent
to me that in the sentencing process, that is that portion of the court activity
that starts after the accused has been convicted and up until he is sentenced,
almost no attention is paid to hearing the views of the victim. By that I am
not referring to hearing the views of victims who may insist upon very heavy
penalties being imposed, although I understand in the United States that it is
not uncommon to be a factor to be taken into account. Ican perhaps illustrate
' what I think is a difficulty by a case I was presiding over this week. Two young
men were charged with and pleaded guilty to assault in a public lavatory, they
were both represented, and the Crown presented the indictment. They accepted
the plea. They both claimed that the person who was the victim of the assault
had, in fact, made homosexual advances to them and as a result of that they
were so outraged that they struck him and kicked him when he was down.
I expressed the view that it seemed to be a little outrageous that this man
whose name could appear in the newspaper, that is the victim, had nobody
looking after his interests. Ultimately, as a result perhaps of non-judicial
persuasion, I said I was going to take no notice of that being said unless the
two accused were prepared to say so on oath and the man who was alleged to
have done this was given the opportunity to be heard. After some adjournment
that occurred, and I had no doubt in my mind that these allegations were
wholly unfounded and were mere excuses to justify what could not otherwise
be explained.
This merely illustrates that when‘the sentencing process is under way
nobody in this system so far as I have noticed, pays a great deal of attention to
the victim. The system seems to be that legal aid gives a certain amount of
help to the accused. The Crown seems to adopt the view that there is something
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not distasteful but a little improper in making any submissions or buying into
this argument, taking the view that they should represent an alooﬂy impartial
State. Somebody should be looking after the interest of the victims when there
are allegations of this sort made which could be published in the newspapers
and could be wholly damaging and yet were quite unfounded.
His Honour Judge A. Roden, Q. C.
I happened to be in the other court at Penrith when my young brother
Cripps had this problem. It is the sort of thing that I had in mind when I referred
in the paper to the desirability of having evidence on these matters. Iwould
not take any notice whatsoever of any barrister or solicitor who from the
Bar table told me that he was instructed that his client had been the object
of homosexual advances made by a prosecution witness. I might have said
“I find that very interesting?’, but it is not a matter that one can take into
consideration. If a Judge has to exercise his discretion in the matter of sentence,
or in any other matter, I maintain he must do it on either a true and correct
version of the facts, or an incorrect version of the facts to which he has been
misled by evidence which was untrue because someone committed perjury.
There is no offence involved so far as I know in an accused person giving his
solicitor or counsel false instructions, and there is nothing unethical in that
solicitor or counsel conveying them to the Judge provided he tells the truth
when he says: “I am instructed that...” So there is absolutely no sanction.
I do not know that I would go so far as agreeing that there should be
some protection' for the victims of the crime in the sense that Judge Cripps
has suggested. With witnesses in any trial, or even with persons who may not be
called as witnesses, things may be said about them that are not very pleasant,
and you cannot have all such people represented. It is one of the hazards of
being a citizen and having the courts of the type that we have that are open
and where what is said is privileged. But, certainly, so far as ascertaining facts
is concerned I think that this practice of instructions from the Bar table ought
to be completely done away with and treated as being of no value whatsoever.
So far as facts as close to the offence itself as the facts to which Judge Cripps
referred are concerned, it is the duty of the prosecution to be ready to call
evidence to meet any allegation which is not admitted. I would have no doubt
had his trial gone on on a plea of “not guilty” that the victim would have been
the ﬁrst Crown witness, and under cross examination would have denied the
allegations that were later put. I see no reason why if those allegations are to
be put by the defence on sentence the Crown should not be there to meet them.
This also ties in with something else that I have suggested - and that is
that where you know there is going to be a plea, or where there is an adjourned
hearing after conviction for the purpose of sentence, there should be an
exchange of information between the Crown and defence so that they will
know what matters they wish to raise and are admitted so that they will not
need evidence, and they will also know which are contested so that they know
they do need evidence. I would certainly include among the matters that should
be made available any pre-sentence report even if it is obtained on the direction
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of the judge or magistrate, as it usually is. It always seems to be quite absurd
that counsel, if he has a nice Probation Ofﬁcer, is given the report ﬁve minutes
before the court sits, otherwise only when the officer is already in the witness
box. He should be in a position to say that he does not want the judge to see it;
because it will invariably contain hearsay material, and if it is disputed then
again it should be a matter for evidence by the people who are able to give
direct evidence.
Les Calvitto, Solicitor
I look to the bulk of crimes, those payable by ﬁnes, and I would like to
link two facts and come to a conclusion.
The ﬁrst fact is that over 50% of receptions into custody are ﬁne
defaulters, and secondly it has been announced, but not yet proclaimed, that
people can work off the rate per day (if that were increased to $25.00 per
day). I therefore come to this conclusion. If it is the Bench’s intent that it
should be difﬁcult for people to buy their way out and impose what I consider
as a heavy ﬁne, say $300.00, are we therefore going to see ﬁnes in excess of
$1,000.00?
Joscelyne Scutt, Lawyer
If one can believe anything that one reads in the newspapers particularly
in “Letters to the Editor” it appears that the public is currently concerned
with disparities in sentencing in our courts. Therefore, I would like to address
my remarks and questions to Judge Roden and to Mr Webb.
I would be very interested to know do magistrates and judges get together
and discuss the sorts of cases that have come before them, and the sorts of
sentences that they have given and go through the rationale for this decision.
The particular disparities that have been noted just to cite a couple of
speciﬁc cases, one of a drug offence where persons it would have seemed would
,have got the lighter sentence receive the heavier sentence, another was a case of
infanticide, and the third case was instances of murder where one person
received a bond and the other person received life imprisonment in apparently
seemingly similar circumstances.
K. R. Webb, S.M.
Magistrates have been conducting sentencing seminars for a number of
years now, and they do discuss these problems of disparity in sentence.
Sentences have also‘been made the subject of an outside study in this State
through the system that we saw on the video tape. Dr Francis and Dr Coyle
in their study came to the conclusion that there may be isolated matters but
basically there is no real disparity shown in sentences in the magistrates’ courts,
and at our own sentencing seminars we have reached the same conclusion.
Obviously there will be disparity when you are talking about ﬁning
different people for the same offence. There is no way of avoiding it. Magistrates
work within the limit of the statute under which the offence occurs, and in
most cases it provides a very short term of imprisonment or a very nominal
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sort of ﬁne in this day and age. We are getting some different situations with
the new pollution laws, but basically the top ﬁnes have been in the order of
$400.00. When you consider the type of offences that people can be found to
be guilty of such as negligent driving, it is not surprising that in some courts
a class of negligent driving is penalized by a fine of $400.00 and in other courts
a different class of negligent driving by a fine of $50.00 or perhaps even less.
The facts are usually not sufficiently reported. I think that a reference to my
paper probably answers the whole aspect so far as the magistrates courts are
concerned.
His Honour Judge A. Roden, Q. C.
Let us assume for a moment that all judges who have jurisdiction with
regard to murderers, drug importers or whoever they may be that you are
concerned with, had a meeting or a series of meetings at which they put forward
their obviously, from what you referred to, “different opinions”. Do you want
a vote to be taken and all judges to be bound by the majority decision? Do you
expect some magic to be worked like the old mango tree justice - in consequence
of talking we will all come to the same point of view? If you want the first of
those things you will not get it so long as our judges as individuals are as
independent as they presently are, and if you want the second then you will
need some magic to bring it about.
The only way you are going to get rigidly standardised sentencing is by
having ﬁxed penalties for every offence. I do not think that is a very good idea,
and I do not think other people would think so either. Inevitably, if you were
now to ask this group of people: “Which do you think was the more sensible
sentence, the one the “grannies” got in New South Wales or the one the airman
got in the Northern Territory?” You are going to find that some will say one
and others will say the other. If you have that difference of opinion amongst
this group of people you are going to have the same difference of opinion among
judges. There is no way you will remove that unless you have an enforced
standardization by a rigid scheme from which you remove the area of discretion.
Once you have that, then you have a situation in which no regard is given
to the peculiar circumstances of each case, although almost every case has its
peculiar circumstances. As I say in the paper, if you are passing human judgment
on human conduct you are going to get vastly differing opinions, and if you
want something that represents “the society” then you are going to get
something that will reﬂect that variety of opinion that exists within that society.
Judges do discuss sentences, usually judges of like mind get together to discuss
the sentences of those with whom they do not agree. There are occasions, there
has been one in the time that I have been on the District Court Bench, when
there has been a meeting of judges of that level from all States, and sentencing
was one of the matters that was discussed. We probably all benefited from
hearing other points of view, but I do not know that any of us changed our
points of view very much. You start with a piece of legislation that prescribes
a maximum and, in the odd case, a minimum penalty, you have discretion
within that area, you have an appellate tribunal that lays down principles that
you feel obliged to follow when you cannot find a way of distinguishing the
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particular case, but within those limitations you exercise your discretion. If ,
you get bad decisions, as you inevitably will, it is because you have bad judges,
as you inevitably will, but unless you take it out of the hands of human beings
it is going to continue to be like that I am afraid.
Joscelyne Sam
I think that one does ﬁrst of all sympathise with the judge who does have
to make his or her decisions in a vacuum. Secondly, I think that one does not
have to go quite so far as saying there must be rigid sentences set, or that we
must go beyond human beings to ﬁnd the answers to setting penalties in criminal
cases. I think a productive idea might be to try to formulate some sort of
guidelines which, I shall admit, are general but that may give judges an indication
as to the kind of penalties that might be appropriate in particular cases. If we
do have bad judges then by requiring them to meet together and to think
speciﬁcally about what they .are doing in a communal situation, it might lead
to them becoming less bad judges.
Greg Smith, Commonwealth Crown Solicitor’s Ofﬁce
Parliament decided that cannabis is like a pop gun compared to hashish
being like a sub-machine gun, and allotted a ten year maximum sentence for
cannabis and twenty ﬁve years for cannabis resin. He was facing ten years and
got six and a half. The “grannies” had hashish, they were facing twenty ﬁve
years, but were sentenced to fourteen years, and so comparatively they received
about the same sentence.
L. Taylor, Lawyer
In relation to what has been said about disparity of sentences, perhaps I
should outline the history of the case referred to earlier, Carngham’s case, and
point out that in that case, in fact, there was no disparity, but the reasons for
the result might be questioned. The situation was that two Carnghams, father
and son, were party to the importation of 900 grammes of heroin into Australia.
The father pleaded “guilty” and came up for sentence before one judge who
took the view that the father was not the principal offender, and sentenced
him to what, in effect, turned out to be six months imprisonment. The son
later came before a differentjudge who took the opposite view, namely that the
son was not the principal offender but the father was, so he sentenced the son
to what was, in effect, six months term of imprisonment making particular
reference to the sentence imposed on the father. The result was that 900
grammes of heroin entered this country, each of the persons involved (and no
other person was involved) received six months imprisonment, so a total of
one years imprisonment was served. It would suggest there is no disparity of
sentence but the result was arrived at because of one of the problems alluded
to earlier, namely that on the evidence put before him each judge took a
different view. I make two suggestions: ﬁrstly each offender should have come
before the one judge and secondly, there should have been a closer examination
of the evidence following the griilty pleas.
One other problem that I would like to refer to is something which
concerns those of us who practise at the Court of Petty Sessions (119 Phillip
Street). We do a great deal of social services prosecutions in which people
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are prosecuted for making false statements on forms submitted to the
department, and I think most people would agree that, in such circumstances,
a term of imprisonment is not the appropriate penalty. A term of imprisonment
may be imposed up to a period of six months but this is quite rare. The other
alternative is the fine and this is the alternative that is used most often. The
problem with this, of course, is that a great number of these offenders are
receiving social services benefits. Their only source of finance are benefits from
the Department of Social Security, so in fact the money goes around in circles
at a great cost to the taxpayer and to the country generally. It seems obvious
that some alternative sanction should be found in this situation.
John Dobes, Solicitor
It appears to me it is inefficient (if not putting the cart before the horse)
to make submissions in relation to sentencing because I can walk into a
magistrate’s court and I do not know what information he is looking to see,
I do not know whether he would prefer it in the form of a written reference
or would want me to actually call a witness in support of my instructions.
I do not know whether it makes a difference to him if the offender is wearing
a tie, or has had a haircut recently. There are no guidelines put out to the
profession about the sort of information that is relevant, you learn it by
experience.
K. R. Webb, SM.
\
I do not think our friend should be too upset. Fortunately he is appearing
for people apparently in a non-custody situation. Magistrates are required to
deal with people in custody situations in a great number of cases. We have
them appearing in nothing more than a G-string on occasions as far as the
males are concerned, and we have females who appear in dresses that are
apparently very easily removed and they will, if they think it is going to attract
attention, remove them. I do not feel that there would be magistrates who
would take exception to the way an individual decided he was going to follow
the current fashions. People are not dealt with on their appearance, except
perhaps those poor unfortunate individuals who come before the court that
the Salvation Army and others try to assist where magistrates deﬁnitely do look
at them and know that the only answer is to provide them with some help.
We are dealing with people and we deal with people as we find them. It
is not going to mesmerize a magistrate for long to have a young man before
him, as we saw on the video tape, who was capable of changing his physical
appearance overnight. Most of us have had enough experience with people to
be able to see through that sort of veneer fairly quickly. If you present your
client the way he appears in the community, he will receive as much
consideration for his appearance so far as the penalty for the offence that he
is appearing for is concerned as he would if represented completely out of
character.
Unless the case hinges greatly around the character of your client I would
suggest that a written reference would be accepted. Character is peculiar to
certain types of pleas when it may be well worthwhile to bring someone along
to give evidence on oath.
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